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Schools face a great challenge in recruiting and retaining quality teachers, given the 
documented importance of, variability in, and difficulty observing and predicting teacher quality. 
One option schools have is to identify what more effective teachers do and use that information 
to train less effective teachers to get better. Unfortunately, there is little empirical support for 
much traditional teacher training, as measured by gains in student test scores. Models of 
collaborative, team-based learning – such as Professional Learning Communities and Japanese 
lesson study – have been widely touted, and there is some evidence that they may be effective in 
certain contexts. Economic theory suggests this could be because of peer monitoring, peer 
pressure, specialization, knowledge-sharing, or market failure in pre-service training, particularly 
if learning to teach is primarily experiential. However, not all collaboration is good due to 
concerns about free-riding and substituting for more productive individual activity, so unbridled 
enthusiasm for collaborative professional development may need to be tempered.  
This dissertation examines the effectiveness of a specific form of teacher collaboration in 
the form of inquiry teams, groups of teachers and administrators jointly engaged in action 
research projects with the aim of uncovering innovative instructional strategies and sharing 
effective approaches. It takes advantage of the phase-in of teams, eventually to all teachers in a 
large, urban school district in the northeastern United States from 2007-2010 to estimate the 
results of three natural experiments using difference-in-differences and instrumental variables 




scores are small and sensitive to year, specification, and outcome, although results are mostly 
positive and occasionally statistically significant, suggesting that overall effects are potentially 
positive but modest at best. Further examination of heterogeneity and four qualitative case 
studies of teams suggest that small average effects mask considerable differences in team 
processes, and that under certain conditions, inquiry team work may be far more effective. A cost 
analysis reveals that, although it is costly to do inquiry work well, given the low-intensity of 
average treatment and the large number of students affected, the benefits of inquiry work could 
exceed the costs if the policy were more targeted. Overall, the policy recommendation is to 
temper unqualified enthusiasm about teacher collaboration, as without appropriate structures and 
supports it has little measurable effect on the outcomes examined here. As a policy lever, a 
universal mandate to participate on collaborative inquiry teams is unlikely to be effective or pass 
a cost-benefit test. Nonetheless, smaller-scale, higher intensity forms of collaboration that allow 
for more active leadership support and participation may be more promising, and more cost-
effective than alternative forms of professional development, particularly for some sub-groups of 
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Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 
It has become a mantra among educational policymakers that the quality of individual 
teachers is the single most important in-school determinant of educational outcomes and further 
that teachers vary substantially in their abilities to increase student learning; significant research 
findings support this view (Rockoff, 2004). Nevertheless, very few observable characteristics of 
individuals entering the teaching profession have significant power to predict a teacher’s future 
effectiveness (Kane, Rockoff & Staiger, 2008; Goldhaber & Anthony, 2004; Palardy & 
Rumberger, 2008). This information gap places significant burden on schools to be able to 
identify more and less effective teachers and find ways to help less effective teachers improve, or 
to replace them with more effective teachers. 
Policies to increase teacher effectiveness fall broadly into three categories. The 
hypothesized effectiveness of policies under each category will depend, in part, on underlying 
beliefs about the nature of the education production function. Critically, the most effective 
policies will depend on whether the optimal mix of educational inputs and processes are fixed, in 
which case teachers must adapt to optimize student learning, or whether they are variable based 
on school, teacher, and even individual student-level factors. One school of thought makes 
relatively few assumptions about the nature of educational production and argues that teachers 
themselves are best poised to uncover the most productive processes and inputs for maximizing 
student learning, which may vary considerably based on context. Therefore, these policies aim to 
maximize teacher effectiveness by providing incentives for teachers to uncover the most 
productive educational techniques, adapted to their own areas of expertise and the unique 
learning needs of their students, on their own. This is achieved by better measuring their 




performance, through some combination of incentive pay, heightened standards for achieving 
tenure protections, and/or increased risk of performance-based dismissal. A second school of 
thought holds that recruitment of quality teachers is not a problem, but that retention of high-
quality teachers is problematic because of better labor market alternatives for the most effective 
teachers. Working conditions or compensating differentials play a critical role for this 
mechanism, as those who leave teaching often report poor working conditions as a more 
important reason than low salary. Further, working conditions tend to be worst in schools that 
serve the students with greatest needs, exacerbating inequities in access to quality teachers 
(Lankford, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2002). Policies in this category aim to improve retention of 
teachers, particularly of the highest-quality teachers in the highest-need schools, by improving 
working conditions and better compensating for poor working conditions. A final set of policies 
aims to directly increase the quantity of or improve the quality of inputs to the educational 
production function to increase teacher effectiveness, most commonly by raising human capital 
through in-service training. 
Variations on incentive policies based on value-added measures are now being tested in 
several jurisdictions, in part in response to Race to the Top grants that encouraged such 
experimentation, but their long-term effects on student learning and teacher recruitment and 
retention are still unknown. Traditionally, professional development or in-service training was 
the most common policy to increase teacher performance. Nonetheless, very few of the 
professional development programs that have been subject to rigorous evaluation have shown 
evidence of effectiveness in improving student learning outcomes. A number of investigations of 
teacher attitudes on professional development reveal that teachers often view their training as 




2004; Garet et al., 2008; Garet et al., 2010; Darling-Hammond and Richardson, 2009). Despite 
these limitations, educational practitioners and policymakers remain committed to professional 
development; estimates of the costs of professional development in the United States range from 
3.3 to 5.7 percent of total educational expenditures1 of $632 billion in 20112, or $20 to $36 
billion annually. 
Several school districts and teacher preparation programs have adopted models of 
ongoing teacher training based on structured collaboration. Notable among these examples is the 
nation of Finland, which is widely lauded for its performance in international assessments (Sabel 
et al., 2010). These models, which in many instances emphasize classroom-based action 
research, data analysis, and adaptation of instructional services to the unique needs of the 
students served, may address several of the inadequacies identified in traditional professional 
development. Teacher collaboration could lead to enhanced or more efficient curriculum 
development through joint production of instructional plans and materials, school improvement 
through better sharing of information among front-line workers and increased teacher leadership, 
and teacher professional development through knowledge sharing, learning from colleagues’ 
experience, or peer pressure (Y. Goddard, R. Goddard, & Tschannen-Moran, 2007). Further, 
given the resources currently invested in in-service teacher training, increasing teacher 
collaboration may be a comparatively cost-effective method of increasing teacher effectiveness.  
However, as previous literature on workplace collaboration reveals, not all collaboration 
is meaningful or fruitful. Productive collaboration must therefore be disentangled from activities 
that distract from or even actively impede instructional improvement. Research from 
organizational theory on team-based problem-solving, learning, and production, associated with 






the Japanese concept of kaizen, could help improve professional development (Dyer and 
Nobeoka, 1998), especially given that there is some evidence for positive teacher peer effects, 
meaning that having more effective colleagues tends to make teachers more effective (Jackson & 
Bruegmann, 2009). Evidence of persistent improvement as a result of qualitative evaluation and 
feedback suggests that some combination of context-specific information and peer pressure can 
lead to improvements in teacher effectiveness (Taylor and Tyler, 2012). In sum, the current 
research and policy consensus seems to be that teachers are extremely important, but we do not 
know with great confidence how to help teachers get better, and broadly speaking, current efforts 
are not working very well despite enormous expense. There are some indications that increasing 
the quantity of and improving the quality of collaboration could alleviate some of these concerns, 
and growing enthusiasm for teacher collaboration as a vehicle for school improvement, but 
relatively little causal research on the effects of any particular collaboration policy. 
THE INTERVENTION 
 This study examines a policy intervention mandating teacher participation on inquiry 
teams, a particular form of teacher collaboration focused on action research, problem-solving, 
team learning, and organizational learning.3 The intervention took place in a large, urban school 
district in the northeastern United States primarily between 2007 and 2012. Since then, although 
some schools still have inquiry teams and teachers still engage in many forms of collaboration, 
the emphasis at the district office has shifted to implementation of the Common Core learning 
standards and a new teacher evaluation system. Although there were tweaks to the process over 
the ensuing years, the basic notion of inquiry teams remained the same; as described by the 
school district, inquiry teams are groups of teachers engaged in structured work focused on 
                                                            




analyzing the learning needs of small groups of students using a rigorous approach based in data. 
The inquiry team initiative was designed to identify and develop innovative, research-based 
instructional approaches with the aim of immediate, small-scale instructional improvement that 
would lead to wider organizational learning and change. 
Inquiry teams were, by design, both structured and flexible. There were relatively few 
parameters surrounding who could be on a team or what a team could focus on, beyond the 
requirement in early years that teams selected a small subgroup of approximately ten to fifteen 
students and a narrowly defined skill to help them focus their work. Teams varied considerably 
in size, composition, and focus, but fell broadly into three categories: teams that focused on 
students in a particular grade level, teams that focused on a particular subject area, and teams that 
focused on a specific, high-needs subgroup such as English language learners or students with 
disabilities. Inquiry was defined as an iterative cycle, as shown in Figure 1, whereby a team used 
data and root cause analysis to identify and uncover underlying causes of learning breakdowns, 
sought instructional changes that could address this cause, developed precise assessment 
instruments to monitor progress toward measurable learning goals, and spread successful 





FIGURE 1. DIAGRAM OF INQUIRY TEAM PROCESS 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from descriptions of inquiry team process by sponsoring school 
district. 
At the district level, the inquiry team policy consisted of a phased mandate over three 
years that ultimately all teachers would participate on at least one team. During the first year, 
2007-2008, each school was required to assemble one pilot team. Principals were expected to be 
members of the team, although they did not always participate in practice, and recruited teachers 
and other staff to join the team via a job posting. Teachers who applied and were selected often 
expressed an interest in using data and learning more about how data could inform instruction 
(Talbert, 2011). Therefore, teams in the first year exhibited two types of selection – teachers self-




During subsequent years, schools were required to have multiple inquiry teams, with the goal of 
90% of teachers participating by the 2009-2010 school year. One of the ultimate goals of the 
policy was to integrate inquiry into the “fabric of the school,” fundamentally changing 
professional development, teacher meetings, and teacher leadership to shift the focus to the 
unique needs of the school and the students it serves, rooted in data (CPRE, 2008). The risks of 
selection bias therefore declined over time, as ultimately nearly all teachers were required to 
participate on teams. 
The goals of the policy were essentially threefold: to improve learning outcomes of the 
teachers’ current students, to improve instruction for all students by improving teachers’ human 
capital in the classroom, and to increase organizational effectiveness by developing teacher 
leadership and providing structured avenues for knowledge-sharing and organizational learning. 
To help achieve these goals, the district provided substantial training, support, and resources in 
the first year, which declined as the initiative spread and in the face of budget constraints. 
Schools were required to designate a teacher or school leader as a Data Specialist, to receive 
additional training in the district’s data and accountability systems, including the inquiry team 
initiative. Principals also received training from district leadership and were expected to share 
what they learned with their staffs. The district provided schools with additional funding for 
teacher overtime to support after- or before-school meetings and laptops for teachers to use to 
facilitate data analysis. Finally, senior district leaders, often experienced former principals, were 
designated Senior Achievement Facilitators (SAFs) and provided hands-on coaching to schools 
on various data and accountability systems, including inquiry teams. SAFs attended some inquiry 
team meetings at most schools, provided feedback on the process, answered questions from the 




move along in the process. Several teams reported the support of SAFs as critical in the 
perceived success of the initiative (CPRE, 2008). 
Textual analysis of the data teams reported on their activities from a sub-sample of teams, 
described in greater detail in Chapter 6, provides some descriptive trends on how teams 
organized themselves, what actions they undertook, potential issues of selection bias in team 
composition, and the obstacles even relatively strong teams faced that may have limited the 
overall success of the policy. For each of the three years under study, about half of all teams 
focused on a single grade level, with the other half focused on a subject area or demographic 
sub-group of students across multiple grades. The large majority – 59% of teams in 2007-2008, 
72% in 2008-2009, and 62% in 2009-2010 – focused on English language arts (ELA) as a 
subject area.  
In the first year, teams described team composition and the process by which teams were 
selected, which often entailed a combination of teachers volunteering and principals recruiting 
team members. Many teams included a number of non-teacher members, such as administrators, 
counselors, and other professionals, in addition to classroom teachers and specialists in special 
education and English as a Second Language (ESL). One possible mechanism by which team 
participation can enhance teacher and school effectiveness is by specialized professionals sharing 
expertise through the team. Teams mentioned experience with data analysis and the school 
district’s data and accountability technology systems as criteria for team participation. 
Several teams identified a subgroup of students within a subject and within or across 
grade levels that exhibited persistently low or declining performance on a state assessment in 
math or ELA. Teams then administered follow-up assessments to more precisely diagnose 




first graders, making inferences among third graders, vocabulary among middle school students, 
and writing and algebra among high school students. Teams reported using several strategies, 
including creating portfolios of written work, administering supplemental instruction through 
small-group tutoring for targeted students, and testing new curricula and materials, to address 
these learning needs. With some exceptions, including a team that successfully addressed 
communication skills among students with autism, teams struggled with pacing and follow-up, as 
they spent much of the year diagnosing student learning needs, leaving little time to experiment 
with potential solutions. Some teams explicitly noted challenges in determining how to proceed 
from the diagnostic stage, either because the learning needs of their targeted subgroup of 
students were too broad and diverse, or because they lacked time and resources to do so. The 
program grew out of a school-leader training program developed by Baruch College and New 
Visions for Public Schools known as the Structured Apprenticeship Model (Talbert, 2011). The 
initiative shares some common features with two other well-known examples of structured 
teacher collaboration, professional learning communities (PLCs) and Japanese lesson study. In 
particular, the central idea of PLCs is that learning about teaching is fundamentally experiential 
and best transmitted through a structured process involving others with shared experience 
(Buysse, Sparkman & Wesley, 2003). Inquiry teams lie between PLCs and Japanese lesson study 
on a continuum of how structured and prescriptive the collaborative process is; like lesson study, 
inquiry teams are encouraged to follow protocols and keep their work tightly focused, but there 
is more room for experimentation and choice in terms of what that focus will be, along the lines 
of PLCs. 
The intervention was part of a larger package of reforms, the central philosophy of which 




greater authority over budgets, hiring and staffing decisions, curriculum, and professional 
development, but were expected to strategically use their authority to achieve student learning 
targets as measured by growth on standardized tests. Schools that consistently failed to 
demonstrate growth in student learning were subject to sanction, up to and including closure, and 
schools that consistently showed outstanding growth received financial rewards for the principal 
and, in some cases, the teachers. District leaders saw inquiry as a critical tool for building teacher 
and school capacity to make use of their greater autonomy to close learning gaps. Operating 
under the theory that traditional professional development was too general and decontextualized 
to be effective at increasing teacher productivity or student learning, the district envisioned 
inquiry as a tool to help teachers make use of new data and accountability tools and shift their 
focus to individualized learning needs of students. The inquiry team initiative was one effort by 
the central office to promote capacity building and knowledge sharing from within to help 
schools accelerate student learning. 
There is some extant literature on the inquiry team initiative. The Consortium for Policy 
Research in Education (CPRE) at Teachers College, Columbia University engaged in two 
implementation studies (CPRE 2008 & 2010) in conjunction with the school district. They found 
that inquiry teams in the first year generally implemented with fidelity, following the model laid 
out by the school district. Team members reported appreciation for the level of support provided, 
including funding for team meetings after school and training by SAFs. The variable seemingly 
most related to implementation quality was the role of the principal; teams where the principal 
played an active, but not overly prescriptive role were more effective overall than teams where 
the principal was either uninvolved or too directive. Despite early successes, teams did struggle 




and very focused instructional skill, leaving little time to experiment with multiple cycles of 
instructional strategies and assessments. Teams also reported wanting more time and support for 
teamwork.  
A follow-up analysis in 2010 reinforced the critical, yet difficult to balance, role of the 
principal and the need for protected time. As the initiative spread throughout the school, the 
report notes some shift in focus away from using inquiry as a tool to directly impact student 
achievement through instructional innovation and toward using inquiry as a teacher development 
tool to build capacity in analyzing data and differentiating instruction. The report also notes the 
integration of inquiry into other work, including the school’s general improvement goals and pre-
existing team structures such as grade-level and subject-area department meetings. 
More recent inquiry work, in the same district but studying the intervention at a later time 
period with fewer prescriptive mandates from the central office, has uncovered more divergent 
findings. Talbert and Panero (2013) expanded upon Talbert’s account of the history of inquiry 
teams, discussing several cases of successful teams that, through disciplined research on 
narrowly focused instructional skills, identified gaps in the writing curriculum as a root cause of 
student skill deficiencies. In contrast, Chu et al. (2012), in a study in which the qualitative data 
for the case studies in this dissertation were collected by a research team including me, found 
that teams no longer maintained focus  on focused skill gaps among sub-groups of students. 
Instead, they aimed for general teacher capacity building, particularly in light of the 
implementation of the Common Core standards and a new teacher evaluation system. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study seeks to expand what is known about teacher collaboration and teacher 




another and the factors that are associated with relatively more or less productive collaboration in 
one context using three empirical approaches. The data for the three approaches are drawn from 
the same district, intervention, and general population of teachers, but different years and 
different samples of teachers, so results across questions reflect in part evolution of the 
intervention over time. Although the three empirical analyses are separate, they logically connect 
in an explanatory sequential, mixed methods design (Creswell & Clark, 2011, p. 81-90), in 
which qualitative methods follow quantitative analyses to provide context and possible 
explanations for patterns of results. 
This study utilizes the phased nature of the policy mandate to participate on inquiry teams 
estimate the effect of team participation on teacher retention, student learning, and teacher value-
added in a series of difference-in-difference estimates to address concerns about selection of 
teachers onto teams. The quasi-experimental approach, combined with the use of administrative 
data in which teams reported their activities, as opposed to self-reported survey data on 
collaboration as has commonly been used in prior literature, represents a significant contribution. 
More importantly, however, this study provides a framework for considering the substantial 
measurement issues that arise when assessing teacher collaboration, which are difficult to 
capture and display significant heterogeneity across teachers, teams, and schools. While the 
small amount of signal relative to noise in the data may be a concern in evaluating the underlying 
value of teacher collaboration as a concept, in the case of a policy mandating collaboration, 
effects that are obscured by significant heterogeneity and weak implementation represents a 
significant finding. Whether or not to collaborate is a manipulable policy lever, whereas the 
quality, intensity, and authenticity of that collaboration is not and may require improved 




This dissertation therefore contributes to the literature on teacher effectiveness, teacher 
labor markets, and teacher training and collaboration by answering three broad research 
questions:  
• Does mandating collaboration through participation on an inquiry team improve teacher 
effectiveness as measured by value-added scores, teacher retention, and student 
achievement?  I will also examine whether goal setting, leadership involvement, and use 
of particular types of data predict heterogeneity in the effectiveness of teams. 
• Through what processes do teams of teachers engage in collaborative inquiry? What team 
and teacher-level conditions are associated with indicators of teacher learning, such as 
evidence of changing attitudes, dispositions, or practice?  
• What are the costs inquiry teams, and how do the costs compare to the estimated benefits 
of teams, measured in monetary terms? 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
ECONOMIC MODEL 
The basic economic concept underlying this study is the notion of an educational 
production function, which formalizes the relationship between educational inputs, such as prior 
student achievement, school characteristics, and teacher characteristics, and various outputs, 
most commonly student achievement as measured by standardized test scores. This dissertation 
deviates from common formulations of educational production in an important respect – rather 
than including teacher education and experience as proxies for human capital, the teacher human 
capital function over two periods is explicitly modeled to take into account ongoing training and 
interaction with colleagues as important determinants of the returns to experience. Therefore, 





(1) !"#$% = '(!")#$,%)+, !)"#$%, ,"#$%, ,)"#$%, -$%, .#$%), 
where !"#$% refers to a student learning outcome, which could include test scores as well as other 
important outcomes, !")#$,%)+ is prior achievement for student i in the class of teacher j ≠ j, 
!)"#$% are peer effects, ,"#$%	and ,)"#$% are demographic covariates for the students and his or her 
peers, respectively, -$% are school-level covariates such as resources and leadership, and .#$%can 
be conceived as teacher human capital. Gary Becker (1964), among other economists, formalized 
the concept of human capital as the knowledge and skills accumulated through education, 
training, and experience, which enhance worker productivity. 
Teacher human capital is often estimated in practice as teacher fixed effects or teacher 
value added, ..  This is itself a function of education, experience, on-the-job learning, and 
teacher peer effects, as well as unobserved underlying teacher characteristics, and is assumed to 
be concave, or increasing at a decreasing rate in each of those dimensions: 
(2) .#$% = 1(2345#$%, 267.#$% , .)#$%, 92:;<=<1#$,%)+) 
Assume: >?>@ > 0;	
>D?
>@ < 0 
 In any given period education is assumed to be given and is treated as a constant; this 
assumption may not hold, for example, for teachers who are in the process of obtaining their 
Master’s degrees in the current period. The relevant decision for teachers as agents in this study 
is the extent to which they invest in their own learning, or ongoing training as an individual or 
with colleagues. Since in most cases wages do not vary with productivity, teachers will select 
how to allocate working time across various activities according to their own utility, which they 
may derive from intrinsic satisfaction, esteem of colleagues or parents, increased job security or 
reduced fear of sanctions by employers, subject to the constraints of time and the cost of effort, 




In each period, teachers must divide time between non-productive activities (“shirking,”), 
individual effort such as planning lessons, collaborative work focused on building collegial 
relationships with colleagues, and collaborative work focused on team-based learning. The 
budget constraint incorporates time and effort by including time weighted by effort, whereby 
more mentally taxing or less pleasant activities “feel” like they take more time. Under similar 
assumptions as noted above for the human capital function – that utility increases at a decreasing 
rate for each of these options, and costs increase at an increasing rate - the optimal solution will 
occur when the ratios of the marginal returns to each activity to the marginal cost are all equal. 
There is an additional assumption required that the returns to time invested in collaborative 
learning will not be immediately felt, and therefore the time allocation will further depend on 
teachers’ discount rates. Note that this simple model abstracts from several important practical 
realities and constraints; for instance, how teachers allocate time at work will be at least in part 
determined by their supervisors, and the choice to collaborate will also depend on colleagues’ 
decisions, as individual teachers obviously cannot collaborate alone. Nonetheless, this model 
describes how teachers make time allocation choices on the margin, and how much effort they 
allocate to various tasks within their workdays. 
 This model has several important implications and raises questions that will be addressed 
in the quantitative and qualitative research designs. The extent to which teachers working on 
teams will focus their efforts on more productive activities, including experiential learning, joint 
production of curricula and assessments, and idiosyncratic learning about instruction in their 
particular school context, will depend on the extent to which teachers on teams believe these 
goals to be attainable through teamwork.  Due to data limitations – namely, that I only observe 




individual teacher characteristics that may predict team participation and its effectiveness are 
limited – this model motivates the issue of heterogeneity in the effects of team participation, 
explored in more detail in chapter 6. The main empirical models and results, in chapters 5 and 7, 
are therefore mainly estimating the effects of teams on teacher effectiveness and student learning 
at the team level, or on teachers nested in teams, as opposed to predicting at the teacher level 
whether and how they will participate.  
Therefore, variation in the effectiveness of teamwork will occur along dimensions that 
affect the marginal returns to teamwork and the marginal costs, relative to other possible uses of 
teacher time. Some predictions from this model that can be empirically tested include, for 
example, that the marginal returns to teamwork will be higher for first-year teachers, teachers 
who are new to a school, and teachers switching to a new grade and subject, as those teachers 
will have the greatest incentives to learn new content and skills and the longest time horizon for 
future payouts to current investment. Similarly, changes to curricula, assessments, or the 
accountability context that teachers face could induce additional teamwork by requiring teachers 
to reinvest in their skills; unfortunately, many such changes, for example implementation of the 
Common Core standards, took place after the sample period for the quantitative data in this 
study, but can be observed descriptively in the qualitative data, which were collected later. Other 
factors that the literature suggests could impact the returns to teamwork or the costs of 
teamwork, including the size of the team, the homogeneity of the team in terms of teacher beliefs 
and learning needs, the extent to which leadership supports teamwork, and the complementarity 
of teacher skills across the team, can be tested, as well. One important distinction between 
teamwork among teachers and in other sectors is that in most settings under which teams have 




partially directly observable by other members of the team, and in many cases, production 
processes are in fact joint. In education, while student learning undoubtedly depends upon the 
contributions of several teachers across grades and subjects, and team teaching scenarios do 
exist, for the most part the actual work of teaching is performed individually, so team members 
can observe one another’s productivity only indirectly. 
Further, the predictions of this model and the empirical literature on teacher 
collaboration, teamwork, and ongoing training may be surprising, given the predictions of the 
standard human capital model that returns to investment in human capital are maximized when 
such investments occur before work begins, and that firms will generally only invest in firm-
specific human capital (Becker, 1964). These contradictory findings raise several possibilities 
that will be tested in this dissertation; specifically, the likelihood of participating on a team and 
the benefits of doing so may vary according to whether the team is focused on a group of 
students or a content area. The former could indicate that teaching is highly context-specific, 
whereas the latter may indicate either market failure in the quality of pre-service training or 
changes in standards and assessments. The empirical tests noted above on how the likelihood of 
team participation and the effects of team participation vary by years of experience overall and in 
a particular school can also help disentangle these mechanisms. 
Finally, teachers’ decision to participate in a team relies upon their perceptions of the 
costs and returns to teamwork, which may differ from the actual costs and returns in three cases. 
First, teachers may engage in hyperbolic discounting, in which teachers have a strong preference 
for returns in the present and aversion to costs in the present. Secondly, there may be asymmetric 
information, in which teachers do not know the returns to teamwork. Finally, teachers may be 




practice to something that is unfamiliar but potentially better, instead sticking with what is 
familiar and working but possibly sub-optimally. Without measures of teachers’ discount rates 
and attitudes about risk, it is difficult to test these hypotheses with the given data, but I consider 
them in the qualitative analysis. 
TEAM LEARNING MODEL 
The process by which teams operate, the definitions of team processes and team learning, 
and some of the outcomes of team process may not be observable in the economic and 
framework described above. Therefore, I complement the economic model with a conceptual 
framework for team processes, particularly focused on team learning and problem-solving, to 
examine using a qualitative methodology. Examples of the types of more nuanced team 
characteristics and processes to be studied in this component of the work include Hoegl and 
Gemuenden’s (2001) dimensions of effective teamwork: quantity and formality of 
communication, coordination of effort, balance of contributions across team members, mutual 
support, effort, and cohesion. The relative effectiveness of a teacher team may depend on 
nuanced aspects of how teachers interact. These interactions could promote varying degrees of 
attitudes toward conflict, including unproductive avoidance or acrimony or more productive 
discussion, as well as different levels of inclusion or exclusion across a community. Other 
research has suggested that group size, the role of school leaders, and the amount of time devoted 
to teamwork are important determinants of the quality of the team process (Scribner, 1999; 
Graham, 2007; Wayman, Midgley and Stringfield, 2006).  
 Therefore, based on part on the team learning model developed by Kasl, Marsick and 
Dechant (1997), I conceptualize teacher teamwork as a series of conditions, processes, and 
outcomes. While team process may evolve over time as conditions change and teams learn 




characterized by overall modes of dynamics, problem solving, and learning at any given time, 
and do not necessarily proceed through various modes as discrete stages.  
Conditions that determine team processes include:  
• Structural features, such as team size, composition of team in terms of levels of 
experience and areas of expertise 
• Team focus (e.g., whether the team’s work is focused on a sub-set of students or 
all students in a particular subject or grade, or if the team has a grade-level or 
subject-area orientation) 
• Time for collaboration  
• Leadership support 
• Individual and group process characteristics such as openness to new ideas, 
willingness to challenge norms and beliefs, and efficient processes for 
communication  
The team’s processes include:  
• Identifying and defining instructional needs and issues that the group faces 
• Analyzing root causes of instructional needs 
• Identifying gaps in the group’s expertise that may be inhibiting performance 
• Locating and developing new instructional strategies or approaches  
• Systematically testing and analyzing new approaches 
• Reflecting on practice 
• Challenging underlying beliefs that may be inhibiting change  




Positive outcomes may include increased effectiveness as measured by student learning, 
increased teacher satisfaction and retention, or evidence of professional learning, while negative 
outcomes could include frustration, resistance to change, excessive team conflict, or complete 
inaction.  
Combining elements of conditions, processes, and outcomes leads me to hypothesize that 
there will be four major modes of teacher collaboration, synthesized by me; the specific 
conditions, processes, and outcomes come from existing literature on teamwork in education and 
other sectors, but the particular combinations and categories are new. Teams may work together 
in name only, or what I refer to as an isolationist mode. Teams may engage actively focus 
excessively on group harmony, with little substantive discussion, challenge to established norms, 
or evidence of any change in practice, in a collegial mode. Teams that promote thoughtful 
engagement with new ideas are engaged in the problem-solving mode, while in the dynamic 
mode, the team extends team problem-solving and learning to continuously improve its own 
team processes and effectively shares its discoveries with the broader school community (see 
Table 1-1 for examples). 
TABLE 1-1 TEAM LEARNING FRAMEWORK 
Mode Conditions Processes Outcomes 
Isolationist Group is too small or too 
large, enabling shirking or 
lacking group cohesion 
and identity 
Group lacks leadership 
support or structures to 
support teamwork, such as 
dedicated time to meet 
Group meetings are short, 
infrequent, perfunctory 
Group engages primarily 
in updates; does not 
address problems or group 
learning needs 
Little to no change in 
practice, student outcomes 
likely to remain the same, 
or may slightly decline 
because teachers are 
substituting unproductive 
team work for more 
productive individual work 
Potential dissatisfaction, 
reduced retention 
Compliance Group has mandate to 
meet from leadership, but 
does not exhibit shared 
support for collaboration 
Group follows a rigid 
protocol for engaging in 
collaborative inquiry, and 
may have some evidence 
Little to no evidence of 
any change in practice; 
some evidence of 




or common beliefs about 
student learning; teachers 
may lack appropriate 
training in collaboration 
and/or research skills to 
engage in inquiry 
of formal compliance, 
such as written agendas, 
but little evidence of 
meaningful engagement 
teachers 
Collegial Group is moderately sized 
(literature suggests optimal 
size of 4-6 participants) 
Group has teachers of very 
similar experiences, 
backgrounds, and beliefs 
Group norms and 
processes emphasize 
efficiency, group harmony 
Group addresses 
instructional needs without 
root cause analysis 
Suggested strategies are 
generally not 
experimental; do not 
challenge status quo or 
established norms 
Teacher satisfaction may 
increase, but preliminary 
student outcomes will 
likely remain the same or 
decline; very little learning 
by group members, little to 
no discernible change in 
practice 
Problem-solving Group is of optimal size; 
group composition 
includes a mix of levels of 
experience, different areas 
of expertise, grounded in 
some common beliefs 
about learning while team 
members are open to new 
ideas 
Group has significant 
leadership support and 
time for meeting 
Group engages in an 
experimental process that 
identifies potential issues 
and gaps in expertise, 
systematically analyzes 
root causes including 
challenging underlying 
beliefs that may be 
inhibiting performance, 
and seeks and tests out 
new approaches  
Improvements in student 
outcomes, although may 
be slow to come as group 
experiments with new 
instructional approaches; 
effect on satisfaction and 
retention may be 
indeterminate, as some 
group members may be 
frustrated by process, at 
least at first 
Dynamic As above, with additional 
leadership support for 
organizational, not just 
team learning 
Group reflects on its own 
process and systems are in 
place to share team 
learning across the school 
or larger system  
Improvements in student 
outcomes, satisfaction, and 
learning that spills over to 
other teams; continuous 
improvement as group 
improves its own 
processes 
 
In sum, the economic model generates predictions about which teachers will be most 
likely to participate in teamwork, and which teachers will receive the most benefit from 
teamwork, which I test in the quantitative analysis. There are further predictions about the 
conditions under which teachers will derive the greatest benefit from teamwork, which are 




analysis. Finally, in the qualitative analysis I examine aspects of the teams themselves, including 
the conditions and processes they use and how outcomes vary accordingly. 
The dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 outlines existing literature on teacher 
quality, teacher development, and collaboration; Chapter 3 describes the quasi-experimental 
quantitative data and methods; Chapter 4 describes the qualitative and cost methods and data; 
Chapter 5 presents the quantitative results; Chapter 6 examines mechanisms and heterogeneity in 
these results; Chapter 7 presents the qualitative results; Chapter 8 presents the cost-benefit 






Chapter 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
DEFINING AND MEASURING TEACHER EFFECTIVENESS 
Among countless other researchers, Eide and Goldhaber (2004) have argued that teacher 
quality is the single most important school variable influencing student achievement, one of 
several desired outcomes of schooling, but find significant disagreement on how to define and 
measure teacher quality, as well as tensions between quality and quantity. Like many others, 
Eide and Goldhaber argue that quality is fundamentally the ability to produce growth in student 
achievement, although for a given teacher quality may be mutable and may vary by context. The 
most important characteristic in determining quality, according to the authors, is a teacher’s own 
academic aptitude, which has been declining on average over the past several decades due to 
improved alternate opportunities for women. There is also a complex relationship between 
school quality and teacher quality; Loeb, Kalogrides and Béteille (2012) examined 
administrative data in Miami and found that more effective schools hire better teachers, retain 
better teachers, and help teachers improve more over time, although those findings raise 
important “chicken or egg” questions of causality, as the schools with more effective teachers are 
almost by definition the most effective schools. Empirically, there is evidence that a standard 
deviation increase in teacher effectiveness, measured using teacher fixed effects on test scores in 
a value-added approach, is associated with about a 0.1 standard deviation increase in student 
achievement on math and reading tests (Rockoff, 2004).  
Many policymakers and researchers have attempted to uncover what makes some 
teachers more effective than others. While there are few clear answers at this point, one 
emerging finding is that what teachers do generally matters more than who they are. Palardy and 




achievement than observable characteristics. Using unusually detailed information on teacher 
practice tied to math and reading achievement data in Cincinnati, Kane and Taylor (2011) found 
that students of teachers who are relatively better at classroom management tended to do better 
in math, while students of teachers who are relatively better at discussion and questioning 
techniques tended to do better in reading. Consistent with the findings on the relative importance 
of teacher practice over teacher characteristics, Jacob and Walsh (2011) found that principals are 
fairly good at identifying effective teachers once they have begun teaching, as principal ratings 
are correlated with value-added measures, especially at the top and bottom of the distribution of 
value-added measures. 
This difficulty in predicting teacher effectiveness ex ante highlights the need for human 
capital-enhancing policies; the evidence that actions matter more than characteristics and that 
teacher quality is closely related to school quality supports the need for knowledge sharing 
between teachers as a way to increase effectiveness over time. 
PRE-SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAMS 
One set of policies to increase teacher effectiveness aims to assess and increase the 
quality of teacher preparation programs, often based in universities. Although this approach has 
received much recent attention in policy debates and was featured as an important component of 
President Obama’s “Race to the Top” education initiative, in general much more of the 
empirically observed variation in teacher effectiveness is within, rather than between, 
preparation programs. Accounting for clustering at the teacher level and including school fixed 
effects and measures of individual ability and institutional selectivity to account for non-random 
selection of teachers into programs and into schools, the difference in average teacher 




in math and 0.19 in reading (Goldhaber, Liddle & Theobald, 2012). This may be an 
underestimate, as schools may tend to hire teachers of similar quality such that one school may 
have the best teacher from one program and the worst teacher from another program, washing 
out differences between them when looking at within-school variation. Using a similar approach 
in Missouri and clustering at the teacher level, Koedel and Ehlert (2012) found very little 
meaningful variation between programs; they speculated this is because teaching programs at 
highly selective universities tend to have more students from the lower tail of the ability 
distribution within that university as compared to teaching programs at less selective universities, 
suggesting that the average teacher across programs will be of about the same average 
intellectual ability. Neither of these studies, however, utilized an experimental or quasi-
experimental design, so they are better viewed as descriptive, rather than causal findings. 
 In part to address concerns about the quality of many university-based teacher 
preparation programs, as well as to reduce barriers to entry to expand the pool of potential 
teachers, alternative certification programs such as Teach for America (TFA) have become 
popular policies across the United States and in other countries. These programs generally 
require limited or no prior coursework in education or student teaching experience and instead 
compress training into an intensive summer program, followed by ongoing training and support 
during a teaching commitment period, often of two years. While many scholars have expressed 
concern about alternatively certified teachers being less prepared and more likely to leave after 
two years than traditionally certified teachers, defenders argue that the programs attract 
applicants with higher average academic ability and from more selective universities than the 
average traditionally certified teacher. The empirical evidence thus far suggests that TFA 




randomized experiment found a 0.15 standard deviation effect of TFA on student achievement in 
math and no impact on reading (Glazerman & Decker, 2006), and a study using panel data found 
very small differences between groups of teachers with different types of certification, on the 
order of 0.01 standard deviations (Kane, Rockoff & Staiger, 2008). 
 Thus far, therefore, although concerns about the quality of pre-service training persist, 
there is limited empirical evidence to identify any specific policy or practice that would lead to 
substantial improvement. Further, evidence that alternatively certified teachers are similar to 
traditionally certified teachers, at least with regard to value-added, suggests that learning about 
teaching may be primarily experiential, and that improvements to in-service training through 
collaboration may be necessary to increase on-the-job learning. Further, team-based problem 
solving, as exists in the inquiry team initiative, may be a promising reform for pre-service 
training, as well. 
VALUE-ADDED MEASURES AND INCENTIVES 
Some researchers and policymakers have suggested that, given our collective lack of 
knowledge about who will be an effective teacher and what effective teachers do, the best course 
of action would be to carefully measure and tie stronger incentives to increased student learning 
(Chetty, Friedman and Rockoff, 2013a and 2013b; Hanushek, 2007; Staiger and Rockoff, 2010). 
However, there are serious concerns about the validity and reliability of existing measures of 
teacher effectiveness, and empirical evidence on the effectiveness-enhancing impacts of 
incentive pay schemes is limited and mixed (Haertel, 2010; Rothstein, 2010; Darling-Hammond, 
et al. 2011). Further, there are substantial political objections to value-added measures of teacher 




scores, narrowing the curriculum and teaching to the test, creating incentives to game the system, 
and undermining teacher professionalism (Corcoran, 2010).  
Several incentive programs for teachers have been tested in practice, often in randomized 
experimental settings, with drastically different results. This pattern of results suggests that the 
effects of incentive policies will be highly sensitive to context and the design of the incentive 
scheme. In the United States, two major incentive schemes have been recently evaluated: on a 
large scale, the District of Columbia unveiled its IMPACT evaluation system that featured the 
promise of large bonuses at the high end of performance, measured by principal and external 
evaluator observations and student test score gains, and the threat of dismissal at the low end. On 
a smaller scale, New York City tried a randomized experiment offering bonuses to schools, 
which could be distributed to teachers however schools wished, based on aggregate school 
performance. Dee and Wyckoff (2013) evaluated the DC IMPACT system using a regression 
discontinuity design, exploiting the cutoffs for rewards and sanctions to estimate the effect on 
otherwise similar teachers, and found that dismissal threats increased voluntary attrition of low-
performing teachers by 11 percentage points and improved performance of those who remained 
by 0.27 standard deviations, while financial incentives improved performance of high-
performing teachers by 0.24 standard deviations. In contrast, Fryer examined a randomized 
experiment that assigned bonuses of up to $3,000 to each teacher in randomly selected schools 
that met school performance targets and found no effect of the incentive on student achievement.  
The National Center on Performance Incentives at Vanderbilt University has also 
performed a number of studies of performance incentive schemes in different contexts across the 
United States and with different design features. For the most part, the results have been quite 




Tennessee offered bonuses to middle school math teachers in an RCT and, while there were 
effects at some grade levels, there was no overall statically significant effect (Springer et al., 
2012a). Similarly, a two-year randomized study of team-based performance incentives in Texas 
did not yield any effects (Springer et al., 2012b). 
Teacher incentive schemes in other countries have generally been more successful than 
those in the United States, with some exceptions. In Kenya, teachers ordinarily face particularly 
weak performance incentives given strong job protections, leading to high teacher absenteeism. 
A randomized experiment of an incentive valued at up to 43% of monthly salary resulted in 
significantly higher test scores, but no effect on teacher behavior except for intensive test 
preparation; the results also did not extend to another test, suggesting that they were highly 
specific to the testing instrument (Glewwe, Ilias & Kremer, 2003). In a quasi-experimental study 
of a tournament based incentive for relative performance in high school English and math in 
Israel, there were significant improvements in test-taking rates, pass rates, and mean test scores, 
driven by changes in teaching methods and increased after-school tutoring (Lavy, 2009). 
Collectively, this literature suggests that stronger measures and incentives related to 
teacher performance will not be sufficient on their own to lead to widespread increases in teacher 
effectiveness. Value-added and incentive-based approaches on their own do not tell teachers how 
to improve, and most policies based on these approaches only target the very top and bottom of 
the distribution of teacher effectiveness, leading to little change for the majority of teachers 
(Hargreaves and Fullan, 2012). Nonetheless, value-added measures can be informative for 
helping to identify effective teacher practice, which can then be shared with colleagues via 
collaborative efforts such as inquiry teams. 




Linda Darling-Hammond and Gary Sykes (2003) argued that recruitment of quality 
teachers is less of a problem than retention of the most effective teachers, given that many 
teachers leave the profession after five or fewer years of teaching. The extent to which teacher 
turnover is a problem depends on two factors that are highly disputed in the literature: whether it 
is the most effective or least effective teachers who tend to leave and whether there are additional 
negative externalities of turnover due to high replacement costs or disruption to the school.   
A key distinction in assessing differential attrition is how quality is defined and 
measured; based on a review of the literature on teacher recruitment and retention, the 
preponderance of evidence suggests that teachers with higher academic ability measured by their 
own test scores, math or science majors, and more selective undergraduate institutions are more 
likely to leave teaching. However, the evidence on differential attrition by measured 
effectiveness in increasing student learning is more limited and ambiguous (Guarino, Santibanez 
& Daley, 2006). There is relatively little causal research on the effects of teacher turnover on 
student achievement, but a recent longitudinal study of 850,000 New York City 4th and 5th 
graders examining school-by-grade turnover found substantial reduction in student achievement 
driven by turnover. Changes in the quality distribution due to replacement teachers being less 
experienced or effective than those who leave drive some of the results, but the authors also find 
spillover effects of turnover on students of teachers who remain, suggesting that there are 
disruptive effects of turnover on the entire school. Still, the effects of are substantively small, on 
the order of 0.01-0.02 standard deviations, even with 25% of teachers on a given grade level 
leaving a school (Ronfeldt, Loeb & Wyckoff, 2013). 
In a descriptive study, Ladd (2009) found that working conditions, particularly the quality 




North Carolina. Some working conditions, however, are by definition impossible to change. For 
example, there is evidence that teachers prefer to work with high-performing students, but a 
policy to promote equity may aim to assign the best teachers to the lowest-performing students.  
Compensating differentials could encourage teachers, particularly highly effective teachers, to 
work in less desirable conditions and with more challenging and higher-need students. However, 
unobserved school and teacher characteristics make it difficult to estimate how much extra 
would need to be paid to attract high-quality teachers to more difficult school environments, 
given the confounding of financial resources, working conditions, and teacher quality. 
Examining the relationship between teacher pay and working conditions, one study found that 
teachers actually tend to earn more in schools where they have more time to plan and where 
teachers report better student behavior, contrary to expectations (Goldhaber, Destler & Player, 
2010). This is likely due to confounding working conditions and school district affluence, as well 
as difficulties in measuring teacher quality. 
Of particular concern in raising teacher retention is the experience of teachers during the 
first few years, which can often involve a challenging and steep learning curve as they master 
basic teaching and classroom management skills, some of which may not be learned without 
hands-on experience. Several schools and districts have experimented with improved induction 
or mentoring to improve working conditions and increase effectiveness and retention of new 
teachers. In a descriptive study that uses a multinomial logistic model that measures the 
association between supportive working conditions such as mentoring and remaining in teaching, 
Smith and Ingersoll (2004) did find that having common planning time with other teachers 
reduced the risk of leaving teaching by about 43%. Although a fair amount of this effect could be 




teacher teamwork, discussed in the next two sections, could increase teacher retention. Overall, 
this line of research suggests that retaining teachers, particularly the most effective teachers, is an 
important outcome, that teachers value collaboration as a working condition that could contribute 
to retention, and that collaborative training could be particularly important during the first year 
of teaching. 
IN-SERVICE TRAINING 
EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
One of the most common ways schools attempt to increase the effectiveness of their 
existing teachers, as well as provide incentives for existing teachers to stay to reduce the costs of 
turnover, is through in-service training or professional development programs. This category of 
interventions is so pervasive that the federal government spent $1.5 billion on professional 
development for teachers in 2004-2005 (Birman et al., 2007). In-service training programs have 
been studied extensively in the education literature, and somewhat less so in labor economics 
and the economics of education. The literature on in-service training programs provides a 
baseline measurement of effects for the most common policy alternative to teacher collaboration 
through inquiry teams, as well as insights on how collaborative efforts can enhance teacher 
learning by addressing perceived deficiencies in existing approaches. 
The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of professional development programs is 
quite mixed, and such variability may be explained by differences in dosage or intensity, the 
quality of implementation, alignment with teacher work, the outcome measured, and the 
estimation methodology. Relatively few studies offer rigorous experimental or quasi-
experimental estimates of the causal effect of particular programs on student achievement or 
teacher value-added, which are primary outcomes of interest. The small handful of recent causal 




of a wider range of studies that are more descriptive, correlational, or qualitative, for additional 
context.   
Yoon and colleagues (2007) surveyed 1300 studies of teacher professional development 
programs published between 1986 and 2003 for the What Works Clearinghouse (WWC) and 
found that only nine met evidence standards – six were published in peer-reviewed journals and 
three were doctoral dissertations, and six were randomized controlled trials (RCTs) while three 
were quasi-experimental estimates.  Overall, they found the programs evaluated to have positive 
effects, with 18 out of 20 measured effects across the studies being positive and statistically 
significant, although this result may partly be due to publication bias. 
Within the labor economics literature, five major quasi-experimental studies of teacher 
professional development programs have been published in recent years. The first examined the 
effects of an in-service training on pedagogical methods in elementary math and reading on test 
scores in Jerusalem schools (Angrist and Lavy, 2001). The authors noted the importance of 
teachers’ on-the-job experience, and specifically in-service training, in determining their 
effectiveness and returns to experience, and the relative paucity of literature on this subject. This 
is surprising given the importance schools and teachers assign to such training – as Farrell and 
Oliviera (1993) noted, “pre-service training is essential to teach subject matter.  In-service 
training is essential to teach teaching skills.” Angrist and Lavy studied the 30 Towns intervention 
in Jersualem, a large infusion of additional resources for schools in a neighborhood with a high 
proportion of immigrant students and lower performance than the city average; much of the 
additional resources were used for teacher training. Since treatment was not randomly assigned, 
the authors used difference-in-differences, ordinary least squares regression controlling for 




arguing that while none of the identification strategies was ideal, robust results across the 
multiple specifications would bolster confidence in program effectiveness, particularly because 
each strategy addressed different potential confounding factors. The estimates of program 
effectiveness for non-religious schools were positive, significant, and robust to specification, 
whereas estimates for religious schools were less robust. The authors argued that dosage and 
treatment intensity may explain this disparity. Based on a back-of-the-envelope cost analysis, the 
authors estimated that the program cost $12,000 per class in 2001 dollars and resulted in 0.25 of 
a standard deviation increase in math and reading test scores, comparable in cost-effectiveness to 
increasing instructional time and more cost-effective than reducing class size. 
Similarly, Jacob and Lefgren (2004) took advantage of a reform targeting low-performing 
schools to estimate the effect of additional teacher training on student achievement in Chicago.  
In this case, the reform targeted schools with students achieving below a particular cutoff to 
receive both additional resources and the threat of sanctions, enabling a regression discontinuity 
design. Utilizing a regression discontinuity with student test scores as the running variable 
helped mitigate concern about teacher selection into training, as teachers in schools just above 
and just below the cutoff were arguably similar. Further, schools had little ability or incentive to 
precisely manipulate the running variable, as it was aggregated across many students, and the 
“treatment” was complex, consisting of both positive elements such as technical assistance and 
negative elements such as the threat of sanctions. The authors did find that teachers reported an 
increase in the quantity and quality of professional development they receive, but did not find 
any effect on student achievement.   
Jacob and Lefgren explicitly noted the differences in their results from those of Angrist 




setting, or methodology. The complex nature of the treatment may have motivated schools just 
above the cutoff to seek alternate means to improve performance to avoid sanctions, the high-
stakes setting may have reduced effectiveness of the training, or the training may have simply 
been too low-intensity or poorly implemented to be effective. They estimated that $108,000 per 
school was spent on additional training, in 2004 dollars; even with a conservative assumption of 
just 20 classrooms per school, the intensity of treatment as measured by resource use in the 
Jerusalem intervention was more than twice as high as the Chicago treatment.4 Finally, Jacob and 
Lefgren did find that their results were more consistent with those of the literature than those of 
Angrist and Lavy; a meta-analysis by Kennedy in 1998 found only 12 studies out of 93 with 
positive effects of staff development, suggesting that much in-service training for teachers is 
low-intensity and low-quality, a finding discussed further below. Further, the quality of 
implementation and coaching, the level of follow-up and ongoing support, and integration with 
teachers’ ongoing curricula and regular work lives all likely influence the effectiveness of any 
particular intervention. 
Most recently, Harris and Sass (2011) examined administrative data in Florida that 
allowed them to link information on student achievement to teacher training and qualifications. 
The authors were able to take advantage of the panel structure of the data, along with unusually 
good measures of teacher training linked specifically to student achievement, to estimate 
essentially a value-added model with school and teacher fixed effects and a rich set of time-
varying covariates. Although there were apparent effects of professional development when 
estimated using pooled ordinary least squares, only effects of content-specific training on 
achievement in middle and high school math remained when adding teacher fixed effects, thus 
                                                            
4 Using the CPI, $12,000 in 2001 dollars is $15,908 in 2014 dollars, while $108,000 in 2004 dollars is $134,232 in 





estimating the effect over time within individual teachers. This suggests that results in other 
subjects and for other types of training were driven primarily by positive selection of teachers 
into training.   
Bridging the gap between pre-service and in-service training, Rockoff (2008) studied the 
effects of mentoring programs for beginning teachers in New York City on teacher retention and 
student achievement outcomes. Rockoff took advantage of the fact that teachers who transferred 
to New York City from other school districts did not receive mentoring, while those who were 
brand new to teaching did, to implement a difference-in-differences estimate of the effects of the 
program, comparing differences in effectiveness over time between the two groups. The effects 
were relatively limited, and included an increased likelihood to remain through the first year for 
those teachers who did receive mentoring; interestingly, having a mentor who taught at the same 
school was a predictor for retention, suggesting that school-specific knowledge, akin to firm-
specific human capital, may play an important role in teacher development. Similarly, using a 
variety of quasi-experimental methods to analyze the effects of induction programs on teacher 
turnover in New York City and nationwide using the Schools and Staffing Survey, You (2012) 
found that, when taking into account endogeneity of participation in mentoring and induction 
programs, the effects of the programs were too widely variable to obtain a statistically significant 
point estimate. 
Along similar lines, Bressoux, et al. (2009) examined the effects of training for novice 
teachers on student outcomes in France, taking advantage of an administrative forecasting 
mistake that led to some otherwise similar teachers receiving initial training and others delaying 
training until the following year. In the French system, all potential teachers are ranked and those 




are placed on a waiting list and may teach without training if a vacancy arises. Ordinarily, this 
setup would not be ideal for research, as the trained and waiting list teachers are demonstrably 
different. In 1991, however, an unusually small number of teachers were selected for training, 
leading to a group of teachers who would have been trained any other year but instead were 
placed on a waiting list and filled vacancies if needed. The authors argue that other common 
concerns about selection into schools by teachers or students into teachers’ classrooms are less 
salient in France, where novice teachers are typically assigned to schools wherever they are 
needed. Using a gain score model with class-level random effects, the authors found substantial 
effects of training in math, but not in reading, and not for the lowest-achieving students. It is 
unclear, however, whether this study is comparable to other in-service training studies, as in-
service training is usually supplementary to whatever basic training teachers receive; it would be 
natural to expect training to have an effect when compared to teachers who receive no training at 
all, but the more policy-relevant question is whether training has an effect on the margin. Since 
the control condition in this study is unlike “business as usual” in most other contexts, the 
external validity of the study may be more limited. 
The United States Department of Education has commissioned two recent randomized 
controlled trials (Garet, et al., 2008 and Garet, et al., 2010) of professional development 
programs of early reading and middle school math, respectively. As Garet and colleagues noted, 
No Child Left Behind has underscored the importance of teacher training by placing great 
emphasis on all schools having “highly qualified teachers,” although the meaning of this term 
has been limited in practice to fully-licensed teachers, and providing $535 million in Title II aid 
for PD to states and districts in the 2002-03 school year. Nonetheless, concerns remain about the 




to be ad hoc and of low intensity. Eighty percent of elementary school teachers report 24 or 
fewer hours of professional development each year.   
To test whether a more intensive approach, closely aligned to the curriculum, would 
improve outcomes, the Early Reading PD Interventions Study randomly assigned teachers to 
receive one of two treatments – an intensive summer institute with follow-up training over the 
school year or the same training plus intensive coaching of 60 hours per teacher on average – or 
a control condition receiving ordinary training. While the authors did find effects on teacher 
knowledge in the short-term, they saw no statistically significant effects on student outcomes, 
and the teacher knowledge effects faded after one year. These results are not attributable to low-
intensity implementation, as treatment schools received 39-47 hours of PD, compared to 14 
hours in control schools, and schools assigned to coaching received 62 hours per teacher, on 
average, compared to 4-6 in non-coaching schools, although implementation still may have been 
of poor quality, depending on the skill of the coaches. 
In the Middle School Mathematics PD Study, 77 schools across 12 districts were 
randomly assigned to treatment or control conditions. There were no significant effects on 
teacher knowledge or student achievement, although researchers did observe treated teachers 
engaging students in critical thinking exercises more often, suggesting some change in teacher 
behavior that may have long-term benefit not captured by test scores. 
Finally, an experimental study of a teacher-training program in the Netherlands examined 
the effects on math student achievement of a highly scripted math training program called Sigma 
(Van der Sijde, 1989). Thirty-three teachers were randomly assigned to one of four conditions, 
corresponding to different intensity levels of training. Those receiving treatment underwent 




student distraction, effective pacing, and smooth transitions; outcomes included observations of 
teacher effectiveness by graduate students, student surveys, and math achievement. Observers 
did note changes in teacher behavior based on amount of training, but those did not translate into 
measurable differences in student achievement; nonetheless, the follow-up was only two and a 
half months after the program started and sample sizes were extremely small, so the improved 
techniques may have not had enough time to affect student achievement, or the sample may have 
been too small to detect any results. 
NON-EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES 
Most other research on in-service training is primarily correlational, descriptive, or 
qualitative, and does not explicitly address selection of teachers into training as a potentially 
confounding variable. Further, relatively few studies feature student achievement as an outcome, 
and instead focus on teacher-reported satisfaction with training or changes in teacher behavior. 
Barrett, et al. (2012) explicitly addressed this issue when examining the effects of the 
Appalachian Math and Science Partnerships in Kentucky. While a value added model with 
teacher fixed effects showed no relationship between the training program and student outcomes, 
accounting for prior teacher effectiveness yielded positive effects of the program, implying that 
previously less effective teachers were more likely to participate. This fact may be idiosyncratic 
to the Kentucky program, however, as many teacher in-service training programs are voluntary 
and may be just as likely to feature positive selection.   
Addressing similar concerns about the quality of research, Desimone (2009) made several 
suggestions for improving impact studies of professional development programs. Most 
importantly, Desimone suggested emphasizing student learning results, or the mechanisms by 
which programs will change teacher behavior to impact student learning, rather than teacher 




features” of effective PD that stand out in the literature, including content focus, active learning, 
coherence, or the extent to which teacher learning is consistent with teachers' knowledge and 
beliefs, duration, and collective participation, and advocated for additional experimental and 
quasi-experimental studies. Effective follow-up and close alignment with the existing curriculum 
and the developmental needs of teachers and students can also contribute to the success of PD 
programs. 
Several articles and reports in the education literature attempt to synthesize findings 
across these and many other studies of professional development programs to isolate key factors 
that determine their effectiveness. Corcoran (1995) found that the type of in-depth, ongoing PD 
that is suggested by the research is rare due to its high cost and time commitment; most PD 
instead takes the form of discrete workshops on “hot” topics taught by local experts. He 
suggested that PD that is integrated with teacher work, based on current research, and reliant on 
teachers as valuable experts and sources of information was most likely to be effective. Corcoran 
also proposed experimentation with models more commonly used in other countries, such as 
lesson studies common in Japan, in which teachers spend less time actively teaching and more 
time in planning, training, and collaboration. Employing such a shift would require fundamental 
restructuring of school, but Corcoran suggested this could be achieved by replacing some 
instructional time with computer-based or distance learning, community-service projects, and 
extracurricular activities led by volunteers.   
Garet, et al. (2001) surveyed 1027 math and science teachers who had attended a 
federally-funded PD program and found that focus on content knowledge, opportunities for 
active learning, and coherence with other learning activities were the program features most 




practice. Similarly, Darling-Hammond and Richardson (2009) found that teachers preferred 
hands-on training focused on their content areas, with an emphasis on student learning and active 
observation, reflection, and teaching. The most effective PD was sustained and intensive; the 
largest effects were among programs with 30-100 hours of training, and no effect was seen in 
programs of fewer than 14 hours. Increasingly, as well, professional learning communities as a 
form of teachers collaboratively learning from one another have been featured in the literature 
but, as noted below, simply bringing teachers together does not ensure effective collaboration. 
Finally, Darling-Hammond and Wei (2009) reported that a majority of teachers spent fewer than 
16 hours per year in content-area training, while teachers said they needed about 50 hours per 
year. Compared with other countries, Darling-Hammond and Wei say that teachers in the United 
States spent more time actively teaching and less time training and collaborating with colleagues, 
limiting their ability to improve over time. 
Day and Gu (2007) attempted to uncover the causes of variation in teachers’ professional 
learning, using data on 300 teachers in 100 schools in the United Kingdom. While their mixed 
methods analysis was descriptive and not causal, they did find wide variation in the association 
between performance and experience, and evidence that teachers did not necessarily learn from 
experience. The key factors they identified in determining professional learning were 
commitment, resilience, and leadership, and they argued that recent “performativity,” or 
emphasis on compliance with mandates and emphasis on accountability measures in the UK, 
would reduce intrinsic motivation. A similar study of the factors that influence teacher 
professional learning in Dutch schools (Sleegers, Stoel & Kru, 2009) examined the effects of 
teacher psychology, school organization, teacher collaboration, and leadership on teacher 




found that psychological factors, notably self-efficacy and internalization of goals, had stronger 
effects, while organizational and leadership factors had smaller and mostly indirect effects. 
Notably, however, collaboration was strongly related to experimentation and keeping up to date 
with the field. 
A number of other teacher training and professional development programs have been 
evaluated in the literature on outcomes besides student achievement and with non-causal 
methods. Goldschmidt and Phelps (2010) assessed the effect of the California Professional 
Development Institutes on subject matter knowledge of teachers, following theories by Lee 
Shulman that pedagogical content knowledge, or knowledge within a specific subject area about 
the most useful ways to present a subject to make it understandable to others, is one of the most 
important aspects of teacher quality. The intervention consisted of 40 hours of summer training, 
40 hours of follow-up training during the school year, and 40 hours of team meetings, and the 
outcome was teacher pedagogical content knowledge in reading measured by the Content 
Knowledge for Teaching Reading test. The authors used a multilevel growth model, assuming 
that teachers would not have shown growth in knowledge in the absence of the program, but did 
not have any quasi-experimental methods to support or test this assumption. They found positive 
effects of the program that faded over time.   
A simple pre-post analysis of a PD for science teachers (Lee, et al., 2008) found 
significant gains in science achievement, but similarly did not employ any control or comparison 
group. Finally, Tournaki, Lyublinskaya and Carolan (2011) examined the effects of a 
professional development program on teacher effectiveness through classroom observations 
using Charlotte Danielson’s Enhancing Professional Practice: A Framework for Teaching 




only found effects under the domain of instruction. Overall, therefore, although evidence that 
traditional professional development programs enhances teacher human capital or student 
achievement on average is weak, there is suggestive descriptive evidence that programs with 
particular features may be more effective. These specific features, which may be more likely to 
be present in collaborative professional development programs such as inquiry teams, have 
generally not been subject to rigorous, experimental evaluation. 
RETURNS TO EXPERIENCE AND DIFFUSION OF EXPERTISE 
A number of studies focused on professional development and training, but specifically 
emphasized the importance of collaboration and teamwork as an important ingredient to 
successful teacher learning. A study of the National Writing Project’s school partnership on 
instructional practices used an randomized controlled trial of 39 schools, 20 of which were 
randomly assigned to a partnership condition to receive customized professional development 
(Sun, Penuel, Frank, Gallagher & Youngs, 2013). The authors used longitudinal and sociometric 
data to examine specifically how high-quality training could promote diffusion of effective 
teaching strategies through collaboration. The authors hypothesized that these spillover effects 
would increase productivity of colleagues, based in part on economic literature on human capital 
externalities, leading to a dual effect of training that was magnified when workers worked on 
teams. They did find statistically significant increases in the number of teachers helped by other 
teachers, although the coefficient of .012 additional teachers helped per teacher-hour of training 
is substantively small. 
Along similar lines, Kraft and Papay (2013) used longitudinal administrative data from 
the Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools to examine how supportive professional environments 




experience masked large variation across individual teachers, and that working in more 
supportive professional environments could lead to greater increases in effectiveness over time. 
The authors were able to combine administrative data, including student achievement data on 
math, with the North Carolina Teacher Working Conditions Survey to analyze 280,000 student-
year observations over 3,145 unique teachers. The measures of professional context included 
order and discipline, peer collaboration, principal leadership, professional development, school 
culture, and teacher evaluation. A factor analysis revealed these items loaded on a single factor, 
with internal consistency reliability estimates exceeding 0.90.  
The identification strategy relied heavily on teacher fixed effects and teacher and school-
level random effects; fixed effects control for time invariant teacher and school characteristics, 
whereas random effects allow slopes to vary to allow for variance in returns to experience. The 
authors finally interacted the measure of professional environment with experience to determine 
whether variable returns were systematic and related to professional context. They found that the 
average returns to ten years of experience are quite large, at 0.11 of a standard deviation in 
value-added, with significant heterogeneity at 0.025 of a standard deviation. School-specific 
random slopes explained about 30% of the variation in returns to experience, although they were 
substantively quite small at 0.007 of a standard deviation, and a one standard deviation increase 
in quality of professional environment was associated with an additional 0.0026 standard 
deviation increase in annual returns to teaching experience. The authors addressed the concern 
that teachers and students did not randomly sort into school environments by interacting the 
experience variable with student and teacher covariates and saw no change in coefficients, but 




In a companion paper, Papay and Kraft (2013) addressed some of the methodological 
issues that arose in these estimates. They further found evidence of returns to experience later in 
the career, contrary to many estimates that suggest that teacher effectiveness plateaus at around 
five years of experience. They identified the confounding of experience with year trends; the 
simplest approach to addressing this problem would be to omit year effects, assuming they are 
random shocks. Other options include a censored model, using only year effects for teachers with 
more than 10 years of experience on the assumption that they do not continue to improve beyond 
that point (Rockoff, 2004) or to bin experience across multiple years to still allow for year 
effects.   
Papay and Kraft proposed a third option, using teachers who have non-traditional career 
trajectories to identify experience effects.  The authors tested each model with simulated data 
with different “true” parameters and find that the censored model performed perfectly if the 
assumption of no improvement after 10 years held true. Even minor violations of that 
assumption, however, generated downward bias, while their proposed two stage model 
performed well if there was no general time trend, but had a downward bias otherwise. Based on 
their simulations and using a variety of specifications, the authors showed that generally there 
was a downward bias on the estimates to returns to experience in the literature, and teachers did 
tend to improve even after 10 years. Together, these findings emphasize the importance of 
ongoing teacher learning and the hypothesis that school culture and organization, as well as a 
teacher’s peers, contribute substantially to that development. Nonetheless, the empirical support 
for any given policy or intervention on average is quite weak. 




Evidence from economic theory and other sectors suggests that one way to improve 
teacher in-service training, which has mostly proven ineffective, and potentially to increase 
teacher effectiveness through other channels is to increase and enhance teacher teamwork or 
collaboration. Collaboration could enhance effectiveness or productivity through more relevant 
on-the-job learning and knowledge sharing between colleagues, through peer pressure or other 
social incentives, or through building intrinsic motivation to achieve shared goals, among other 
channels. Collaboration could also be subject to free-riding, encouragement of negative social 
norms, and other problems.   
Even without obvious externalities from group-based production, socialization in the 
workplace can play an important role in determining productivity. Using within-worker fixed 
effects and examining variability in productivity based on whether an individual berry picker 
was working alongside self-identified friends, Bandiera, Barankay and Rasul (2010) found no 
average social effects on productivity in berry farming, but those averages masked considerable 
heterogeneity. Workers were more productive when working with higher-ability friends and less 
productive when working with less able friends; these effects appear to be driven primarily by 
conformism to adopted social norms. In other words, workers adapted their own practices to 
match the productivities of those around them, even when the production processes were entirely 
independent.   
Similarly, Mas and Moretti (2006) utilized plausibly random shift changes in a grocery 
store to analyze how an individual cashier’s productivity varied with that of his or her 
colleagues. They found that a 10% increase in the average productivity of those working with a 
cashier was associated with a 1.7% increase in that cashier’s own productivity. Social pressure 




visible to others. Peer monitoring extends beyond labor market productivity; one study found 
that peer monitoring and social ties reduced moral hazard in group lending in Eritrea (Hermes, 
Lensink & Teki, 2005).  
In cases when the outcome is jointly determined by a group, unlike more individual 
efforts such as berry farming and grocery store cashiering, effects can be even more pronounced 
and work through other channels. In a simple experiment on the quality of decision-making, 
participants working with a group made fewer errors than those working alone, although the 
channel was unclear and likely driven by reduction in idiosyncratic error by pooling the decision 
(Chalos & Pickard, 1985). Other literature, however, emphasizes the potential for productivity 
losses and increases in error due to lack of individual accountability and time lost to group 
coordination, referred to by Steiner (1972) as “process loss.” The productivity of group processes 
and accuracy of group decisions depends a great deal on contextual factors, and the evidence 
overall on group versus individual decisions is mixed (Kerr & Tindale, 2004).  
The adoption of group-based piece rates and team-based production at a garment factory 
increased worker productivity by 14%. Participation in teams was voluntary, and the researchers 
compared productivity within the same worker who was observed working individually and on a 
team (Hamilton, et al., 2003). There is some concern that some of the effect was driven by 
selection, as team participation was endogenous – those most likely to benefit from joining a 
team would be most likely to join. However, the increased productivity of teams compared to the 
aggregated productivity of the same individuals working alone does reduce concern about free-
rider effects of teams. Further, the productivity of some teams exceeded the individual 




as a group, and some individuals elected to join teams even if it reduced their pay, suggesting 
some non-pecuniary benefits to teamwork. 
Kandel and Lazear (2012) created a theoretical model that could explain these empirical 
findings.  Despite concern about free-riding, partnerships and profit-sharing mechanisms could 
enhance productivity through a sense of team spirit and peer pressure. Peer pressure could be the 
result of avoiding shame in cases where effort is observable or avoiding feelings of guilt for 
shirking when effort is not observable by colleagues – in other words, peer pressure can exist 
even without monitoring mechanisms. Kreps (1997) further suggested that concern for esteem of 
colleagues, particularly when work is ambiguous or creative as in teaching, may reduce the 
disutility of effort and increase worker productivity. 
Empirical work suggests several factors that may contribute to or detract from the 
effectiveness of teams, teamwork, and the social pressure mechanisms described here. Team size 
is one important predictor, although the optimal team size likely depends on the context, and 
there is little consensus in the literature on that question. One experiment analyzed how teams of 
different sizes performed on a cognitive puzzle game and found that teams of four performed 
better than teams of one or two (Sutter, 2005).  Using descriptive data on teamwork in the 
software industry, Hoegl and Gemuenden (2001) found that effective teamwork is divided into 
six dimensions: quantity and formality of communication, coordination of effort, balance of 
contributions across team members, mutual support, effort, and cohesion. They based their 
framework on empirical case study analysis and tested it with structural equation modeling; they 
found that all six dimensions of team quality were strongly associated with work satisfaction and 
learning.  Using this framework to analyze the determinants of team quality, they found that 




negatively correlated with them, implying that, at least above a certain level, teams could 
become counter-productively large. 
There have been no causal studies of the effects of collaboration or teamwork on teacher 
effectiveness or retention, and very few empirical quantitative studies that have specifically 
focused on these associations, although some quantitative studies with a broader focus have 
included measures of collaboration as important covariates. There is, however, a rich qualitative 
literature on the factors that make teamwork in education relatively more or less effective in 
different settings. 
The relative effectiveness of a teacher team may depend on nuanced aspects of how 
teachers interact. These interactions could promote varying degrees of attitudes toward conflict, 
including unproductive avoidance or acrimony or more productive discussion, as well as 
different levels of inclusion or exclusion across a community. A case study of the micropolitics 
of teacher collaboration in two schools in the San Francisco Bay Area found that one school 
effectively used collaboration to address conflict in a way that challenged institutional norms, 
sparked new ideas, and promoted institutional learning, while another school used collaboration 
to promote warm and collegial relationships among teachers, but saw little long-term change as a 
result (Achinstein, 2002).   
A quantitative, but non-causal, study of the factors that affect professional community in 
Chicago schools found that, at the teacher level, experience was a predictor of professional 
community, and at the school level, strong leadership, trust, and higher prior achievement were 
strong predictors. The authors conceptualized professional community as comprising reflective 
dialogue, deprivatized practice, staff collegiality and collaboration, a focus on student learning, 




using a survey of teachers. School size was the strongest predictor of professional community, 
with smaller schools having more community, but that effect seems to be a mediator, not a direct 
cause, as it disappeared when survey data on the school’s social context were added to the 
model.  Although the study analyzed rich survey data using multi-level modeling techniques, it 
could not control for selection of teachers into schools with particular features and levels of 
community, so only offers correlations for further study (Bryk, Camburn & Louis, 1999). 
Using a similar quantitative but non-causal strategy to analyze unusually rich data about 
school characteristics in New York City, Dobbie and Fryer (2013) found that particular practices 
in charter schools were correlated with effectiveness, while teacher training and traditional 
factors such as class size and per pupil expenditures were not. These practices did not explicitly 
include teacher collaboration, but did include frequent feedback, tutoring, increased instructional 
time, high expectations, and the use of data to guide instruction. The last, in particular, could be 
related to effective team-based problem-solving by teachers. 
In his 2006 review of the education literature on teacher collaboration as a workplace 
condition, Kelchtermans found that collaboration could increase effectiveness of teaching and 
enhance continuous school improvement, but simply increasing professional collegiality did not 
automatically confer these benefits. To the extent that the threat of interfering with collegial 
relationships may inhibit colleagues from discussing difficult issues, a culture of collegiality may 
become a culture of comfortable mediocrity dominated by unchallenged consensus or majority 
thinking. Kelchtermans found that collaboration was most effective when teachers engaged in 
collaborative problem solving that pushed them to deeply engage in underlying actions and 
beliefs. An early case study found dramatic range in the quality and quantity of conversations 




of teacher collaboration, Professional Learning Communities (PLCs), in a middle school 
similarly found variation in the extent to which PLCs contributed to depth of teacher learning 
and improvement in effectiveness; notably, one teacher on a less effective team observed that the 
collaboration was “About teaching… but not about student learning.” Researchers identified 
group size, leadership support, and time for common planning as elements that contributed to 
more effective collaboration (Graham, 2007).   
Surveys and focus groups of teachers in Minnesota reported that over 90% of teachers 
found collaboration to be valuable and to improve the use of data to make decisions in schools 
(Huffman & Klanin, 2003). Case studies of collaborative professional culture in three elementary 
schools that dramatically improved in a short period of time revealed that conversations based on 
student data tended to promote purposeful improvement and self-efficacy (Strahan, 2003). 
Clearly, the effectiveness of any particular collaborative approach to teacher improvement and 
development would depend greatly on the underlying culture of the school (Hoy, 1990). In 
particular, since teacher collaboration will tend to promote the spread of dominant beliefs about 
teaching and learning to new teachers, schools with already positive cultures should see more 
positive effects from collaboration; it is unclear, however, whether collaboration on its own can 
help improve the culture of a dysfunctional school. 
Increasingly popular research methodologies also offer promise for learning more about 
the effects of collaboration, as well as the factors that determine effective collaboration. In 
particular, social network analysis has been applied to teacher collaboration in Dutch schools, 
uncovering structures of teacher interactions that often differ from formal structures, serve 
multiple purposes and change over time. Notably, interactions did seem to be closely linked to 




were similar to themselves with respect to gender, age, experience, ethnicity, beliefs about 
teaching, and grade and subject taught (Moolenaar, 2012).   
A common refrain in the literature on teacher collaboration is the importance of strong 
principal leadership to facilitate more effective collaboration. There is no doubt that leadership 
matters, but there is a tension between leadership that is hands-on but that could become too 
prescriptive versus leadership that promotes teacher autonomy but could lead to a lack of quality 
control. Either leadership style appears to be associated with more effective collaboration unless 
it veers too far into the extreme in either case. School leaders also promote effective 
collaboration by providing protected time for common planning (Scribner, 1999).  Based on 
work with four medium-sized districts, Wayman, Midgley and Stringfield (2006) emphasized the 
importance of “calibration,” which they defined as developing a common understanding of 
teaching and learning and consensus on goals, as a critical contextual ingredient for successful 
collaborative data teams. 
Overall, although the quantitative and in particular any experimental or quasi-
experimental data is thin, there is reason to be optimistic about specific forms of collaboration 
that emphasize data use, teacher learning, and problem solving, as a way to enhance teacher 
learning and productivity and address gaps in teachers’ pre-service training. An ongoing 
qualitative study of PLCs that emphasized collaborative inquiry presented initially promising 
results on teacher professional growth despite significant challenges in successfully forming such 
teams (Nelson, 2009). Further, a quantitative analysis of teacher satisfaction with professional 
development based on collaborative action research found promising results that hinged critically 




research there appears to be great potential, but much work to do in the area of identifying 
effective practices in teacher collaboration and teamwork. 
Ronfeldt and colleagues recently published a study (2015) that quantitatively explores 
how within-school variation in the quality of collaboration relates to student achievement. 
Although the study is non-causal, it represents a significant contribution by incorporating both 
school-level and teacher-level variability in collaboration type and intensity in a multi-level 
model; further, the study examines the teacher-level factors that predict collaboration quality, 
measured by surveys of teachers on the intensiveness and helpfulness of various types of 
collaboration. The authors emphasized the importance of both conditions as indicators of quality, 
as collaboration that is helpful without being extensive is necessary but not sufficient, and 
collaboration that is extensive but unhelpful is merely a waste of time. They find positive and 
statistically significant results of more and better-quality collaboration, particularly at the school 
level, with much stronger effects in math than in reading. Once controlling for the school level in 
a random-effects, multi-level framework, only small teacher effects remain - less than 0.1 
standard deviations in math, and no significant effects in reading. 
In a five-year, quasi-experimental analysis of teacher inquiry among grade-level teams in 
nine Title 1 schools, effects were only seen in later years of the intervention, when the 
intervention was refined to provide additional training and implementation support (Saunders, 
Goldenberg & Gallimore, 2009; Gallimore et al., 2009). The authors note significant gaps in 
existing literature on teacher collaboration: few quantitative studies and even fewer experimental 
or quasi-experimental studies exist, few studies examine impacts on student achievement, and 
qualitative studies likely suffer from selection bias as teams are only selected for study on the 




that selected the inquiry team improvement initiative to 6 comparison schools that received other 
initiatives and were similar at baseline, is an improvement upon descriptive analyses, it still may 
suffer from selection or management bias since schools elected to participate in the treatment. 
Further, while measured effects were substantially larger than other effects in the literature, at 
0.8 standard deviations, those were only observed after intensive training and implementation 
support that was not randomly assigned. 
INDIVIDUAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING – HUMAN AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
INTERACTIONS 
A number of authors have offered arguments for why collaboration may be productive in 
public sector settings in general, and in education in particular. While empirical evidence on this 
is somewhat limited, it does suggest specific potential benefits of collaboration and settings 
under which it is most likely to enhance individual and organizational productivity. 
Hargreaves and Fullan (2012) argued that professional capital – the product of human capital, 
social capital, and decisional capital – is the key lever by which to invest in better schools and 
teachers (p. 3). Any of three alone is insufficient, particularly human capital, in part because 
investing in social capital, defined as relationships and trust, can lead to improvements in human 
capital through knowledge sharing and peer effects, but not vice versa. Hargreaves and Fullan’s 
argument is based in part on examination of the educational practices of high-performing nations 
such as Finland, arguing that school reforms must invest in raising the performance of all 
teachers, as opposed to narrowly focusing on eliminating a few at the lower tail of the 
performance distribution and rewarding a small handful at the top. They further base their 
argument on a McKinsey report based on a study of 20 national school systems that are 
consistently high performing and continuously improving. The authors conclude that a marker of 




innovation through peer-based learning, structured experimentation, and decentralized decision-
making (Mourshed, Chijioke & Barber, 2010). One possible reason for the hypothesized 
interaction between human capital and social capital is that knowledge may be highly 
contextualized in school settings, and learning may be highly experiential – as Hargreaves and 
Fullan state, truth is “situational, not statistical” (p. 112). 
Pil and Leana (2009) engaged in a study of 1,103 teachers in 239 grade teams to analyze 
the relative importance of human and social capital and their interactions. They used survey data 
to measure the number of social ties between teachers and their strength and incorporated those 
measures, along with human capital measures, in a multi-level analysis on their effects on 
student math scores. They conclude that social capital may have as much of an effect on student 
achievement as teacher human capital, in part because aggregated and accumulated human 
capital is itself a resource, deemed intellectual capital, that is shared through social capital. At the 
teacher level of analysis, human capital was an important predictor, but at the team level, social 
ties became important, as well. 
Finally, collaboration may have implications broader than promoting individual learning 
and productivity. Ansell (2011) argues that there is a fundamental tension between democracy 
and governance - governance requires flexibility and discretion, especially in novel situations 
that street-level bureaucrats encounter for which there has not been time to develop a series of 
rules through the democratic process. Managing this tension, and allowing public servants 
sufficient latitude to solve problems while building their own and organizational capacity to do 
so while also maintaining public oversight and trust, is a central challenge of democracies. Two 
trends relevant to education make this tension even more challenging to manage: one is the 




that new systems and institutions seldom fully entirely replace, but are rather layered on top of, 
old systems. Secondly, constituencies for public services – in this case, students – are highly 
differentiated, requiring unique and innovative responses on demand. 
Democratic experimentalism - based on the philosophy of pragmatism developed by 
Peirce, James, Dewey, Mead and others, and applied to particular settings by Charles Sabel, 
Michael Dorf, and others – applies pragmatist philosophy to the relationship between democracy 
and governance, based on continuous improvement as seen in Japanese production methods. 
Public sector agencies engage in collaboration, monitoring, and problem-solving to continuously 
evolve and improve to meet public demand. This philosophy implies that effective collaboration 
can help teachers adapt to new conditions, manage changes in curriculum, innovate and solve 
new instructional problems, adapt to meet the unique learning needs of students, incorporate new 
research findings into their practice, and share successful strategies so that teachers and schools 
can learn from one another. Focusing collaboration on a particular problem, as is the case with 
the inquiry team intervention studied here, reflects the need to drill down to particulars, and an 
emphasis on what Ansell calls “analytical holism.” The process is analytical because of the need 
to break complex problems into constituent parts, to address them in a focused, disciplined 
manner, while “holism” refers to need to fully consider the context in which problems occur. 
 Collectively, the literature suggests that there is relatively little consensus on the most 
effective policies to increase teacher productivity over time. Empirical evidence on pre-service 
training, in-service training, and incentive programs is generally inconsistent or weak, although 
elements of all three could ultimately be combined to enhance teacher effectiveness. There is 
relatively little quantitative literature on the effects of teacher collaboration, and most of the 




existing studies that relate teacher collaboration to student achievement suggest that there are 
small but positive effects. There is a relatively rich qualitative literature on the practices of 
effective teacher teams, which generally suggests that leadership support and time are critical 
pre-conditions, and the most successful teams are willing to productively engage in conflict to 
promote learning; however, these studies generally are on teams that have already been 
determined to be effective, and thus may suffer from selection bias. 
 The recent study by Ronfeldt represents a significant contribution in that it was the first 
to look at within-school variation in collaboration type and quality using multi-level modeling. 
This study contributes to the literature and advances knowledge on the research questions by 
engaging in the first comprehensive, mixed methods examination of a single policy initiative 
over time using three empirical approaches: a quasi-experimental approach that incorporates 
heterogeneity, mechanisms, and within-school variation that is based on administrative, not 
survey data, a qualitative case study analysis that further examines heterogeneity in team quality, 
processes, and more proximal teacher learning outcomes, and a cost analysis. While there is 
significant literature on the practice of teacher collaboration, this study contributes to the 





Chapter 3 DATA AND METHODS: QUANTITATIVE STRATEGY 
DATA 
Quantitative data for this study on schools, teams, teachers, and students come from 
administrative datasets from 2008-2010. The primary unit of analysis is teachers, nested in teams 
and schools. The quantitative data come from administrative datasets on school demographics 
and accountability; basic teacher biographical information including experience, education, and 
tenure within a particular school; information about team composition and focus that teams 
voluntarily entered into a central database in the 2007-2008, 2008-2009, and 2009-2010 school 
years; teacher value-added scores for teachers of math and English Language Arts in grades 4-8 
that were released publicly from 2007-2010; and student-level information on attendance and 
graduation. Due to changes in the level of detail reported on team composition, the individual 
teachers serving on each team are only identifiable in the 2009-2010 school year. Data from 
other years will be used for alternative identification strategies as robustness checks and 
sensitivity analyses, and to measure changes over time on some outcome variables. 
   The number of teams grew from 1,455 in 2007-2008 to 2,605 in 2008-2009 to 9,176 in 
2009-2010, and ranged an average of just over 1 per school in 2007-2008 to 15 per school in 
2009-2010, although a small number of schools with an implausibly large number of teams (up 
to 85) indicates some possible data entry errors that may skew the mean number of teams per 
school upward. Note that a number of the identification strategies employed depend upon grade 
assignment or grade shifts, and therefore are limited to teams that focused on a single grade 
level. Approximately 55% of teams over the three years were grade-level teams; as one test of 
the generalizability of the results beyond grade-level teams, I run ordinary least squares (OLS) 




grade-level teams are slightly smaller than those for the pooled sample, suggesting caution in 
generalizing the quasi-experimental results to other types of teams. 
The data available on teams varies by year, as the district changed the questionnaire for 
the administrative database they used to collect information on team activities, and data entry 
was optional. Thus, the quantity and quality of data varies by school, a fact that can be exploited 
in descriptive analysis of heterogeneity in team quality and intensity. Data become generally 
more available over time, but include the school, number of teachers on the team, grade level 
and/or subject area focus of the team, characteristics of the student population on which the team 
focused (e.g., English language learners), and descriptive notes on the team’s process, including 
assessments it used to measure student learning and any instructional changes the team made. 
Table 3-1 summarizes the data available each year and which outcomes are used in each 






TABLE 3-1 OUTCOMES BY MODEL AND YEAR 
		 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 
Model Retention VA 
Test 
Scores VA Retention 
Test 
Scores VA Retention 
Test 
Scores 
OLS with school fixed effects X X 


































OLS for first-year teachers (with 
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 Information about teachers comes from two sources – one is an administrative dataset 
with basic biographical information including education and experience on all teachers in the 
district from 2007-2011; although this dataset has information about all teachers, the data 
available are relatively thin and do not include, for example, the exact grade taught by each 
teacher. Therefore, some biographical information about teachers must come from the outcome 
dataset, which provides an estimate of value-added in math and English Language Arts for 
teachers in grades 4-8 from 2007-2010. Although this dataset only covers 14,651of the 96,680 
teachers and administrators in the complete pedagogical information database, it will provide the 
primary sample for analysis because it includes grade level and value-added data, critical for the 
analysis under the primary identification strategy. Descriptive statistics on the teachers in this 
sample are summarized in Table 3-2. 








n 82726 82700 80117 
Share first year 0.09 0.07 0.03 
Average years 
teaching 9.05 9.30 9.82 
 
As noted above, one outcome of interest will be an estimate of teacher value-added, or 
the changes in student learning over time that can be attributed to an individual teacher by 
partialing out prior achievement and student characteristics. The school district under study 
contracted with researchers at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to obtain estimates of value-
added for teachers in grades 4-8 in math and ELA. The analysis was limited to those grades 




younger grades lacked pre-scores while high school exams are not vertically aligned with exams 
from previous years to allow for a growth measurement. This value-added analysis was not for 
formal stakes, and was intended to provide information to teachers and principals about teacher 
performance that might be used to improve professional development; however, these scores 
were released to the public following a Freedom of Information Act request in September 2010 
by several media outlets, following a similar release to the Los Angeles Times.  
The value-added model is estimated in three stages, taking into account the standard error 
of measurement for pre- and posttests, prior scores, student characteristics, and peer 
characteristics within the classroom. The first stage regresses student test scores on prior scores, 
student characteristics, and classroom indicators; the second stage regresses the residuals from 
the first stage on classroom characteristics, and the third stage regresses the residuals from the 
second stage on teacher indicator variables, to take into account that some teachers teach 
multiple classes and some classrooms have multiple teachers (Value-added Research Center, 
2010). Note that this analysis is therefore subject to limitations of analysis using value-added 
data, including limited scope of outcomes measured by test scores, potential bias due to 
systematic sorting of teachers and students, and imprecision and lack of reliability of measures of 
teacher effectiveness. 
There are 14,651 unique teachers with value-added scores on math and/or ELA in the 
2008-2010 time period, which includes the 2009-2010 year of nearly full inquiry team 
implementation and the prior school year as a baseline for the difference-in-differences 
specification. Of the 58,826 value added scores, which are substantially greater in number 
because teachers receive scores for multiple subjects, grades, and years, the majority are for 




teachers are not represented as they teach non-tested subjects. The scores are almost evenly 
divided between ELA (27,559) and math (29,267). Table 3-3 shows descriptive statistics on 
value-added measures; the main measures are standardized to have a mean of 0 and standard 
deviation of 0.2, which is very similar across subjects, grades, and years, although appears to be 
very slightly higher for math than ELA, for higher grades than lower grades, and for later years, 
on average. 
Additional outcomes include teacher retention, obtained from the pedagogical 
information database, as well as student outcomes on attendance and graduation rates to analyze 
the effects on important outcomes besides test scores. The teacher retention outcomes allow for 





TABLE 3-3. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON VALUE-ADDED, 2008-2010 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Value-added 56826 0.002 0.1720 -0.99 2.15 
Subject      
ELA 27559 0.000 0.147 -0.78 2.15 
Math 29267 0.003 0.192 -0.99 1.59 
Grade      
4 17010 0.001 0.185 -0.87 1.51 
5 16132 0.003 0.181 -0.84 2.15 
6 6583 0.008 0.163 -0.68 1.33 
7 4661 0.005 0.131 -0.84 0.97 
8 5036 0.005 0.151 -0.73 0.87 
Year      
2008 17697 0.001 0.130 -0.87 1.59 
2009 16733 0.002 0.130 -0.69 1.14 
2010 16640 0.006 0.237 -0.86 2.15 
The average number of teams per school was high, at 15, with a maximum of 85 teams at 
one school. Since this initiative was supported by the school district’s central administration, 
there may have been an incentive to inflate the number of teams or exaggerate the extent to 
which teamwork was actually happening at the school level when entering information about 
team activity into the database; for instance, the largest team had 127 members, and one teacher 
was listed as a member of 96 different teams. Therefore, to focus on teams of a more realistic 
scope, teams with more than 20 members and teachers on more than 10 teams were trimmed 
from the sample. Of the 9,176 teams originally in the database, 176 were trimmed in this way, 




the team database were trimmed from the sample.5 Of the remaining teams, 4,919 focused on a 
single grade level. There were slightly more teams at the elementary than at the middle school 
grade levels, potentially because middle school teams may have been more likely to be organized 
by subject area.  
Official teacher IDs are not observable, so teachers were linked to the Inquiry Spaces 
data by name, creating potential for incorrect linkages due to spelling variations or two teachers 
sharing the same name. To mitigate this risk, all teacher names were converted to lower-case and 
trimmed of leading and trailing spaces using Stata’s string functions. Teachers with the same 
first and last name but different schools within the same year were dropped from the sample to 
reduce the risk of connecting team data to the wrong teacher; this applied to 177 teachers during 
the sample period. Note that some of these teachers may genuinely be the same person who 
switched schools during the school year, and this procedure does not address the risk that 
teachers within the same school may have the same first and last names. Therefore, inferences 
about this sample cannot be extended to teachers who switch schools during a school year. 
Outcome data on student test scores come from the State Education Department for the 
school district under study. Data are provided on Math and ELA test scores at the grade-
demographic subgroup level for grades 3-8, on high school exit exams by cohort and subgroup, 
and on graduation rates for a smaller number of subgroups by cohort for grades 9-12. I matched 
these data to teams that focused on the same grade, subject, and subgroup, with subgroups 
including black or Hispanic students, English language learners, and students with disabilities. 
Teams that did not identify one of these subgroups or that identified multiple subgroups were 
matched with outcome data aggregated across all students for the respective grade and subject. 
                                                            




Note that because teams do not identify exactly which students were targeted by the team that 
these estimates are likely conservative, as the outcomes for the treatment group may include 
several students who were not direct recipients of the treatment; nonetheless, if the outcome of 
interest is general improvements to instruction and teacher productivity that affect all students 
then these estimates are appropriate. One limitation of these data are that the state does not report 
average scores for a grade-subject-subgroup cell if fewer than five students were tested in that 
group for that year. For smaller schools and for sub-groups for which many students are not 
tested, particularly students with disabilities and English language learners who may be exempt 
from certain tests, this results in a large amount of missing data. 
To net out preexisting differences between students across schools, I used a gain score 
methodology in place of raw scores. The gain scores are similar in purpose to value-added 
measures, in that they attempt to isolate the effects of schooling on student learning from other 
factors, but differ in that they only adjust for prior scores and not other student characteristics, 
and that they are at the grade-subject-subgroup level, as opposed to the teacher level, so they are 
aggregated differently. Gain scores can be calculated in one of two ways – subtracting this year’s 
score from last year’s score at the previous grade to net out cohort effects or subtracting this 
year’s score from last year’s score at the same grade level to net out grade effects. The main 
results use the latter methodology, as results are reported at the school level and therefore using 
the cohort methodology does not allow for comparing students across years when they switch 
schools, such as from 5th grade in elementary school to 6th grade in middle school. The OLS 
results are qualitatively the same using either approach, but the instrumental variables results, 
discussed in the next section, differ, suggesting a potential problem with the instrument. At the 




different grade levels and multiple times, so the final results at time of graduation are used. 
Graduation rates are used simply as raw rates, which could disadvantage schools serving students 
with greater needs who enter high school with lower expected graduation rates or average time to 
graduation; this may bias the results against inquiry teams if these are the students who are most 
likely to be served by the teams, but there is not a clear counterfactual against which to compare 
graduation outcomes. As a partial test of the limitation of this approach, I separately use four 
year, five year, and six year graduation rates and find qualitatively similar results. 
Table 3-4 presents descriptive statistics on these outcomes. Elementary and middle 
school math and ELA test scores are generally centered around 670 and slightly decline through 
grades and over time. Students with disabilities and with limited English proficiency score 
substantially lower, on average, and students show about 5 points of growth on average in 2008-
2009 and lose about 1 point on average in 2009-2010. At the high school level, exit exams are 
scored on a scale of 1-4, with scores of 3 or higher indicating college readiness and 2 being the 
minimum to obtain a state-certified diploma. Average scores are between 2 and 3 on this scale, 
are fairly consistent across years, and once again are substantially lower for students with 
disabilities and English language learners. 
TABLE 3-4. SUMMARY STATISTICS ON TEST SCORE OUTCOMES, 2008-2010 
Panel A. 2008-2009 Panel B. 2009-2010 
  Mean score Growth Mean score Growth 
Elementary/Middle Schools  Elementary/Middle Schools 
Grade     
3 673.7 3.93 668.5 2.43 
4 670.87 3.15 664.94 1.05 
5 671.39 8.23 666.79 0.4 
6 662.03 4.56 658.25 -1.54 
7 661.93 9.03 657.6 -1.68 
8 655.12 3.28 651.79 -1.95 




All Students 668.95 5.27 671.96 -0.99 
Black or African American 663.17 4.96 666.28 -1.07 
Hispanic or Latino 664.52 5.69 668.09 -0.49 
Limited English Proficiency 647.91 6.76 653.42 1.4 
Students with Disabilities 645.05 7.78 651.12 2.29 
High Schools  High Schools 
Subgroup   
	 	All Students 2.54 0.04 2.56 0.03 
Black or African American 2.53 0.05 2.55 0.03 
Hispanic or Latino 2.49 0.03 2.51 0.02 
Limited English Proficiency 1.89 0.02 1.9 -0.01 
Students with Disabilities 1.69 0.06 1.75 0.06 
 
SIMPLE MODEL 
The most straightforward way to estimate the effect of team participation on teacher 
productivity, student learning, and other outcomes would be to regress an outcome measure, !"#$, 
on an indicator for team participation, %&'("#$, which would in effect calculate a difference in 
mean outcomes for teachers who do or do not participate on teams, as in equation 3: 
(3) !"#$ = * + ,%&'("#$ + -"#$ 
where, as above, j index teachers, s indexes schools, and t indexes time.  
There are, however, potential problems with this approach. Two key challenges to 
isolating the effects of teacher-led, structured collaboration are that this type of collaboration is 
difficult to measure and is undoubtedly correlated with other important omitted variables. Nearly 
all principals and teachers would likely report that they are “collaborative,” but in order to have a 
measurable impact on students, that collaboration would likely have to be fundamentally 
different in subtle but important ways that are difficult to observe in quantitative data. Further, 
these subtle differences likely do not come about independently of other important factors that 
determine teacher effectiveness and overall student achievement, including the capacity of the 




likely multiple potential sources of selection bias. These include voluntary participation on teams 
by teachers for various reasons, possibly based on important prior characteristics that may also 
determine outcomes, principal assignment of teachers to teams, and the quality of each 
individual team based on its focus and composition. In the first year of the initiative, descriptive 
data suggest that teachers primarily volunteered for teams, suggesting that the first source of 
selection bias may be the most problematic. 
Specifically, the concern is that ./0(%&'("#$, -"#$) ≠ 0. In other words, there are likely 
omitted variables that determine both likelihood of team participation and outcomes of interest, 
such as individual motivation and effort and the choices of colleagues. It is highly likely that this 
represents a classic simultaneity problem in that it is difficult to determine whether good teachers 
collaborate more or whether more collaboration makes teachers better. The direction of the 
omitted variable bias is not certain, however; for instance, principals may assign weaker teachers 
to work with their colleagues to improve, which may mask positive effects of collaboration. 
Teachers themselves may select onto more or less selective teams, more effective colleagues 
may choose to work together, or principals may assign stronger teachers to work with colleagues 
who need support on teams. 
A third problem, as noted in the review of the literature on teamwork and collaboration, 
is that not all teamwork is equal, and that while some types of team-based activities may 
contribute to productivity, others may have no effect or even be negative. This is particularly 
problematic in this setting, given that the policy under study technically mandates team 
participation, especially in the 2009-2010 school year. Both failure to capture variability in team 
quality, as well as inability to distinguish genuine team work from perfunctory compliance with 




%&'( ∗"#$+ 7. %&'( ∗"#$ represents a team’s true quality.  If 7	were uncorrelated with -"#$, as 
in classical measurement error, this basic model would be biased toward zero. A more accurate 
measure of %&'( ∗"#$ could help mitigate this bias. However, there are very likely school and 
teacher-level unobservable factors that will influence both quality of teamwork and outcomes, 
implying that ./0(-, %&'( ∗) ≠ 0. Therefore, attempts to reduce bias due to measurement error 
may exacerbate the aforementioned omitted variables bias. Further, some apparent gains to 
teamwork may represent a case of management bias, whereby productivity returns attributed to a 
particular input in a production process are in fact the result of the intangible skill and influence 
of the leader who chose that input (Mundlak, 1961). 
Given these measurement, endogeneity, and heterogeneity challenges, I estimate the 
effect of collaboration under a series of natural experiments by which teachers were induced by 
plausibly random circumstances into collaboration. The study includes multiple quasi-
experimental approaches, as opposed to just one, for two reasons: each approach may be subject 
to its own potential sources of bias, but if the sources of bias across approaches are not correlated 
with one another and the results are qualitatively similar, it increases confidence in any “true” 
effect of collaboration. There is, however, no way to empirically test whether or not any potential 
sources of bias cancel out, so while consistent results across models increase confidence, they do 
not guarantee valid causal estimates. Secondly, since the approaches isolate the effects of 
collaboration on peculiar groups of teachers, such as first-year teachers in particular grades and 
subjects and grade-switchers within a school, consistency across results increases confidence that 
results are generalizable and are not likely due to idiosyncrasies in the sub-samples used for 
identification of a local average treatment effect. Finally, given the complex and in some cases 




across models can provide evidence on how teamwork affects teachers and which mechanisms 
are at play. Further analyses, incorporating measures of team quality as well as team 
characteristics as covariates and interaction effects, are more descriptive in nature and help 
inform the qualitative analysis. 
Overall, I made methodological choices to obtain conservative estimates of the effects of 
inquiry. Where a decision could potentially induce bias, and when otherwise lacking in 
theoretical and empirical guidance, I chose the option that would more likely lead to downwardly 
biased estimates, both to err on the side of caution and to more clearly obtain a “lower-bound” 
estimate of the policy effects of inquiry for consistent interpretation. For example, all standard 
errors are clustered at the school level. It is highly likely that errors are correlated within schools, 
given the sorting of students and teachers into schools and the unobserved effects of leadership 
and school culture. Ignoring such patterns of correlation would lead to downwardly biased 
standard errors and incorrect inferences. Clustering at the appropriate level so as to model the 
error variance using observed correlational patterns within the data addresses both 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, leading to efficient and unbiased estimates; however, 
the correct level at which to cluster standard errors is not always clear, a priori. Clustering could 
occur at the teacher, grade, or subject levels within schools. As a general rule, clustering at 
higher levels within the data leads to larger standard errors, so school-level clustering is the 
conservative assumption (Cameron and Miller, 2014). 
Similarly, the available outcome measures are likely to produce lower bound estimates of 
the direct effects of inquiry. In its original conception, inquiry teams were intended to focus their 
efforts on small sub-groups of students with similar instructional needs, identified as a skill gap 




characteristics. The actual students targeted by inquiry teams are not identifiable in the data, so 
outcomes are more aggregated, at the teacher or grade-subject-subgroup level. This allows for 
the estimates to capture any spillover effects on students not directly targeted by inquiry teams, 
as well as more general effects on teacher productivity, but provides a conservative estimate of 
the direct effects of the inquiry process on the students it targets. As a sensitivity analysis in 
chapter 8, the cost-benefit analysis, I consider what assumptions or effects would be necessary in 
order for the policy to “break even,” or for the benefits of the policy to exceed the costs. 
MODEL #1: GRADE SWITCHERS 
The first quasi-experiment takes advantage of the phase-in of the initiative, as well as 
teachers who switch grades within the same school from a grade without an inquiry team during 
the 2008-2009 school year to a grade with an inquiry team in the 2009-2010 school year, 
following a similar identification strategy used in Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013a and 
2013b). Ordinarily, grade-switching might be problematic because it could indicate that, for 
example, principals are moving more effective teachers to high-stakes testing grades and less 
effective teachers away from those grades, but all teachers in this sample teach grades and 
subjects with high-stakes standardized tests. This model estimates the difference-in-differences 
in value-added outcomes for teachers who switch from a non-inquiry grade to a grade with an 
inquiry team in 2009-2010 to all other teachers, as in equation 4: 
(4) 9"#$ = * + ,:;<=%"#$ + ,>=?@%AB"#$ + ,C;<=%$=?@%AB"#$ + D"#$,E + F#$,G + -"#$ 
where j indexes teachers, s indexes schools, t indexes time, 9"#$  is the outcome of interest, 
primarily teacher value-added, ;<=%"#$ is an indicator for the 2009-2010 school year, D"#$is a 
vector of teacher-level controls, F#$ is a vector of school level controls, and ,C is the coefficient 




analysis is that the change over time in value-added measures for non-grade switchers is a valid 
counterfactual for changes over time in grade switchers. This assumption is plausible because 
even though many other policy changes occurring during a relatively tumultuous time for the 
school district might ordinarily be of concern as confounding factors, it is highly likely that 
switchers and non-switchers would be subject to the same alternative policies. Further, while 
switching grades may be endogenous, it is unlikely that a principal would switch the grade a 
teacher is teaching simply to place the teacher on an inquiry team, when creating a new team at 
the teacher’s present grade level would be a far less disruptive way to achieve the same 
objective. One possible source of downward bias is that value-added may be expected to dip 
when teachers switch grades as they adjust to a new curriculum. As one test of this assumption, a 
robustness check for this analysis restricts the sample solely to grade-switchers to net out any 
effect of the switching itself. This model is restricted to 2009-2010 because that is the only year 
for which individual teachers on teams are identifiable, and is further restricted to teachers in 
grades 4-8 with students who took the state math and/or English Language Arts (ELA) exams, as 
those are the only teachers for whom the grade levels they taught are observable. 
MODEL #2: FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS  
The grade-switcher model only allows for estimation of the effect of the policy for a 
small sub-set of teachers, and only in the year 2009-2010, when the objective was for 90% of 
teachers to be participating in a team. The second model allows for focusing specifically on 
teachers in their first year, which may be a particularly critical year for the development of 
teacher human capital. In particular if the mechanism through which teams operate is to address 
market failure in teacher preparation programs because learning to teach is highly experiential, or 




specific, then the effects would be expected to be particularly pronounced among new teachers. 
Further, because new teachers are hired to fill vacancies that may arise as late as the summer, 
after planning for the next school year is already underway, it is less likely that first-year 
teachers are strategically placed on inquiry teams and more likely that such placement is 
idiosyncratic and uncorrelated with inquiry teams at a school. One possible threat to validity 
would occur if teachers were especially likely to leave the previous year if they were on poor-
quality inquiry teams, implying that grade-subject combinations with vacancies and inquiry 
teams represent an unusually weak sub-sample of teams. This would bias results against teams. 
However, heterogeneity analysis in Chapter 6 suggests that most teams implement with low-
intensity, suggesting that poor inquiry work is unlikely to be a sufficient reason for a teacher to 
leave a school. Finally, the first-year teacher model allows for exploration of prior years of data 
that may indicate enthusiastic, early adopter effects of the first wave of inquiry teams, or 
improving effects over time due to gaining experience with teamwork. One limitation of this 
model is that individual teachers are not identifiable in the data in the 2007-2008 and 2008-2009 
school years, so the assumption must be made that if a team exists at a particular grade level with 
a first-year teacher, the new teacher is a member of that team. There are two potential concerns 
created by this assumption – one is that while principals may not strategically place first-year 
teachers on grades with teams, they may strategically elect to have teams on grades with first-
year teachers, and the second is this once again limits the sample to those teachers for whom the 
grade they teach is observable, which is the set of teachers in the value-added data. 
Of particular concern among new teachers is the expected payoff to investment in their 
human capital, given high turnover rates, especially in high-poverty urban schools. Therefore, 




year, as well as how many years the teacher remains in teaching, up through the 2010-2011 
school year, the last period for which retention data are observable. Note that, although these 
outcomes may suggest the appropriateness of non-linear models – probit or logit for the binary 
outcome of returning the following year and a survival model for the duration analysis – the 
properties of these models in conjunction with quasi-experimental methods such as the 
difference-in-differences specification used here are not well established. Therefore, the primary 
results will assume linearity. The key issue this raises relates to the distribution of the error term; 
for a number of reasons, when analyzing duration as an outcome the error is unlikely to be 
distributed normally. Most obviously, there are no negative durations. There is also right 
censoring, as I only observe teacher retention through 2011, which is not nearly enough time for 
all teachers who began teaching in the 2007-2010 time period to exit teaching. Finally, teacher 
retention is likely bimodal, with some teachers for whom the profession is not a good match self-
selecting out relatively quickly and others remaining for their full careers (Cleves, Gould and 
Gutierrez, 2002). In practice, however, none of these issues are likely to significantly alter the 
results of the analysis, and assuming normality and linearity simplifies interpretation of results 
and allows for use of quasi-experimental methods, as in equation 5, specified similarly to 
equation 4: 
(5) 9"#H$ = ,:;<=%$ + ,>%&'("#H$ + ,C;<=%$%&'("#H$ + D#,E + -"#H$ 
where 9"#$represents a range of outcomes for teacher j in school s at grade g and time t. These 
outcomes include whether or not a teacher returns for a second year, total years teaching through 
the 2010-2011 school year, and value-added measures. 




The third model uses two-stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate the effect of inquiry 
teams on various student-level outcomes, based on the predicted incidence of a team at the grade 
or subject level. The prediction is based on the number of class sections offered at that grade or 
in that subject within a school, as shown in equations 6 and 7, under the theory that as the policy 
phases in across a school, teams are most likely to form where there is a “critical mass” of 
teachers. This instrument is based on the literature on optimal team size and on homogeneity as a 
predictor of team effectiveness. Although the outcome of the first stage regression of team 
existence on the instrument of class sections is binary, this regression is estimated using OLS. As 
Angrist (2001) notes, estimating a binary first-stage using probit or logit yields an inconsistent 
second stage unless the first-stage is correctly specified, whereas the second stage results are 
consistent even with a linear approximation in the first-stage. Data on class sections come from 
the Class Size Reports published by the school district each year; these reports provide grade-
specific enrollments, number of class sections, and average class size for each grade in 
elementary and middle schools and for each subject in high schools. Unfortunately, class size 
data are not disaggregated at the grade level in 2007-2008, so I ran these models for the 2008-
2009 and 2009-2010 inquiry data only. 
(6) IH#$ = * + ,:=J.KL/MNH#$ + ,>=J.KL/MNH#$> + O# + -H#$ 
(7) !PH#$ = O: + O>IH#$ + -PH#$ 
IH#$ is an indicator for having a team at grade g in school s at time t, =J.KL/MNH#$  is the 
number of class sections at that grade level, O#  is a school fixed effect, IH#$ is the predicted 
probability of having a team based on the number of sections, and !PH#$is a vector of outcomes 




Several assumptions are required for an instrumental variables estimate to be valid. First, 
the instrument cannot be weak - the covariance between the instrument and the endogenous 
variable, in this case, the existence of a team, must be greater than zero. Secondly, the instrument 
must satisfy the exclusion restriction, implying that the instrument only acts on the outcome 
through the channel of the endogenous variable and is uncorrelated with the error in the second-
stage equation. Note that one limitation of this analysis is that, because of the way school 
planning occurs, there is likely to be relatively little variation between grades in enrollment and 
number of sections, so the prediction for the existence of teams at a particular grade level or 
subject area is based on a small amount of variance. This could potentially lead to a weak 
instrument problem, which exacerbates the bias of 2SLS estimates in small samples. The first 
assumption is testable using the F-statistic for the first-stage regression, among other tests, but 
the exclusion restriction cannot be tested directly. 
In general, instrumental variables estimates provide a causal effect of the treatment on 
compliers – in this case, those grades and subjects which have a team because of the number of 
class sections at that grade or subject, excluding those which would always have a team and 
those which would never have a team. Compliers are not directly observable, as those grades and 
subjects with teams also include always-takers, or those that would have a team regardless of the 
number of sections. An important assumption for this interpretation, however, is that there are no 
defiers – no grades or subjects that would elect not to have a team because of more class sections 
and would have a team with fewer class sections. This monotonicity assumption is potentially 
problematic in this case, as the likelihood of having a team does not increase indefinitely with 
the number of teachers at a grade or in a subject area. There is likely a point beyond which there 




to have a team at another grade level or subject area where the numbers are more manageable. 
Therefore, to test this assumption the first stage is specified in multiple ways, including linearly, 
with a quadratic term to allow the likelihood of having a team to decrease with class sections 
above a critical point, and for sub-samples of schools with smaller numbers of class sections, to 
determine robustness of results to the specification of the first-stage and to this assumption, as 
suggested by Dieterle and Snell (2014).  
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF HETEROGENEITY 
As noted above, all of these models are subject to potentially severe attenuation bias due 
to measurement error in the indicator variable for having a team, particularly given that the 
quality of team collaboration and the actions teachers take as a result of teamwork is likely to 
vary tremendously between schools, is not able to be adequately captured in data, and is itself 
likely to be endogenous. Although the instrumental variables approach can mitigate 
measurement error, model 3 instruments for team participation, not for team quality. I explore 
additional measures of quality of team participation, as well as possible instrumental variables to 
use to predict quality, as a way to address measurement error. Measures of quality include the 
number of “inquiry cycles” the team completed – in 2009-2010, for instance, it was possible to 
input up to 5 cycles in the database recording inquiry activity, but only four out of over 9,000 
teams entered data for all five cycles – and descriptive coding of the team process, focus, and 
activities based on reading a sub-sample of entries into the inquiry team database. Differences in 
accountability pressure due to staggering of the qualitative accountability system are considered 





Chapter 4 METHODS AND DATA: QUALITATIVE AND COST ANALYSES 
QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS  
There is extensive literature on the heterogeneity of quality of collaboration, as well as 
the difficulties in measuring quality with validity, reliability, and precision. Further, the 
quantitative analysis estimates the effects of a policy mandating teamwork, but due to 
heterogeneity and measurement issues, does not estimate the effect of teamwork itself, 
particularly if that teamwork is of high quality. Accordingly, I complement the quantitative 
analysis on the effects of teamwork, as well as descriptive analysis on the heterogeneity of 
effects and the conditions that contribute to success, with a qualitative case study analysis of four 
teams to further explore the conditions and processes that constitute effective teamwork. The 
qualitative data were collected prior to the quantitative analysis, although they represent a later 
time period in the evolution of the same intervention in the school district. The qualitative 
analysis was informed by, and occurred subsequent to, the quantitative analysis in a mixed 
methods, sequential explanatory design (Creswell and Clark, 2011). In essence, given the low 
intensity of implementation seen in the quantitative analysis and high degree of heterogeneity, 
the qualitative analysis was designed to attempt to explain and contextualize quantitative 
findings, to uncover practices and attitudes that may contribute to more successful inquiry, and to 
generate hypotheses for further quantitative analysis. 
The topic, research questions, and setting lend themselves to a case study analysis for a 
number of reasons. Teams within schools constitute what qualitative methodologists, starting 
with Louis Smith, refer to as a “bounded system,” whereby each team has distinct characteristics 
and recognizable edges. Case studies provide an in-depth description and analysis of each 




multiple data sources including observations and interviews. The case study methodology 
emphasizes exploration and discovery over testing specific hypotheses, and therefore is well 
suited to uncovering team processes and the conditions that lead to team success (Merriam, 
2009). 
As noted above, the data available for analysis include transcripts from between 8-10 
observations of team meetings and 1-2 semi-structured interviews with individual or groups of 
team members at each of four schools. The schools were selected to represent a range of student 
demographics among schools that showed great promise in team practice based on analysis of 
the team database and recommendations by central office staff. All data were collected and 
transcribed by me and a team of students and professors at Teachers College and Columbia Law 
School; transcriptions have been entered into the Dedoose qualitative analysis software program 
to facilitate analysis. All observation and interview transcripts were carefully read and coded 
according to a topical and analytical coding scheme developed in accordance with the conceptual 
framework and the literature on teamwork (see Appendix C for coding scheme). I then wrote 
brief summary descriptions of the processes teams underwent in each case. Using the analytic 
codes and case descriptions, I have summarized the findings for each case using data tables 
based on analytical categories from my conceptual framework, including instances of particular 
conditions, processes, and outcomes, and compared and contrasted findings within and across 
cases (Yin, 2013). 
The case study method has several potential limitations. In particular, the sample for case 
studies is necessarily small and nowhere near as large and representative as the 13,000 teams in 
the quantitative sample. Therefore, findings may be less generalizable. Further, the results are 




context may be influencing conditions, processes, and outcomes. The case study sample was 
deliberately selected to reflect high-quality implementation of the inquiry team initiative, and 
thus results may reflect selection bias – schools with strong leadership and teachers may be more 
likely to collaborate well and see positive results, as opposed to collaboration contributing to 
teacher quality. Relatedly, qualitative analysis relies heavily on methodological choices and 
interpretation by the researcher. A strength and limitation is its inherent subjectivity, whereby it 
is possible to more deeply explore nuance, context, and mechanisms more deeply than in 
quantitative methodology, but the results may be sensitive to limitations of sample, context, and 
the researcher’s own judgment. The primary guard against potential biases is the systematic 
development and testing of alternative hypotheses that may also explain observed patterns in the 
data.  
The research team collected qualitative data on four teams in one elementary and three 
middle schools during the 2011-2012 school year. The primary unit of analysis for the qualitative 
study is the team. A purposive sample of four teams has been selected, each comprising between 
5 and 10 teachers; two administrators (a principal and an assistant principal) are a permanent part 
of one team and school administrators are occasionally members of the other teams.  
Schools were selected based on quantitative measures of school performance, a 
qualitative evaluation of collaboration by outside experts using a school quality rubric, and 
recommendations by non-profit organizations that support the schools. Two of the teams 
represent grade-level teams, with teachers of different subjects sharing interdisciplinary practice 
and evaluating the instructional needs of individual students. One team represents a group of 
teachers who joined together to focus on similar pedagogical skills, and a final team represents a 




instruction with research-based best practices across the school. While the sample is not random, 
it includes a range of school demographics, one school with a very high population of English 
language learners, and one school with an above-average population of students with disabilities 
(see Table 4-1). Each team was observed between eight and ten times, and at least one interview 
was conducted with each team. Observations and semi-structured interviews following an 
established protocol with iterative follow-up questions were audio-recorded and transcribed. The 
observations intended to document team practice, focusing on whether teams followed 
established protocols and agendas, leadership on the team, group dynamics, how teams made 
decisions and the types of evidence consulted, and whether and how teams followed up on plans 
discussed at each meeting. Interview questions addressed similar topics, but gave teachers and 
principals the opportunity to reflect upon and discuss the extent to which choices made were 
deliberate, the process for choosing how to implement inquiry teams, and any proximal 





TABLE 4-1. DESCRIPTION OF CASE STUDY SAMPLE 
 
School A School B School C School D 
School Characteristics     
     Enrollment 190  500  250 400 
     Grades Served 6-8 Pre-k-5 6-8 6-8  
     Race/Ethnicity     
          Black 40% 5% 20% 5% 
          Hispanic  50% 20% 70% 90% 
          Asian  <5% 30% 5% -- 
          White  10% 45% 5% -- 
          American Indian or Alaska Native  <5% -- <5% -- 
    English Language Learners (ELLs) 10% 30% 5% 50% 
Individualized Education Programs (IEPs)  40% 15% 20% 20% 
    Free or Reduced-Price Lunch  75% 80% 75% 95% 






 To address the questions of the costs of inquiry teams and how those costs compare to 
potential benefits, I followed the ingredients method, developed by Henry Levin (Levin and 
McEwan, 2001). As noted in the theoretical model, a critical element in the time allocation 
model by which teachers choose how to perform their work is the marginal cost of each activity, 
relative to its marginal benefit and compared to alternatives, expressed in the model in terms of 
time and effort.  
While the theoretical model focuses on teachers, school leaders play an important role - 
their policies and choices strongly influence teachers’ choices, and the costs and benefits of how 
teachers spend their time clearly relate to school leaders’ objective functions and budget 
constraints. Even when the direct costs of additional teacher collaboration are minimal, there are 
clearly opportunity costs when teachers engage in collaborative activities; they could be 
engaging in individual work that may be more productive, they could be providing additional 
professional services to the school such as tutoring struggling students or helping with 
administrative tasks, and there may even be direct financial outlays if collaborative work 
requires, for example, overtime wages, as it did in some cases with the inquiry team initiative. 
Therefore, a full economic evaluation of the initiative requires evaluation of not just the effects, 
but also the costs. Given continued investment in teacher professional development, and renewed 
interest in collaboration as a professional development tool – the contract with the teachers’ 
union in the school district in this study now mandates weekly peer collaboration – information 
about the costs and benefits of collaboration is particularly important. 
The ingredients method, in contrast to analysis of expenditures or budgets, attempts to 




economic or opportunity cost. Simply looking at budgets or other sources of data on financial 
outlays may miss important ingredients that are donated or provided in-kind, such as time 
teachers reallocate to inquiry teams from other work, or uncompensated time they may spend 
after school on inquiry and related work. Budgets may also not account for the reallocation of 
existing resources from one use to another, and may not take into account important costs that 
are not typically reported in annual budgets, such as the costs of fringe benefits or the 
depreciation of capital goods. Further, the careful tabulation of ingredients based on document 
analysis and interviews with stakeholders provides a more thorough picture of exactly what an 
intervention entails, acting as a rudimentary implementation analysis, as well. 
To gather ingredients data, I drew upon the rich implementation data available in the 
team databases over three years, as well as the implementation studies performed by CPRE 
(2008, 2010) and Talbert (2010). Data on ingredients were then combined with information 
about national average prices for educational resources from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
National Center for Education Statistics, and other sources, gathered to form the Educational 
Resource Price Database by the Center for Benefit-Cost Studies of Education at Teachers 
College, Columbia University, to obtain a range of per-school costs as well as a pooled average 
per student cost for the program. 
Cost data were then combined with effectiveness data from the quantitative analysis for 
cost-benefit analysis. A cost-benefit analysis assesses the ratio of the benefits to the costs of a 
program, both measured in monetary terms. The necessary condition for implementing a 
program is that the benefits exceed the costs – in other words, the net benefits are positive or the 
benefit-cost ratio is greater than one. A sufficient condition for implementing the program is that 




the existence of meaningful alternative programs that are evaluated using similar methodology 
and assumptions.  
To perform the within-program cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the program is 
worthwhile on its own, I applied the measured effects to shadow prices for various outcomes that 
have been reported in the literature; for instance, Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff (2013b) have 
estimates of the value of increases in teacher value-added based on differences in students’ future 
earnings, and Ronfeldt, Loeb, and Wyckoff (2013) have estimates of the detrimental effects of 
turnover on student achievement, which have been translated into monetary terms based on 






Chapter 5 EFFECTS OF INQUIRY TEAM PARTICIPATION ON MEASURES 
OF TEACHER PRODUCTIVITY 
This chapter presents findings on the association between team participation and various 
outcomes that serve as indicators of teacher human capital or productivity, including measures of 
value-added, gains in student test scores, student graduation rates, and teacher retention rates. 
This chapter also includes estimates of the causal effect of inquiry on these outcomes using the 
three quasi-experimental models described above. Consistent results across the models will 
provide strong evidence of an overall effect of inquiry on the development of teacher human 
capital, whereas differences in results across models are more difficult to interpret and may be 
due to differences in outcomes, in local average treatment effects (LATEs) for each model, or 
potential bias, wherein one estimate is valid and another is invalid due to violations of the 
necessary assumptions for internal validity. Whenever possible, I ran robustness checks across 
models; for example, the value-added outcomes are the primary outcomes of interest for the 
grade switcher model, but are also used in the instrumental variables and first-year teacher 
models to determine whether differences in estimated effects are due to different outcome 
measures or different analytic approaches. 
SIMPLE MODEL 
Missing Data 
 Given that data for the value-added models, including the simple model described here 
and the grade switcher model in the next section, come from a variety of different administrative 
datasets over multiple years, bias or inefficiency in estimates due to missing data is a potential 
concern. Most significantly, as noted above, the outcome variable is restricted to teachers for 




2009-2010. For the difference-in-differences model, there is the further sample restriction to 
those teachers for whom value-added scores and grades taught are observable in 2008-2009 and 
2009-2010. This represents 33,354 observations across the two years, out of 98,852 total 
different teachers observed over those two years in the team and pedagogical information 
databases. Within these sample restrictions, data is occasionally missing on some covariates, 
particularly pre-intervention value-added and the standard deviation of prior value-added at the 
team level, which requires additional prior years of data. Further, school-level demographic 
covariates are not observed in the database provided by the district for a very small number of 
schools, possibly because the schools were phasing out or because they were too small to report 
summary statistics without risking privacy violations.  
The available data on covariates, including number of observations, are presented in 
Table 5-1. The main results presented in this section and the next section exclude observations 
for which there is incomplete information. As a robustness check, I also ran models that imputed 
zero or the mean across other observations for missing variables, with dummy variables to 
indicate missingness, and found results that were qualitatively similar. In some cases, point 
estimates were very slightly higher and estimates that were marginally significant in the main 
specification became significant with the imputed data, possibly because of greater power due to 
larger samples. However, the preferred results are those that do not impute zero or the mean for 
missing data, as they are generally more conservative and avert the risk of overfitting the model 
due to imputation. 
Table 5-1 Summary Statistics on Covariates in Team-Switcher Model 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Value-added 33,354 0.004 0.191 
On a Team 98,852 0.737 0.440 





level demographic) 91,387 0.302 0.284 
Prior VA 21,998 0.007 0.130 
Team-level Prior 
VA SD 42,061 0.116 0.044 
 
To examine the basic association between being a member of a team and teacher value-added, I 
ran a series of models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS); Table 5-2 presents the results. Given 
that many teachers were on multiple teams, the data were collapsed to the teacher-subject-grade-
year level for ease of interpretation and consistency with the value-added outcomes, which were 
also at that level. The key independent variable is a dummy variable indicator for whether a 
teacher is on any teams. Column 1 shows the basic correlation between team participation and 
value-added measures, which is small and statistically insignificant. Columns 2-4 show the 
results with various covariates added to the model, including measures of value-added prior to 
the intervention, a measure of the spread of value-added on the team to address heterogeneity of 
teacher effectiveness on teams, an indicator for middle schools, and school-level student 
demographic measures. Although the coefficients become larger and are estimated with 
somewhat greater precision, they are still substantively small and statistically insignificant. 
Given that standard errors are also substantively small, at less than 0.01 standard deviations, it is 
likely that the raw average effect of inquiry team participation on teacher value-added in the 
same year is zero. Further, the R2 statistic on models without prior value-added is exceptionally 
low, at less than 0.01, suggesting that inquiry team participation explains very little of the 
variation in value-added. Since several of the following identification strategies rely upon 
inquiry teams at a single grade level, I also test whether grade teams and other teams are 




coefficient of 0.018 is marginally greater than the coefficient of 0.013 in the similar model for all 
teams, suggesting that non-grade level teams are slightly more effective than grade-level teams. 
The coefficient excluding grade teams is similarly small and not statistically significant, and the 
two coefficients are not statistically different from one another using a Chi square test. 
  
TABLE 5-2 ORDINARY LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM PARTICIPATION AND 
VALUE-ADDED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 VA VA VA VA VA 
On a team 0.0000476 0.00995 0.00424 0.0129 0.0181 
 (0.00537) (0.00687) (0.00531) (0.00700) (0.0127) 
      
Prior VA  0.713***  0.711*** 0.706*** 
  (0.0238)  (0.0239) (0.0252) 
      
SD of Prior VA 
on Team 
 0.177*  0.177 0.251 
  (0.0896)  (0.0911) (0.143) 
      
Constant 0.00629 -0.0140 0.0341* 0.0125 0.005 
 (0.00357) (0.0127) (0.0168) (0.0213) (0.0256) 
Observations 16628 11803 16223 11644 9687 
Demographic 
Covariates 
  X X X 
Excluding 
Grade Teams 
    X 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 As noted above, there are a number of concerns with this basic approach to estimating the 
causal effects of teamwork on teacher value-added. Team participation is not the only margin on 
which there could be selection bias. There are likely complex interaction effects related to team 
composition and the quality of teamwork, as well as issues related to the reflection problem, 
whereby it is difficult to disentangle the effects of the group on an individual and the group 
effects as the aggregated individual effects (Manski, 1993). Column 1 in Table 5-3 adds school 
fixed effects to estimate within-school variation in teacher value-added based on whether or not 




quality that might influence team participation and team quality. The remaining effect is small 
and remains statistically insignificant, which could be because any effects of teams are actually 
due to differences in leadership and culture across schools, or could be because very little 
variation in team participation and value added exists within schools. 
The school fixed effects specification may address some of those sources of bias to the 
extent that they are consistent across the school, but does not address underlying teacher 
characteristics that could simultaneously determine team participation and outcomes. A teacher-
subject fixed effect estimate nets out time invariant teacher characteristics within each subject 
area; the results of this model are presented in Column 2 of Table 5-3. The fixed effects are 
identified based on the introduction of the program over time, and measure changes in value-
added within the same teacher and subject. The effect is positive and statistically significant, 
although is still substantively quite small. The fact that this coefficient is higher than the OLS 
estimate indicates that selection into teams, at least by the 2009-2010 school year, could be 
negatively associated with value-added, as teachers who need the most help may be most likely 
to be assigned to teams by principals. Note that there are several major limitations to this model 
that caution against interpreting the results causally: one is that unobserved teacher 
characteristics that change over time are not captured, and secondly is that since the model 
captures changes in value-added between 2009 and 2010, some portion of the effect attributed to 
team work may partly be a year shock, as the mean value-added is 0.004 units higher in 2010 
than in 2009. Further, because the amount of variation is limited to changes in teamwork over 
time, the issues of measurement error and any remaining omitted variables bias that is not 




reduced. Note that these models were similarly run imputing missing data and splitting the 
sample according to grade-level teams, and results were qualitatively similar. 
TABLE 5-3 FIXED EFFECTS ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF TEAMWORK ON VALUE-ADDED 
 (1) (2) 
 VA VA 
On a team 0.0018 0.0113* 
 (0.00645) (0.00506) 
   
Prior VA 0.674*** -0.300*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0159) 
   
SD of Prior VA on Team 0.0618  
 (0.0819)  
   
School FE X  
Teacher-Subject FE  X 
Demographic Covariates  X 
Observations 11644 21998 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
One limitation of the fixed effects estimate is that the only source of variation is changes over 
time within the same exact teacher, limiting the sample to teachers with observations for both 
years and excluding all between-teacher variation. 
MODEL #1: GRADE SWITCHERS 
 The first quasi-experimental model takes advantage of the gradual phase-in of the inquiry 
team initiative. This analysis focuses on teachers who switch grades within a school from a grade 
without a team in 2008-2009 to one with a team in 2009-2010.  
Of the 14,651 teachers who appear in the value-added data, and for whom there is data 
for both the 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 school years, 1,975 switched grades. Of those, 777 
switched to a grade with a team, and of these 191 switched from a grade without a team to a 
grade with a team, which is the treatment identified in the difference-in-differences specification. 
Note that this analysis is restricted to teams that focused on a single grade level; some teams 




excluded from the analysis. Therefore, to the extent that those teams may have contributed to 
teacher value-added, this exclusion leads to a downward bias in the estimated effects of 
teamwork. Note  that Rothstein (2014) critiqued the switching quasi-experiment used by Chetty, 
Friedman, and Rockoff (2013a) to estimate the bias of value-added estimates using data from 
North Carolina and found that teacher switching is correlated with changes in student prior test 
scores. In general, Rothstein finds that teachers leaving a grade are replaced by others with 
higher prior VA scores when student test scores are increasing and lower prior VA scores when 
student test scores are decreasing. The model that restricts the sample to switchers nets out this 
effect, and may be the most credible due to this concern. 
Table 5-4 presents the results from the main difference-in-differences specification, 
described in equation 4. The key coefficient of interest is the interaction between an indicator for 
switching from a grade without a team in 2009 to a grade with a team in 2010 with a fixed effect 
for the year 2010. The indicator for switching to a grade with a team is applied to all teachers 
who switch to that grade within a school in 2009, so the relevant coefficient estimates the 
differences over time between those who switched to a grade with a team and those who did not. 
The counterfactual therefore includes teachers who did not switch grades and switchers who 
were always on a team or never on a team. Column 1 presents the results of the basic model, 
which are positive but small and not statistically significant. 
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5-4 add covariates, both as a check on the validity of the 
difference-in-difference assumptions and to increase the precision of the estimates. If the 
difference-in-difference estimates are valid and the assumptions hold, the coefficients should not 
change dramatically between the models; the coefficient on the interaction term remains 




error actually increases, but these differences are likely due to sample size restrictions based on 
the availability of value-added scores. Model 4 replaces school-level demographic covariates 
with school fixed effects, and the results become slightly more negative, but are still small and 
not statistically different from zero. Models were also estimated with zero imputed for missing 
values on prior value-added and the standard deviation of prior value-added for the team, along 
with dummy variables to indicate missing values, and were qualitatively similar. Although they 
were estimated with slightly greater precision, the coefficients of interest were still not 
statistically significant. 
TABLE 5-4 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECT OF TEAMWORK ON VALUE-ADDED 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Value Added Value Added Value Added Value Added 
Switch to team in 
2010 
0.00230 0.00318 -0.000485 -0.0023 
 (0.0140) (0.0144) (0.0183) (0.0230) 
     
2010 0.00464 0.00461 0.00615 0.0042 
 (0.00312) (0.00315) (0.00364) (0.0187) 
     
Switch to team 
grade 
-0.00777 -0.00641 0.00125 0.0043 
 (0.00824) (0.00832) (0.00941) (0.0187) 
     
     
2006-2007 VA 
Score 
  0.512*** 0.4610*** 
   (0.0162) (0.0101) 
     
Team SD - Prior 
VA 
  0.204*** 0.1378** 
   (0.0477) (0.0449) 
     
Constant 0.00172 0.0242* 0.000867 -0.0103 
 (0.00168) (0.0104) (0.0124) (0.0059) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
 X X  
School FEs    X 
Observations 33354 32484 21338 21675 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 





 Two potential concerns with this analysis are that switching grades is not exogenous, 
therefore violating the assumption that differences over time between switchers and non-
switchers would be expected to be similar in the absence of inquiry teams, and that switching 
itself may have an effect on value-added. Therefore, Table 5-5 presents the results of this 
analysis restricted just to the sample of 1,975 teachers who switched grades. The results are 
qualitatively similar to the results for the full sample, but are generally much smaller, in part due 
to smaller samples; none of the coefficients under any specification of the model are statistically 
significant. 
TABLE 5-5 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATE OF EFFECT OF TEAMWORK ON VALUE-ADDED, GRADE 
SWITCHERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Value Added Value Added Value Added Value Added 
Switch to team in 2010 -0.00148 0.000141 0.00069 0.0005 
 (0.0152) (0.0156) (0.0189) (0.024) 
     
2010 0.00842 0.00736 0.00652 -0.0016 
 (0.00698) (0.00716) (0.00791) (0.0068) 
     
Switch to team grade -0.00738 -0.00536 0.00501 0.0168 
 (0.00882) (0.00886) (0.0104) (0.0214) 
     
2006-2007 VA Score   0.334*** 0.1610*** 
   (0.0402) (0.0279) 
     
Team SD - Prior VA   0.167 0.1722 
   (0.100) (0.1297) 
     
Constant 0.00133 0.0249 0.00498 -0.0159 
 (0.00345) (0.0198) (0.0248) (0.0171) 
Demographic Covariates  X X  
School FEs    X 
Observations 4535 4364 3550 3680 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 The teacher data reports estimated value-added in multiple ways and for various sub-
samples of students. One key metric is value-added using multiple years of student data, which is 




added measures, in particular, have been criticized for imprecision and lack of stability over 
time, suggesting that they are more subject to differences in idiosyncratic student populations 
and measurement error. Table 5-6 reports estimates of the OLS and difference-in-difference 
models, including demographic covariates, using various outcomes. Column 1 reports OLS 
results using the multi-year value-added outcome measure, and column 4 reports the difference-
in-differences estimate; in neither case is the result statistically significant. The value-added data 
also include estimated effects on particular subgroups of students; based on the intended purpose 
of the inquiry team initiative and anecdotal evidence on teams, several teams targeted English 
Language Learners and students in the lowest 3rd of the school by performance. Therefore, 
effects of team participation on a teacher’s percentile ranking on these measures is potentially an 
outcome of interest that may capture more directly the effects of inquiry on the target population 
of students; columns 2 and 3 report the OLS estimates on these respective outcomes, and 
columns 5 and 6 report the difference in differences estimates. The only statistically significant 
coefficient is the difference-in-differences estimate of the effect of team participation on value-
added for students in the lowest 3rd. This may be because inquiry targets this group of students, 
but this coefficient should be interpreted with caution, as the multiple inferences across models 





TABLE 5-6 OLS AND DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE ESTIMATES OF THE EFFECTS OF TEAMWORK ON OTHER VALUE-
ADDED MEASURES 

















Switch to team in 
2010 
   0.00964 8.221* -2.035 
    (0.0173) (3.878) (8.834) 
       
On a team -0.00587 -1.306 -0.858    
 (0.00523) (1.396) (0.832)    
       
       
2010    0.0118*** 1.028* 1.487* 
    (0.00238) (0.402) (0.703) 
       
Switch to team 
grade 
   -0.00146 -2.043 0.433 
    (0.0108) (2.937) (6.683) 
       
Constant 0.0343* 33.26*** 38.65*** 0.0218 38.11*** 35.37*** 





X X X X X 
Observations 10444 3228 10259 20295 19575 5837 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 






 Overall, the results of the grade-switcher models and the related OLS and fixed effects 
estimates of the effects of teamwork on teacher value-added in 2009-2010 are quite modest. 
Almost all estimated coefficients are positive, but they are all substantively quite small and only 
two – the coefficient on teamwork in the individual teacher fixed effects model and the 
coefficient on the difference-in-differences interaction of the effect of teamwork on value added 
for students in the lowest third – are statistically significant. The coefficient on the main value-
added effects of approximately 0.01 represents the equivalent of a 0.04 effect size on teacher 
value-added, and the standard error is roughly twice the size of the coefficient. Although the 
effects of collaboration measured in other quantitative literature are quite small, in the range of 
0.1 standard deviation increases in test scores, these effects are small enough to suggest that 
there are no notable effects of inquiry on value-added, with the possible exception of value-
added on students in the lowest third, academically. Given the number of different models tested, 
the two significant results may be the result of multiple hypothesis testing and therefore may not 
hold in the population. There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of effects some of 
which are empirically tested in subsequent sections.  
One reason for the modest results in Model 1 could be that inquiry teams simply do not 
affect teacher productivity, on average – the intervention could be ineffective, could be working 
on another outcome, or could be implemented with such heterogeneity that positive and negative 
effects net to approximately zero on average. Given the various theoretical mechanisms through 
which collaboration can affect teacher productivity, some of which are positive and some 
negative, it is quite possible that zero net effects are masking considerable heterogeneity, and 




very little substantive inquiry work in reality, adding a great deal of noise to the data. The next 
chapter on team quality, mechanisms, and heterogeneity will further explore and test this 
hypothesis. 
Another possible reason for modest effects relates to the choice of outcome measure and 
the time horizon. Note that the theoretical model makes predictions about the effects of inquiry 
based on time spent collaborating as an investment in teacher human capital, which may involve 
a tradeoff in current productivity for greater future productivity. The value-added measures are 
based on tests taken during the 2009-2010 school year, at the same time as the inquiry work; if 
the primary effect of inquiry work is through the channel of teacher human capital, it may take 
longer for that investment to pay off and gains may not be seen until future school years. 
Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be directly tested, as value-added measures are only 
available through the 2009-2010 school year; however, the other models will include some 
longer-term outcomes. It is also possible that value-added outcomes are not the best measure of 
teacher productivity or human capital, as they are too imprecisely measured and subject to 
potential bias related to the sorting of students. It should be noted, further, that very few 
interventions have a proven effect on teacher value added, which may be a particularly difficult 
outcome to change. Finally, the difference-in-differences estimates focus specifically on the local 
average treatment effect on teachers who switch from a grade without an inquiry team to a grade 
with a team; this may be a peculiar sub-sample of teachers who is not representative of the larger 
group, although we do not observe statistically significant coefficients in the OLS model, either. 
MODEL #2: FIRST-YEAR TEACHER MODEL 
Due to differences in the availability of data, the models for first-year teachers are 




allows for comparison between years, as well as comparisons in the estimated effect of 
teamwork on value-added in 2009-2010 as a robustness check on the grade switcher model, but 
does reduce statistical power relative to pooling and precludes the inclusion of year fixed effects 
to control for year-specific shocks. The key difference in modeling between years is that the 
grade level taught is not observable prior to 2007-2008; therefore, there is no prior year to use in 
a difference-in-differences specification, and effects in that year can only be estimated using 
OLS.  
Missing Data 
 Since the covariates and outcome variables for this model come from pedagogical 
databases with information on all teachers, there is very little missing data, with the exception of 
the sample restriction on teachers with value-added scores for that outcome. Table 5-7 
summarizes descriptive statistics for this model. 
Table 5-7 Descriptive statistics on first-year teacher model, 2007-2008 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
Value-added 15634 0.00 0.13 
Still teaching 
next year 88535 0.92 0.27 
Years 
teaching 88535 4.49 0.97 
On a team 88535 0.10 0.30 
First Year 
Teaching 88535 0.09 0.29 
On a grade 
team 88535 0.04 0.19 
% Black 88534 0.32 0.28 
 
These results are presented in Table 5-8. Participating on a team in the first year of the 
inquiry team initiative appears to increase the probability of returning the following year by 




89% of non-team first-year teachers returning, but has no statistically significant effect on total 
years teaching through 2011, which is 3.4 years on average. Importantly, however, the first year 
of the initiative was subject to the greatest potential selection bias, since principals recruited 
team members and members volunteered to participate. Therefore, those who would have been 
less likely to return anyway may have been less likely to participate on teams, whereas first-year 
teachers in subsequent years are more likely to be placed on preexisting teams, reducing 
endogeneity. 
 
TABLE 5-8 OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM PARTICIPATION AND RETENTION, FIRST-YEAR 
TEACHERS, 2007-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 




















On a team 0.0485*** 0.0482*** 0.0375* 0.0468*** 0.009 0.0105 -0.033 -0.001 
 (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0153) (0.0137) (0.0472) (0.0468) (0.0503) (0.064) 
         
Constant 0.887*** 0.932*** 0.888*** 0.932*** 3.431*** 3.751*** 3.434*** 3.7*** 
 (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.004) (0.015) (0.0147) (0.053) (0.0121) (0.05) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
 X    X   
School FEs   X    X  
Excluding 
grade teams 
   X    X 
Observations 7543 7542 7543 7292 7543 7542 7543 7542 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Table 5-9 shows the association between being on a grade with an inquiry team and 
measures of value-added, specified using school-level covariates, school fixed effects, and only 
teams that did not focus on a single grade. The results are small and not statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level; the association with the fixed effects specification is marginally significant at the 
0.10 level. Overall, there appears to be some evidence of a small but limited correlation between 
team participation and both short-term retention and value-added for first-year teachers in the 




pronounced for early career teachers and that, on average, the initial implementation of the 
initiative was stronger than in later years. Nonetheless, these results cannot be interpreted 
causally without the fairly strong assumption that principals did not strategically elect to have 
inquiry teams on grades with new teachers to aid in their development or that teachers who were 
most likely to return were most likely to join teams; this assumption is plausible, but not 
empirically testable. Further, the R2 measure across these models is quite small, at approximately 
0.005, or half of one percent of variance in retention explained by the models. 
TABLE 5-9 OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM PARTICIPATION AND VALUE-ADDED, FIRST-YEAR 
TEACHERS, 2007-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Value-added Value-added Value-added 
Grade with team 0.002 0.015 -0.001 
 (0.006) (0.0088) (0.0069) 
    
Constant -0.0022 -0.0124 -0.0101 
 (0.0156) (0.0055) (0.0183) 
Demographic Covariates X   
School FEs  X  
Excluding grade-level 
teams 
  X 
Observations 1102 1102 852 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Additional prior years of data allow for estimation using a difference-in-differences 
methodology, which compares changes over time for first year teachers in grades that have an 
inquiry team in 2008-2009 to grades that do not, therefore netting out any grade-specific effects. 
The results of this analysis on teacher retention are shown in Table 5-10; columns 1-6 show OLS 
results for 2008-2009 on whether a teacher is still teaching the following year and total years of 
teaching, without and with demographic controls and with school fixed effects. The results are 
similar across specifications, small, and not statistically significant. Columns 7-8 show similar 
results using the difference-in-differences approach on the two outcomes with school fixed 




indicator for the treatment year, 2009; the effects are negative and not statistically significant 
across specifications. Notably, the effects are qualitatively similar across OLS and difference-in-
difference specifications, indicating that differences between this model and the OLS estimates 
for 2007-2008 are likely due to year-specific shocks or better implementation in 2007-2008, 
rather than methodological differences due to the estimation strategy. One clear difference 
between years is that the baseline next-year retention rate of 95.3% is significantly higher in 
2008-2009 than it was in 2007-2008. 
 
TABLE 5-10 TEAM PARTICIPATION AND RETENTION OF FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, 2008-2009 

























On a team -0.0172 -0.0172 -0.0219 0.00407 0.001 0.0024 -0.0006 0.0416 
 (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0235) (0.0419) (0.0424) (0.0496) (0.0149) (0.0449) 
         
On a team in 2009       -0.0133 -0.0294 
       (0.0175) (0.0525) 
         
2009       0.0325* -0.597*** 
       (0.0140) (0.0422) 
         
Constant 0.960*** 0.968*** 0.963*** 2.745*** 2.847*** 2.746*** 0.931*** 3.369*** 
 (0.0086) (0.0272) (0.0156) (0.0342) (0.0907) (0.0330) (0.0111) (0.0335) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
 X   X    




Observations 1381 1343 1381 1381 1343 1381 4443 4443 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Effects on teacher value-added are shown in Table 5-11. The effects are insignificant 
across specifications. The results for the difference-in-differences specifications, presented in 
columns 3-4, are quite similar, indicating that there are limited grade-specific effects.  
TABLE 5-11 EFFECTS OF TEAM PARTICIPATION ON VALUE-ADDED, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, 2008-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Value added Value added Value added Value added 
On a team 0.0127 0.0184 -0.00213 0.0120 
 (0.00856) (0.0119) (0.00740) (0.00735) 
     
Team in 2009   0.0150 0.00228 
   (0.0109) (0.00859) 
     
2009   -0.0308*** -0.0120 
   (0.00896) (0.00690) 
     
Constant -0.0273 -0.0377*** 0.00227 -0.0189*** 
 (0.0205) (0.00791) (0.0151) (0.00547) 
Demographic covariates X  X  
School FEs  X  X 
Observations 1343 1381 4287 4443 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 Table 5-12 shows the association between team participation and measures of retention 




year, as data are only available through 2010-2011, meaning that first-year teachers in 2009-
2010 can only be observed for up to two years. Columns 1-6 show OLS outcomes on still 
teaching next year and total years teaching, without and with controls and with school fixed 
effects, respectively; no results are statistically significant. Columns 7 and 8 show the difference-
in-differences results for these two outcomes, including school fixed effects. Once again, the 
baseline one-year retention rate is significantly higher, at 96.7%, indicating a general upward 
trend in retention of first-year teachers for a second year during this time period. These results 
are negative and, in the case the years teaching outcome, statistically significant, implying that 
teachers who were placed on a grade with a team in 2010 were less likely to remain in teaching 
compared with teachers placed in the same grades in prior years, as compared with the difference 
between years for first-year teachers in non-team grades. This could be indicative of year-
specific shocks in 2009-2010 or a decline in the overall quality of teams with the spread of the 
initiative. 
 
TABLE 5-12 2009-2010 RETENTION 





















On a team 0.0182 0.0176 -0.052 0.0024 -0.006 -0.138 0.112*** 0.340*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037) (0.072) (0.027) (0.068) 
         
On a team in 
2010 
      -0.0589 -0.261* 
       (0.042) (0.104) 




2010       0.0486* -0.64*** 
       (0.021) (0.052) 
         
Constant 0.967*** 0.990*** 0.988*** 2.018*** 2.220*** 2.061*** 0.923*** 2.675*** 
 (0.012) (0.043) (0.012) (0.026) (0.106) (0.021) (0.008) (0.020) 
Demographic 
covariates 
 X   X    
School FEs   X   X X X 
Observations 324 320 324 324 320 324 1339 1339 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Finally, Table 5-13 shows the effects of team participation on value-added measures. 
Columns 1 and 2 show OLS results and columns 3 and 4 show the difference-in-differences 
results; results are quite similar across specifications, and statistically significant and positive for 
the difference-in-differences model using school fixed effects. These value-added results are 
measured in the same year as the initiative, so they do not necessarily represent positive selection 
by the teachers who do not attrit; nonetheless, if teachers are more likely to leave as a result of 
participating on a team, and also have marginally higher-value added scores, the initiative may 





TABLE 5-13EFFECTS OF TEAM PARTICIPATION ON VALUE-ADDED, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, 2009-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Value-added Value-added Value-added Value-added 
On a team 0.0388 0.0690 -0.00183 -0.0236 
 (0.0260) (0.0540) (0.00846) (0.0181) 
     
On a team in 2010   0.0373 0.0552* 
   (0.0277) (0.0278) 
     
2010   -0.0102 -0.000470 
   (0.0153) (0.0138) 
     
Constant -0.0795 -0.0450* -0.0199 -0.0242*** 
 (0.0599) (0.0189) (0.0226) (0.00542) 
Demographic Covariates X  X  
School FEs  X  X 
Observations 320 324 1299 1339 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 




Overall, the first-year teacher models show limited effects of inquiry teams on beginning 
teachers, with some marginally significant effects on value-added and some effects on retention 
in the first year of the initiative. These results could be due to measurement error and attenuation 
bias as a result of differences in implementation intensity and quality; the fact that results were 
strongest in the first year is consistent with, but does not irrefutably prove, that hypothesis, as 
implementation may have been strongest with enthusiastic early adopters within each school.  
The consistency of results across OLS and difference-in-differences models, as well as 
across models estimating the effect of inquiry teams on value-added for grade-switchers and for 
first-year teachers in 2009-2010, provides some evidence in support of the validity of the 
identification strategies employed here.  




A final set of models allows for exploration of a wider range of outcomes by examining 
the effects of inquiry at the team, rather than the teacher level of analysis. These models also rely 
upon the gradual phase-in of the initiative and make the assumption that, as principals expand 
inquiry teams across the school and select new sub-groups of teachers to serve on teams that 
teams are more likely to arise when a “critical mass” of teachers exists at a particular grade level 
or in a particular subject area. Variation within schools in terms of where teams are more or less 
likely to occur therefore is based on grade or subject-specific enrollment shocks due to plausibly 
random, year-to-year variation in cohort size. This assumption is based in part on literature on 
team process and optimal team size, which suggests that most types of teams operate best with 
about 4-6 members (Sutter, 2005).  
Missing Data 
 Once again, the primary concern regarding missing data in this set of models is missing 
outcome data, as test outcomes are not reported on subgroups with fewer than five students. Of 
the 35,985 school-grade-subject-subgroup combinations in 2008-2009 that match up to 
subgroups identified as targets by inquiry teams, 28,289 have reported scores, 25,310 have 
reported scores from a previous year, and 23,649 have a growth score, which requires two years 
of reported scores. Patterns of missing data vary by subgroup – for teams that focused on 
multiple subgroups or did not identify any subgroup and were therefore matched with scores for 
“All Students,” only 7 out of 7,450 cells are missing. For other subgroups, missing outcomes 
ranged from 10.6% for “Students with Disabilities,” which is a common target for inquiry teams, 
to 38.9% for “Black or African American.”  
Table 5-14 presents basic OLS results of the association between a grade-subject-




in 2009 compared to the same group in that grade in 2008. There is a small but statistically 
significant association that is robust to the inclusion of demographic covariates of about 1-1.5 
points in growth, depending upon the specification, which is about 12% of the average level of 
growth for this time period across all grade-subject-subgroup combinations. Note that restricting 
the sample to teams that focused on a single grade, as in column 3, results in a point estimate that 
is roughly half that of the other specifications and not significant, suggesting that grade-specific 
teams are, on average, less effective than teams that focused on multiple grades within a subject 
area or student subgroup. 
TABLE 5-14 OLS ESTIMATES OF EFFECTS OF INQUIRY TEAM PARTICIPATION ON MATH AND ELA GAIN SCORES, K-8 
SCHOOLS, 2008-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 






1.578*** 1.542*** 0.652 1.305*** 




 X X  




  X  
     
School FEs    X 
     
Constant 5.983*** 2.215*** 0.919 6.010*** 
 (0.144) (0.570) (0.976) (0.0759) 
Observatio
ns 
23649 23649 6065 23649 
 
  The first stage, reduced form, and two-stage least squares results for K-8 schools in 
2008-2009 are shown in Table 5-15. Columns 1-4 present first stage and reduced form results 
including demographic covariates and school fixed effects, respectively, while columns 5 and 6 




While there is a statistically significant relationship between the number of classes and having a 
team in the first stage, it is minuscule at 0.003, increasing the odds of having a team by less than 
a percentage point, and even smaller and not statistically significant in the school fixed effects 
specification. The two-stage least squares results are highly unstable, ranging from 7 points in 
growth associated with having a team using the demographic covariate model to an implausible 
198 points of growth in the fixed effects model. These results are likely due to a weak instrument 
at the first stage, particularly in the school fixed effects model, suggesting that the within-school 
variation in number of classes at each grade level and subject is too small to identify variation in 
team formation. Table 5-16 shows the results including covariates and using a quadratic 
specification for the instrument. The two-stage least squares results are very similar across 
specifications of the instrument , suggesting that the monotonicity assumption may hold. Neither 
the first stage nor reduced form coefficients are significant in this specification, however. 
In all cases, however, the F-statistic from the first-stage regression is small. Using the 
preferred school fixed effects specification, the F-statistic is 0.25,  indicating strong potential for 
a weak instrument; although the instrument is a significant predictor of having a team with the 
linear specification, it is not significant in the quadratic specification. Using multiple 
instruments, as is the case in the quadratic specification, allows for an overidentification test, 
which tests for the validity of all instruments under the assumption that at least one of the 
instruments is valid. Ordinarily, this would be tested using a Sargan test, which determines 
whether any exogenous variables are correlated with the residuals from the two-stage least 
squares estimate. In the case of clustered standard errors, Hansen’s J statistic, which follows a 
Chi-square distribution, can be used for this test. In this case, the J-statistic is 0.019, so we do not 




assumption that the other is; given that one instrument is a transformation of the other 
instrument, this assumption is plausible. 
 
TABLE 5-15 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES OF EFFECTS OF INQUIRY TEAM PARTICIPATION ON MATH AND 
ELA GAIN SCORES, K-8 SCHOOLS, 2008-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 















0.00288** 0.0232 0.000703 -1.148***   
 (0.00108) (0.0341) (0.00141) (0.124)   




    7.037 198.1 
     (10.42) (113.2) 
       
Constant 0.0448*** 2.088** 0.0884*** 11.62*** 1.633 -14.11 
 (0.0136) (0.660) (0.00657) (0.588) (1.156) (11.61) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X   X  
School FEs   X X  X 
Observations 66664 22601 66664 22601 22601 22601 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
TABLE 5-16 QUADRATIC INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES OF EFFECTS OF INQUIRY TEAM PARTICIPATION 
ON MATH AND ELA GAIN SCORES, K-8 SCHOOLS, 2008-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 











Number of classes -0.000521 -0.141 -0.00390 -1.504***   
 (0.00278) (0.106) (0.00279) (0.228)   
       
Number of classes 
squared 
0.000202 0.00950 0.000285 0.0282   
 (0.000165) (0.00485) (0.000149) (0.0152)   




    13.96 130.1* 
     (7.630) (65.37) 
       
Constant 0.0546*** 2.585*** 0.101*** 12.41*** 1.031 -7.132 
 (0.0148) (0.750) (0.00924) (0.725) (0.964) (6.707) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X   X  
School FEs   X X  X 
Observations 66664 22601 66664 22601 22601 22601 




* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
While they cannot be tested formally, a number of other diagnostics can be run with 
instrumental variables models to qualitatively assess the validity of the required assumptions. 
One simple test for exogeneity is to regress seemingly unrelated variables that may be correlated 
with omitted variables on the instrument; these regressions should not reveal a statistically 
significant relationship. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5-17 report this test, regressing prior test 
scores and free and reduced price lunch rates on the number of class sections at a grade level. 
The instrument does not pass this test, calling the exclusion restriction into question, although 
controlling for these pre-existing characteristics does help capture some of these unobserved 
characteristics to the extent that they are correlated with unobservable school characteristics. A 
test of the monotonicity assumption is to restrict the sample to areas where it is more likely to 
hold and determine if results are robust to this restriction. Columns 3 and 4 show these tests, with 
column 3 restricting the sample to grades with fewer than 8 class sections, and column 4 
restricting the sample to elementary schools, which tend to be smaller and have fewer sections 
than middle schools.  In both cases, the coefficient varies wildly and is estimated with great 
imprecision, indicating that the behavior of the instrument is unpredictable; further, since the 
instrument is weak, sample restrictions may exacerbate any bias. Columns 5 and 6 report similar 
tests using OLS and the results are more consistent, suggesting that the problem lies with the 
instrument itself. 
TABLE 5-17 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES DIAGNOSTICS, 2008-2009, K-8 SCHOOLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 














Number of class 
sections 
-0.578*** -0.00398***     
 (0.0476) (0.000514)     




On team   -30.57 261.6 0.585* 1.536*** 
   (27.78) (473.1) (0.269) (0.319) 
       
Constant 657.0*** 0.838*** 5.905* -18.49 4.063*** 3.475*** 
 (0.275) (0.00297) (2.432) (41.33) (0.417) (0.473) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
  X X X X 
Observations 22903 22903 20534 15178 16909 8107 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 At the high school level, the outcomes of interest are increases relative to prior cohorts on 
exit exam scores and graduation rates. OLS results of the association between teamwork and 
these outcomes are presented in Table 5-18. Columns 1-4 show the association between 
teamwork and gains on exit exam scores under various specifications, including with and without 
demographic covariates, for only teams that focused on a single grade, and with school fixed 
effects. Under no specification are these results statistically significant. Similarly, the effects on 
graduation rates are shown in columns 5-8. Although these effects are larger, they are still not 
significant under either specification. This could be in part because of the highly aggregated way 
that graduation rates are measured, as they do not take into account any prior probability of 
graduation, and they are reported for fewer subgroups and thus include many students who are 
not targeted by teams. 
TABLE 5-18 OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAMWORK AND HIGH SCHOOL OUTCOMES, 2008-2009. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 











0.00532 0.00450 0.00733 -0.00392 0.0316 0.0272 0.0275 -0.0267 
 (0.0164) (0.0166) (0.0291) (0.0164) (0.0243) (0.0235) (0.0446) (0.0154) 
         
Demographic 
Covariates 
 X X   X X  
         
School FEs    X    X 
         
Single grade 
teams only 
  X    X  




Constant 0.0434*** 0.0464 0.0449 0.0439*** 0.577*** 0.895*** 1.006*** 0.579*** 
 (0.00576) (0.0245) (0.0274) (0.00356) (0.0114) (0.0510) (0.0337) (0.00260) 
Observations 10356 10318 1932 10356 3845 3838 596 3845 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 5-19 provides results of the instrumental variables estimate of the effects of having 
a team on high school outcomes. Similarly to the K-8 results, the instrument may be weak, as the 
first-stage F-statistic is 7.38 when the instrument is specified with demographic covariates and 
25.0 when specified with school fixed effects. The relationship between class sections and team 
formation is stronger for high schools than for K-8 schools, as the bivariate relationships are 
significant and the F statistics are somewhat larger; however, neither the reduced form results 
nor the two-stage least square results are significant. Panel A shows the effects on student 
achievement gains, while Panel B shows the effects on graduation rates. Columns 1-4 of Panel A 
show the first stage and reduced form results of the quadratic specification, using demographic 
covariates and school fixed effects, respectively. The number of classes is associated with the 
probability of having a team, and the square is negatively associated, as would be expected if 
there is an optimal team size above which collaboration becomes counterproductive, although 
the relationship is substantively quite small. The reduced form and two-stage least squares results 





TABLE 5-19 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (2SLS) ESTIMATES OF EFFECTS OF INQUIRY TEAM PARTICIPATION ON HIGH 
SCHOOL OUTCOMES, 2008-2009 
Panel A. Student achievement growth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 












0.0131*** 0.00130 0.00710*** -0.000433   
 (0.00279) (0.00111) (0.00122) (0.00169)   
       
Number of 
classes squared 
-0.000126* -0.0000275 -0.0000738*** -0.00000293   
 (0.0000556) (0.0000190) (0.0000215) (0.0000299)   




    0.0350 -0.125 
     (0.0608) (0.193) 
       
Constant 0.000682 0.0802* 0.0774*** 0.0260** 0.0819* 0.0388 
 (0.0631) (0.0319) (0.00673) (0.00990) (0.0322) (0.0258) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X   X  
School FEs   X X  X 
Observations 8504 6415 8524 6435 6415 6435 
 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Panel B. Graduation rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





Number of classes -0.00729* -0.000134   
 (0.00339) (0.00259)   
     
Number of classes 
squared 
0.000152** 0.00000218   
 (0.0000546) (0.0000612)   
     
Team at grade-subject- 
subgroup cell 
  -0.583 -0.0179 
   (0.365) (0.343) 
     
Constant 0.918*** 0.637*** 0.915*** 0.638*** 
 (0.0806) (0.0116) (0.0816) (0.0272) 
Demographic covariates X  X  
School FEs  X  X 
Observations 1582 1585 1582 1585 
 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 





As with the K-8 instrumental variables results, some more informal diagnostic tests can 
provide insight as to whether the exclusion restriction and monotonicity assumptions are 
justified, even if those cannot be formally tested. The results of these diagnostics are reported in 
Appendix A. While the diagnostics for high school suggest that the exclusion restriction may be 
more likely to apply in this case than in K-8 schools, the monotonicity assumption may once 
again be violated. Given the concerns raised regarding the instrumental variables estimates – the 
weak instrument and potential violations of monotonicity and exclusion restriction assumptions – 
results for 2009-2010 are presented in Appendix A. They are qualitatively similar to the 2008-
2009 results, with the exception that the two-stage least squares results for K-8 schools in 2009-
2010 become negative and statistically significant.  
 
Discussion 
Overall, the instrumental variables results appear to be significantly less valid and 
reliable than the results from the other models. The most worrisome aspects of the instrumental 
variables results are the significant evidence that the proposed instrument is quite weak, 
exacerbating the bias of the two-stage least squares estimate, and the fact that IV results vary 
considerably by year, outcome, and specification, whereas OLS results are generally more stable 
across these dimensions. Evidence on the validity of the other required assumptions for 
instrumental variables is more mixed. Results are similar whether the instrument is specified 
linearly or in a quadratic term, providing evidence for monotonicity, but they are not robust to 
taking sub-samples of schools with fewer class sections or elementary vs. middle schools, while 
OLS results are. Similarly, the Hansen’s J statistic test of overidentifying restrictions provides 
some evidence that this instrument meets the exclusion restriction, but the instrument’s 




are robust to how gain scores are calculated, and very similar whether they compare scores this 
year to scores for the same cohort in the prior grade last year, or scores for the same grade last 
year, IV results are quite sensitive to this choice. Therefore, of all the models it appears that the 
IV results hold up least well to scrutiny. 
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
Across the models, the general evidence seems to be the effects of inquiry team 
participation on general teacher productivity and student learning are quite small, on average, if 
any causal effects exist at all. While most point estimates are positive, few are statistically 
significant and those that are in most cases do not rise to the level of substantive policy 
significance, being the equivalent of less than 0.1 standard deviations. These estimates are 
somewhat smaller than, though still roughly in line with, the most rigorous existing estimates of 
the effects of teacher collaboration on student achievement, and are not entirely surprising given 
the generally weak empirical evidence for teacher effectiveness-enhancing programs overall, 
suggesting that teacher productivity is a particularly difficult outcome to measure and to change 
through policy. 
This is a difficult question to answer causally, given the many complex and interrelated 
issues of selection bias, management bias, measurement error, and confounding with school 
leadership and culture. Further, given that the students who are the direct targets of inquiry are 
not directly observable, any effects measured will be more distal on general learning outcomes 
and teacher effectiveness at a particular grade level and subject or for a particular subgroup of 
students. Given these concerns, even the relatively modest results that appear, particularly for 
struggling students and in the first year of the inquiry team initiative, are still promising and 




could enhance teacher effectiveness and study heterogeneity, which may be masked by very 
small average results. Given the limitations of the grade-switcher and instrumental variables 
models, namely that the grade switcher model is limited to the last, lowest-intensity year of 
implementation and focused on potentially problematic value-added measures as an outcome and 
that the instrumental variables estimates suffer from a weak instrument and other potential 
issues, the first-year teacher model is preferred going forward. Based on that model, as well as 
descriptive results from OLS models, there is evidence for some retention outcomes and possibly 
some test score outcomes in the first year of the initiative, but most other evidence suggests that 






Chapter 6 ANALYSIS OF MECHANISMS AND HETEROGENEITY 
 The literature on collaboration and teamwork in education and other sectors suggests that 
not all teamwork is positive, which could help explain the modest and mostly null results in the 
previous chapter. Teamwork can enhance teacher productivity and effectiveness, as well as 
student learning, through a number of channels but can also have no effect or even detract from 
productivity through other channels. Further, teams vary considerably in the intensity with which 
they implemented the inquiry initiative, resulting in a great deal of noise in the data that could 
obscure effects of more meaningful teamwork. This chapter examines possible causal 
mechanisms and heterogeneity due to variation in team processes and intensity, primarily in a 
descriptive and exploratory way, as these differences are likely to be strongly correlated with 
other unobserved factors that determine outcomes, including underlying teacher quality, school 
culture, and leadership. 
POTENTIAL MECHANISMS 
 Suggestive evidence for several possible mechanisms can be observed in the quasi-
experimental models through patterns in outcomes and sample affected, as well as by including 
covariates and interaction terms and examining results for sub-samples. The most 
straightforward mechanism by which teamwork could impact teacher productivity and student 
learning is through knowledge-sharing, whereby individuals on teams benefit from the team’s 
collective knowledge and experience, which supplements and complements their own. Without a 
deeper dive into the narrative responses to scan for explicit examples of this, the closest way this 
mechanism can be assessed is by testing whether the effect of teamwork is greater for teachers 
whose prior value-added is lower than the team average, indicating these teachers might be 




A second mechanism by which inquiry can operate is through instructional innovation 
that benefits all teachers and students, regardless of their starting point. Since inquiry is an 
iterative research process, rooted in theories of democratic experimentalism and abduction, this 
would involve adopting or developing new instructional strategies or making changes to the 
curriculum to adapt to the learning needs of sub-groups of students (Talbert, 2011). This 
mechanism cannot be tested directly, but will be explored in the case studies in the next chapter. 
Related mechanisms, including the extent to which teamwork facilitates challenging teacher 
mindsets, particularly if they hold negative views about students’ abilities, will also be explored 
in case studies.  
A third possible mechanism through which inquiry can enhance teacher productivity 
specifically is by addressing gaps in teacher preparation programs. This could indicate market 
failure of teacher preparation programs to adequately prepare teachers for the classroom and may 
be especially prevalent if teaching skills are primarily experiential and must be learned hands-on. 
One way to test this mechanism would be to assess whether the initiative has a particularly 
strong effect on first-year teachers, as it appears to.  
Teams could also enhance productivity through peer monitoring, peer pressure, and 
enhancing intrinsic motivation due to desire to achieve shared goals and reinforcing a common 
mission. This might be observed through stronger effects in smaller teams or teams that are more 
homogeneous with regard to grade-level, subject-area, level of experience, and prior value-added 
(Kandel and Lazear, 2012; Kreps 1997).  
 Conversely, teams that implement the inquiry initiative at very low intensity would not be 
likely to have any effect on teacher productivity at all, and in some cases, teamwork may even 




teachers believe that others on the team will do work for them, could substitute for more 
productive but less pleasant individual work, or could reinforce negative social norms around 
student learning. This may be exacerbated in this scenario, when participation on inquiry teams 
was mandated by 2009-2010; therefore, any measured effects of inquiry teams are effects of the 
policy, rather than of substantive engagement in the inquiry process itself. Further examination 
of these mechanisms, as well as identifying teams that are operating at very low intensity and 
likely to do little to affect outcomes, requires deeper examination of data on the teams 
themselves. 
DEFINING AND MEASURING QUALITY TEAMWORK 
 The data teams entered about their processes and outcomes in an administrative database 
operated by the school district to gather data on inquiry implementation that could be used to 
assess heterogeneity varied each year. Data in the 2007-2008 school year, with the fewest 
number of teams and at the start of the initiative, was generally the richest in terms of narrative 
detail and team reflection. Representatives of teams were asked to enter information about the 
grade level, content area, skill, and demographic subgroup focus of the team, the goal the team 
set for its target population, the assessments used to measure progress toward that goal, the 
team’s findings, ways the team impacted overall school culture, reflections on how the school 
would change and expand the inquiry team initiative the following year, and a series of smaller 
sub-goals and instructional strategies designed to achieve those goals while working toward the 
larger goal. Note, however, that although the data in the first year was richest in these narrative 
and reflective details, teams did not report the number of teachers on the team, the number of 




 The data teams entered in 2008-2009 were less rich overall. Since there were multiple 
teams in each school, schools entered information about how inquiry was organized at the school 
(e.g., by grade level vs. by subject area; whether or not the school employed a hub-and-spoke 
style system with a central coordinating team including representatives from each team), and 
how many teachers across the school were involved in inquiry work. Each team entered data on 
the number of students in the target population, grade level and demographic subgroups targeted, 
content and skill areas targeted, goals for the inquiry work, and assessments used to identify 
students, set goals, and measure progress. All other information was organized by “cycles,” a 
series of mini-inquiries in which teams narrowed their focus to small subskills, test strategies, 
assess, and make adjustments as necessary. The number of cycles for which teams enter data is 
itself an indicator of the sustainability of the inquiry process, as it indicates flexibility in the 
process, openness to making changes, and ongoing learning. The vast majority of teams, 
however, only entered information for the first cycle. For each cycle, teams were asked about 
goals, plans to achieve goals, measured effects of the strategies implemented, and reflections on 
what they learned from the cycle and how it could be extended to a larger group of students and 
the school community. 
 The data for 2009-2010, as mentioned above, were the only set for which the individual 
teachers on teams are identified, although students are not identifiable. The inquiry data for this 
year was folded into a larger, centralized database system, to more easily link with teacher and 
student data. Teams entered information about team composition, subject area and skill focus, 
the question that guided the team’s work for the year, goal and assessments used to measure 




instructional strategies implemented for up to five inquiry cycles, and reflective questions on the 
effects of inquiry.  
In order to more closely evaluate heterogeneity in team processes and how that correlates 
with outcomes, some analyses will focus on a textual analysis of a random sub-sample of 100 
teams from each year. For this sub-sample, the team’s responses to all questions was carefully 
read and the intensity and fidelity of the team’s implementation of the inquiry initiative was 
assessed on four dimensions according to a rubric developed by the author based on the literature 
on teamwork. Note that this exercise was not intended to evaluate the inquiry teams, as that is 
not one of the research questions for this study and is beyond the scope of this dissertation; it 
would also likely be impossible to do so in a valid and reliable manner given the limitations in 
available data, particularly on the outcomes of teamwork and whether any individual teachers 
implemented practices developed by the teams in their classrooms. Rather, the purpose is to 
summarize the data on the wide range of team processes embedded in detailed textual responses 
into a smaller number of numerical values to analyze how those processes covary with outcomes. 
The four dimensions, based in part on Hoegl and Gemuenden’s analysis of the dimensions of 
high-quality collaboration, as well as the central school district’s evaluation of inquiry work in 
the Quality Review rubric and survey scales used to assess teamwork developed by Joan Talbert 
and colleagues at the Center for Research on the Context of Teaching at Stanford University, are 
Focus, Diagnosticity, Sustainability, and Process. Focus refers primarily to the team’s ability to 
set targeted, measurable, ambitious yet attainable goals that are primarily instructional in nature. 
It also includes the extent to which there is evidence that the team’s efforts aligned with its stated 
goals. Diagnosticity and use of evidence refers to the team’s problem-solving orientation, 




willingness to experiment and test new ideas. Sustainability and follow-up refers to the extent to 
which teams engaged in longer-term pursuit of inquiry work, including whether or not they 
engaged in multiple inquiry cycles. Process and balance of contributions refers to evidence of 
team dynamics, including whether there is evidence of structure or protocol at team meetings, 
whether team members rotate roles and responsibilities, and whether there is discussion of 
sharing effort among team members. Overall, Focus and Sustainability were the dimensions on 
which there is the most concrete evidence, such as the presence or absence of a goal and the 
presence or absence of additional cycles of teamwork, whereas evidence on the other dimensions 
is more limited and required subjective judgment. Table 6-1 summarizes the rubric used to assess 
these 300 teams. 
TABLE 6-1 RUBRIC USED TO ASSESS INTENSITY OF IMPLEMENTATION OF INQUIRY TEAMS 
Category 1 2 3 
Focus No clearly-defined 
goals or apparent area 
of focus, whether it is 
a sub-group of 
students, particular 
instructional skill, or 
particular area of 
teacher professional 
development; team 
does not use time 
together to discuss 
teaching and learning 
Some evidence of 
goals and narrowing 
of team’s focus, but 
goals are not well-
defined, not 




bound goals focused 
on the instructional 
needs of particular 
students and/or 
specific skills and 
instructional areas 
Diagnosticity and use 
of evidence 
Little to no evidence 
of a problem-solving 
orientation or any 
diagnostic process; 
little to no evidence of 
systematic use of data 
to inform decisions or 
test results; no 
rationale provided for 
decision-making 




by use of data; 
mentions sources of 
evidence; goal and 
instructional 
strategies are related 
to assessment of 
student learning 
needs 
Teams have a clear 
diagnostic process 
and a problem-solving 
approach that 
involves analysis of 
multiple types of 
evidence and student 
data, including 
analysis of student 
work; evidence of 
root cause analysis; 










Little to no evidence  
of structures to 
promote sustainability, 
e.g., regular meetings, 
sufficient time to 
meet, clearly defined 
next steps 
Teams meet regularly 
and have sufficient 
time to meet; some 
limited evidence of 
instructional change 








development, etc., as 
a result of inquiry; 
effective leveraging 







Team process and 
balance of 
contributions 
No evidence of 





of domination by one 
or a few members, or 
free-riding by one or 
more members 
Team has some 
processes in place, 
such as agendas and 
protocols, to ensure 
effective meetings, 
and may have one 
particular individual 
who primarily leads 
the work 
Team has clear, 
agreed-upon 
structures to promote 
effective use of time, 
including protocols 
and agendas, and 
team members rotate 
roles and all play an 
active role in 
decision-making 
Sources: Quality Review Rubric, indicator 4.2; Inquiry Capacity Continuum; SAM Evaluation scale from the Center 
for Research on the Context of Teaching, Stanford University; Hoegl and Gemuenden, 2001 
 Given the inherent subjectivity of this rating process, as well as power limitations 
inherent in using a sample of 100 teams in each year, most analyses of heterogeneity will 
proceed using proxies for team quality that can be readily calculated for the full sample. These 
include the number of inquiry cycles for which teams entered information, whether or not teams 
set a goal, and whether or not teams include student work in the evidence they use to identify 
target students and assess student progress. These quality indicators are cross-checked with the 




quality, and whenever possible heterogeneity analyses are run using both the sub-sample with 
more detailed quality ratings and the larger sample, with rougher quality indicators for all teams. 
 Critically, since the team’s self-reports of their activities in the inquiry database are the 
only source of data on team process for the entire sample of 13,425 teams over the three years, 
the unbiasedness of all these analyses rests on the assumption that what teams actually did is 
correlated with what they say they did. It does not need to be exactly the same, as small 
differences will wash out on average and the analysis only requires that teams who said they did 
more on average did more; in other words, the relationship between data entry and real team 
activity must be at least weakly monotonic. There are a few plausible scenarios in which this 
assumption could be violated due to social desirability bias, given that the data were being 
collected by the school district that implemented the policy – one is the case of teams dominated 
by a single individual who enthusiastically entered a great deal of data on team activity, even 
when the team itself did little. In that case, these teams may in fact be less effective than average, 
because they do not represent a balance of contributions and effort and instead represent the 
efforts of a single individual, but would appear to be better in the database. Similarly, teams that 
were highly concerned about complying with central mandates on teamwork may have 
exaggerated the extent of their teamwork to appear better to central district officials. It could be 
the case that those teams most concerned with compliance would enter the most information but 
also engage in relatively less authentic inquiry work because they are more risk-averse and less 
willing to engage in experimentation and challenge preconceptions. Due to these possible 
violations, in addition to the fact that intensity of team activity is itself endogenous, all analyses 
of quality and heterogeneity are descriptive, rather than causal. 




 Descriptive statistics on the intensity of inquiry team activity by year are presented in 
Tables 6-2 and 6-3. For each year, the average scores out of 3 on Focus, Diagnosticity, 
Sustainability, and Process for the sub-sample of 100 hand-coded teams are shown, as well as the 
unweighted average across the three scores. In addition, for all teams, the share of teams that 
have no goal, that analyze student work, and that engage in multiple inquiry cycles, as well as the 
average number of cycles, are shown. Finally, the table shows correlations between Focus and 
having no goal, Diagnosticity and analyzing student work, and Sustainability and having 





TABLE 6-2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON TEAM QUALITY AND INTENSITY OF IMPLEMENTATION 
Panel	A:	2007-2008	
	 	 	Variable Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
Focus 1.91 0.4734 1 3 
Diagnosticity 1.74 0.5794 1 3 
Sustainability 1.67 0.4935 1 3 
Process 1.98 0.449 1 3 
Overall 1.825 0.3901 1 3 
No goal 0.0069 0.0826 0 1 
Analyzes 




0.422 0.494 0 1 
Number of 
cycles 1.904 2.158 0 23 
Panel	B:	2008-2009	
	 	 	Focus 1.49 0.5024 1 2 
Diagnosticity 1.25 0.4578 1 3 
Sustainability 1.24 0.474 1 3 
Process 1.33 0.5136 1 3 
Overall 1.327 0.3688 1 2.75 








0.3217 0.4672 0 1 
Number of 
Cycles 0.8714 1.139 0 10 
Panel	C:	2009-2010	
	 	 	Focus 1.61 0.4902 1 2 
Diagnosticity 1.2 0.402 1 2 
Sustainability 1.12 0.3562 1 3 
Process 1.18 0.4115 1 3 












0.0551 0.2283 0 1 
Number of 
Cycles 1.088 0.4138 1 5 
 
TABLE 6-3 CORRELATIONS (2009-2010) 
 Focus Diagnosticity Sustainability Overall Process No Goal Student 
work 
        
Focus 1.0000       
Diagnosticity 0.2973 1.0000      
Sustainability 0.2707 0.6067 1.0000     
Overall 0.6454 0.8361 0.7867 1.0000    
Process 0.3015 0.7572 0.6782 0.8593 1.0000   
No Goal -0.7261 -0.2358 -0.2323 -0.4777 -0.1969 1.0000  
Student 
Work 
0.1215 0.0992 -0.0323 0.0549 -0.0420 -0.1285 1.0000 
Number of 
cycles 
0.0977 0.1833 0.2344 0.2186 0.1850 -0.0838 0.0781 
 
 Overall, the intensity of inquiry team implementation declined over time. As more and 
more teachers participated on teams to reach the goal of 90% participation in 2009-2010, teams 
became less likely to set goals and engage in multiple cycles of inquiry work. This could be for a 
number of reasons which are not possible to directly test with the given data, but which can be 
observed anecdotally in a sub-sample of teams: principals are less likely to directly participate on 
all teams when there are many teams per school, teams receive less coaching and support from 
networks and the central office over time, and teams in the first year are composed of 
enthusiastic early adopters who signal their willingness and ability to implement the inquiry team 
initiative through volunteering to participate at the outset. In the first year, nearly all teams (over 




ratings of implementation intensity are by far the highest, at an average of nearly 2 out of 3. In 
fact, the first year is the only year for which there are any teams that receive the highest score on 
all dimensions of implementation. Nearly all measures of intensity of implementation drop every 
year, with the exception of the percentage of teams analyzing student work, which increases 
sharply in the final year. This could be an artifact of the data entry system, as teams were 
allowed to select “Student Work” from a checklist of sources of evidence they used, as opposed 
to prior years in which teams manually entered information about evidence. Notably, by 2009-
2010 nearly 30% of teams did not even set a goal, indicating that these were teams in name only 
that schools entered to demonstrate compliance with the 90% participation goal, but in practice 
the teams may not have even ever met. 
 Responses that the sub-sample of teams selected for quality ratings entered into the 
inquiry database reveal some general trends in how teams implemented inquiry teams. Overall, 
even when teams do show evidence of higher-intensity implementation, such as goal-setting, 
looking at multiple sources of evidence, and engaging in multiple cycles of inquiry work, the 
number of teams that fully adhere to the spirit of inquiry teams by engaging in root-cause 
analysis that precipitates instructional changes is low. Many teams set vague goals with broad 
target areas, such as general increases in student reading levels or state test scores. The 
instructional strategies implemented were also often quite broad and general, such as 
“differentiate instruction,” “use data to inform instruction,” and “provide professional 
development to teachers.” One team listed its instructional strategies as “Small group instruction. 
Differentiating instruction. Flexible grouping. Technology integration.”  
In the first year in particular, although teams adhered to the inquiry team model more 




group of students without substantial increases in resources. For example, many strategies 
involved small group or one-on-one tutoring during lunch or after school by the inquiry team 
members, or moving the targeted students to smaller classes. Therefore, any results of this work 
may be the result of students being aware they are the target of an initiative, as well as 
reshuffling resources to target those particular students’ needs away from the general student 
body, as opposed to any deeper changes in teacher work or the culture of the school. Talbert 
(2010) noted this trend as well, which was initially troubling to central district leaders, as it went 
against the intent of the policy of using inquiry for instructional innovation, teacher capacity-
building and deeper systemic change. Ultimately, however, district leaders tolerated this 
interpretation of inquiry as a step toward using the process for more authentic change.  
 Possibly as a result of a conscious effort by the central office to move away from these 
sorts of non-scalable interventions and refocus on teacher capacity, operationalized through the 
elimination of the requirement to target a specific subgroup of students with inquiry work, there 
is a notable shift in 2009-2010 toward teacher-focused strategies. While this shift did help to 
avoid directing inquiry activities toward resource-shifting strategies such as smaller classes and 
extended day programs for small sub-groups of students, it also is generally associated with 
broader questions and vaguer goals. For instance, one team’s guiding question in 2009-2010 was 
“How well are students mastering specific Performance Indicators within specific classes and 
across the entire grade?” 
 Some of the most promising strategies teams identify revolve around improving 
communication and knowledge-sharing among various stakeholders in student learning, 
including other teachers and parents. Therefore, although the evidence from the textual analysis 




action research is limited, the capacity of teams as a vehicle for improving communication and 
sharing existing information across the school seems stronger, indicating that as one possible 
mechanism for any positive effects of teamwork. 
INCORPORATING HETEROGENEITY IN MAIN MODELS 
 To test some of these mechanisms, as well as to reduce noise in the data created by 
extremely low-intensity teams such as the 30% that did not set a goal in 2009-2010, indicators of 
implementation fidelity were added to selected models analyzed in the previous chapter. These 
indicators were added as covariates and in place of the team indicator variable. Ideally, these 
indicators would also be added as interactions with team indicators to assess heterogeneity; 
however, because there is only data on implementation fidelity for teachers and/or grade-subject 
cells that actually have a team (zero is imputed for all others), the interaction effect is perfectly 
collinear with the main effects and thus adds no information to the model. Overall, results are 
fairly consistent across specification of quality, including whether it is used as a replacement for 
the team indicator or added as a covariate and which measure of quality is used, and similar to 
the main results, although somewhat more positive and more precisely measured. Representative 
results are summarized here, and estimates from all specifications are reported in Appendix B. 
 The preferred specification uses the indicator for whether or not the team sets a goal as a 
basic measure of quality that indicates whether or not a team actually engages in inquiry work, 
even at a minimal level. Results from specifications using the hand-coded sub-sample are highly 
erratic and measured with very little precision, given very low power from the sample of just 100 
teams per year. Other measures of quality and intensity of implementation are only weakly 
associated with outcomes, are statistically insignificant in almost all specifications, and are in 




the indicator for whether a team analyzes student work is often negative, albeit insignificant. 
This indicates that, on average, outcomes are better for teams that do not analyze student work, 
contrary to expectations given prior literature. One possible explanation is measurement error; 
teams could report analyzing student work at much higher rates than what they actually do. 
 The association between being on a team that has a goal and retention outcomes in 2007-
2008 for all teachers and first-year teachers, respectively, are reported in Tables 6-4 and 6-5. 
These results are very similar to those reported for the first-year model using the team indicator, 
in part because nearly all teams have a goal in 2007-2008. Notably, the correlation for all 
teachers is particularly strong, indicating a 15 percentage point increase in one-year retention 
rates, but this result is strongly subject to selection bias related to likelihood of volunteering or 
being chosen to participate on a team. 
TABLE 6-4 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM QUALITY AND RETENTION, ALL TEACHERS, 2007-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Still teaching next 
year 
Years teaching Years teaching Still teaching next 
year 
Has goal 0.157*** 0.0654*** 0.0545*** 0.149*** 
 (0.00320) (0.0154) (0.0149) (0.00316) 
     
     
Constant 0.800*** 4.487*** 4.680*** 0.877*** 
 (0.00238) (0.00623) (0.0240) (0.00894) 
Demographic Covariates   X X 
Observations 108937 88535 88534 108935 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 






TABLE 6-5 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM QUALITY AND RETENTION, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, 2007-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Still teaching next 
year 
Years teaching Still teaching next 
year 
Years teaching 
Has goal 0.0558*** 0.0172 0.0560*** 0.0232 
 (0.00859) (0.0456) (0.00862) (0.0450) 
     
Constant 0.889*** 3.433*** 0.939*** 3.797*** 
 (0.00409) (0.0149) (0.0167) (0.0647) 
Demographic Covariates   X X 
Observations 8130 8130 8129 8129 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Similarly, the association between having a goal and estimates of teacher value-added, 
reported in Tables 6-6 and 6-7 for the full sample of teachers and first-year teachers, 
respectively, is quite similar to the association between the team indicator and value-added. The 
association is consistently positive but small and only statistically significant for value-added for 
students in the lowest third. 
TABLE 6-6 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM QUALITY AND VALUE-ADDED, ALL TEACHERS, 2007-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




VA Percentile ELL 
Has goal 0.000807 0.857 1.329* 0.550 
 (0.00332) (0.558) (0.675) (1.387) 
     
Constant 0.0124 49.18*** 41.11*** 47.40*** 
 (0.0100) (1.451) (1.961) (4.551) 
Demographic Covariates X X X X 
Observations 17697 16684 10214 2271 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 







TABLE 6-7 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAM QUALITY AND VALUE-ADDED, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, 2007-2008 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




VA Percentile ELL 
Has goal 0.00805 2.098 3.232 2.754 
 (0.00634) (1.409) (2.149) (4.343) 
     
Constant -0.00796 51.30*** 42.65*** 62.59** 
 (0.0173) (3.488) (6.585) (18.81) 
Demographic Covariates X X X X 
Observations 1689 1552 714 171 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
2008-2009 
  For 2008-2009, the heterogeneity analysis focuses on the effect of having a team at a 
particular grade-subject cell on test score growth. Although the instrumental variables 
specification in the previous chapter addresses concerns with selection bias related to the 
placement of teams at particular grades and subject areas, it is not the preferred specification in 
this case because of the previously discussed weak instrument and monotonicity problems that 
lead to potential bias and difficulties in interpreting the IV estimates. Therefore, the analysis 
focuses on the OLS results, which should be interpreted as correlational, not causal. Column 1 of 
Table 6-8 presents the baseline association between the existence of a team at a particular grade 
and subject combination and test score growth, which is positive and statistically significant. 
Grade-subject-subgroup combinations with teams are associated with about 1 more point of 
growth from a baseline of about 8 points on average, or about 0.1 of a standard deviation in 
growth. Column 2 adds quality measures on whether a team has a goal, whether the team 
engages in multiple cycles of inquiry work, and whether a team analyzes student work as 
covariates. Due to collinearity, none of these estimates are statistically significant, but it appears 
that much of the variation in the association between teamwork and score growth is related to 




negative. Column 3 replaces the team indicator with an indicator for whether there is a team that 
sets a goal, and the coefficient is slightly higher than the basic team indicator, suggesting some 
small variation in team quality captured by goal-setting. Columns 4 and 5 show results 
incorporating the hand-coded quality measures, which are very imprecisely estimated due to low 
power. 
TABLE 6-8  OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEST SCORE GROWTH AND TEAM QUALITY MEASURES, K-8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Team indicator 1.117*** 0.175   -2.185 
 (0.273) (0.935)   (3.292) 
      
Has goal  0.786 1.168***   
  (0.947) (0.281)   
      
Multiple cycles  0.732    
  (0.570)    
      
Analyzes student 
work 
 -0.614    
  (0.747)    
      
Overall    -0.285 1.162 
    (0.520) (2.185) 
      
Constant 3.651*** 3.652*** 3.657*** 3.677*** 3.679*** 
 (0.550) (0.551) (0.550) (0.719) (0.719) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X 
Observations 25016 25016 25016 9012 9012 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Table 6-9 shows the same results for high schools. The baseline estimates in column 1 are 
small and not statistically significant. Somewhat surprisingly, the results on the team indicator 
become positive and marginally significant when adding quality indicators as covariates, shown 
in column 2, suggesting that teams with higher scores on quality indicators are associated with 
lower test score gains. This could be because these indicators are not reasonable proxies for team 
quality, due for instance to violations of the assumptions listed above, could indicate teams 




models, specifications, and outcomes being tested. Columns 3 and 5 incorporate the hand-coded 
quality measure and column 4 replaces the team indicator with an indicator for whether the team 
has set a goal; in no case are estimates statistically significant. 
TABLE 6-9  OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEST SCORE GROWTH AND TEAM QUALITY MEASURES, HS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Team indicator 0.0105 0.155* 0.115   
 (0.0169) (0.0741) (0.294)   
      
Has goal  -0.108  0.00523  
  (0.0731)  (0.0174)  
      
Analyzes student 
work 
 -0.0685    
  (0.0429)    
      
Multiple cycles  -0.0780*    
  (0.0312)    
      
Overall   -0.137  -0.0567 
   (0.242)  (0.0316) 
      
Constant 0.0541* 0.0531* 0.0440*** 0.0544* 0.0400 
 (0.0254) (0.0254) (0.00738) (0.0254) (0.0208) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X  X X 
Observations 9542 9542 2946 9542 2946 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
2009-2010 
 For comparison, results for 2009-2010 are shown for both retention and value-added for 
the full sample and first-year teachers, as well as for test score gains at the grade-subject-
subgroup level. Tables 6-10 and 6-11 present the association between measures of the quality 
and intensity of team participation and retention outcomes for all teachers and first-year teachers, 
respectively. The results for first-year teachers are more subject to causal inference, as it is less 
likely that brand new teachers would be strategically placed on grades and in subjects with 
teams. In the models with all teachers, there is a small but positive and statistically significant 




relationship becomes insignificant when adding quality measures as covariates, in Column 3 of 
Table 5.9, but is very slightly larger when using an indicator for a team having a goal in place of 
an indicator for whether a team exists (Column 5). Once again, the relationship with the hand-
coded quality measure is small and insignificant, with the exception of a modest relationship 
with the Years of Teaching outcome. For the much smaller sample of first-year teachers, no 
relationships are statistically significant. Note that the results for the hand-coded sample are 
omitted, as no first-year teachers were on teams selected for the hand-coding sample. 
TABLE 6-10 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INDICATORS OF TEAM QUALITY AND RETENTION, ALL TEACHERS. 























0.0123*** 0.105*** 0.00828 0.126**     
 (0.00345) (0.0205) (0.00670) (0.0387)     
         
Has goal   0.00599 -
0.00477 
0.0129*** 0.0890***   
   (0.00556) (0.0325) (0.00350) (0.0215)   





-0.0219     
   (0.00558) (0.0310)     
         
Multiple 
cycles 
  0.00142 -
0.00344 
    
   (0.00799) (0.0482)     
         
Overall       0.00762 0.275*** 
       (0.0221) (0.0388) 
         
Constant 0.968*** 4.650*** 0.968*** 4.650*** 0.969*** 4.661*** 0.971*** 4.606*** 
 (0.00836) (0.0526) (0.00837) (0.0525) (0.00836) (0.0532) (0.0107) (0.0610) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X X X 
Observations 12447 12429 12447 12429 12447 12429 7992 7975 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 







TABLE 6-11 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INDICATORS OF TEAM QUALITY AND RETENTION, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS. 
 

























-0.0702   
 (0.0174) (0.0382) (0.0240) (0.0435)   
       
       
Has goal   0.0270 0.0599 0.0238 0.0166 
   (0.0344) (0.0439) (0.0129) (0.0392) 
       
Analyzes 
student work 
  0.0128 0.0424   
   (0.0170) (0.0342)   
       
Multiple 
cycles 
  -0.205 -0.259   
   (0.184) (0.177)   
       
Overall       
       
       
Constant 0.946*** 2.175*** 0.946*** 2.169*** 0.941*** 2.170*** 
 (0.0367) (0.0974) (0.0371) (0.0976) (0.0367) (0.0975) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X 
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Similarly, Tables 6-12 and 6-13 show results for all teachers and for first-year teachers on 
value-added outcomes. None of the coefficients on team and team quality indicator variables are 
statistically significant in either case, although the point estimates are somewhat larger and more 
positive for the quality indicator variables, in particular the indicator for having a goal, than for 
the team indicator variable. This provides some supportive evidence of the hypothesis that low-
intensity teams bring down the average impact estimates, but even with quality indicators the 





TABLE 6-12 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEAM QUALITY INDICATORS AND VALUE-ADDED, ALL 
TEACHERS 















Team indicator -0.00130 -0.0133 -0.00173 0.00546 -0.00657   
 (0.00593) (0.00905) (0.00612) (0.00966) (0.0115)   
        
Has goal  0.0166   0.0165 0.00496  
  (0.00975)   (0.00985) (0.00635)  
        
Multiple cycles   0.00556  0.00215   
   (0.0142)  (0.0143)   
        
Analyzes 
student work 
   -0.00830 -0.00842   
    (0.0101) (0.0101)   
        
Overall       0.0134 
       (0.0409) 
        
Constant 0.0219 0.0215 0.0220 0.0220 0.0217 0.0202 0.0240 
 (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0163) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0187) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X X 
Observations 13585 13585 13585 13585 13585 13585 8854 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
TABLE 6-13 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEAM QUALITY INDICATORS AND VALUE-ADDED, FIRST-
YEAR TEACHERS 













Team indicator 0.0394 0.0155 0.0377 0.164 0.140  
 (0.0258) (0.0371) (0.0263) (0.103) (0.0975)  
       
Has goal  0.0336   0.0355 0.0473 
  (0.0438)   (0.0437) (0.0300) 
       
Multiple cycles   0.0322  0.0482  
   (0.0876)  (0.0884)  
       
Analyzes 
student work 
   -0.143 -0.147  
    (0.103) (0.101)  
       
Overall       
       
       
Constant -0.113 -0.119* -0.113 -0.103 -0.111 -0.120* 






X X X X X X 
Observations 324 324 324 324 324 324 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 Finally, Tables 6-14 and 6-15 show the association between the existence of a team at a 
grade-subject-subgroup cell and test score gains for K-8 schools and high schools, respectively. 
For the most part, the estimates do not change substantially using various indicators for quality, 
although notably the estimates are somewhat smaller on the coefficient for a team having a goal 
than for the simple team indicator, the estimate on analyzing student work is larger, positive, and 
approaching statistical significance, unlike in other models, and the coefficient on the hand-
coded quality measure is positive and significant. This is somewhat surprising, given the 
substantial proportion of teams that do not even set a goal, as well as the very large number of 
teams that report analyzing student work. It could indicate that whether or not a team sets a goal 
is too rough an indicator of quality, and coding a larger sample of teams could be worthwhile for 
further study. Once again, there are very few statistically significant relationships at the high 





TABLE 6-14 OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEST SCORE GROWTH AND TEAM QUALITY MEASURES, K-8 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Team indicator 1.708*** 1.621*** 1.693*** 0.823 0.714   
 (0.232) (0.341) (0.247) (0.592) (0.649)   
        
        
Has goal  0.158   0.163 1.659***  
  (0.443)   (0.452) (0.302)  
        
Multiple cycles   0.209  0.175   
   (0.837)  (0.873)   
        
Student work    1.115 1.125   
    (0.692) (0.692)   
        
Overall       1.443* 
       (0.684) 
        
Constant -1.758** -1.758** -1.756** -1.756** -1.754** -1.687** -1.396 
 (0.622) (0.622) (0.622) (0.621) (0.622) (0.627) (0.918) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X X 
Observations 23671 23671 23671 23671 23671 23671 9765 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
TABLE 6-15 OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEST SCORE GROWTH AND TEAM QUALITY MEASURES, HS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth Growth 
Team indicator 0.0198 0.0221 0.0205 0.0280 0.0302   
 (0.0122) (0.0129) (0.0124) (0.0270) (0.0285)   
        
Has goal  -0.00448   -0.00438 0.0167  
  (0.0227)   (0.0228) (0.0194)  
        
Multiple cycles   -0.0358  -0.0324   
   (0.0716)  (0.0730)   
        
Student work    -0.0104 -0.00955   
    (0.0308) (0.0308)   
        
Overall       0.0886** 
       (0.0318) 
        
Constant 0.0712** 0.0709** 0.0713** 0.0711** 0.0709** 0.0742** 0.0830* 
 (0.0246) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0247) (0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0326) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X X 
Observations 11476 11476 11476 11476 11476 11476 2774 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 





With some exceptions, the results were generally consistent across models, years and 
specifications, and despite a small number of positive and statistically significant relationships, 
still consistently weak. As a general rule, the key variable of interest on which teams varied was 
whether or not they set a goal, which serves a basic indicator as to whether or not a team was 
“real.” The results are reasonably consistent with those presented in the main models, although 
overall somewhat larger and more positive, providing some limited support for the hypothesis 
that results are modest in part due to noise and heterogeneity. Overall, implementation appears to 
be strongest in the first year and the effects of teamwork are largest in that year. Still, adding 
measures of quality does not dramatically alter the results, suggesting that effects may still be 
small in reality, or that significant measurement error remains and the proxy measurements used 
here are weak. The general conclusion that remains fairly robust across models is that teamwork 
has a small effect, primarily on first-year teachers in terms of retention, possibly a small effect on 
student test scores in elementary and middle school grades, and some possible small effects on 
teacher value-added, especially with regard to teaching the lowest-performing students.  
Given some surprising findings, particularly that whether or not a team looks at student 
work does not seem to significantly alter its effects, continued examination of heterogeneity and 
team quality is warranted. In addition to poor measures not adequately capturing quality, there is 
the possibility that quality measures do not significantly alter the results because teams were not, 
on average, implementing inquiry teams particularly well or with very high intensity. Even in the 
first year, when most quality measures are highest, the average score for the hand-coded sub-
sample of teams was low and only one team in the sample of 100 achieved the highest possible 




of inquiry, it appears that additional training and support would be needed in order to implement 
teams effectively at scale. 
Finally, as noted above, all of these findings are subject to bias due not only to selection 
of teachers onto teams but also due to confounding of team quality with other factors, such as the 
preexisting, unobserved quality of the teachers on the team and unobserved elements of school 
culture and leadership. An attempt was made to address this concern by isolating possibly 
exogenous variation in team quality and intensity of implementation by using variability in 
accountability pressure due to the staggered nature of the accountability system as an 
instrumental variable. However, the instrument in this case suffered from several potential 
validity threats, including weak instrument problems and possible violations of the exclusion 
restriction; for this reason, the results are presented in Appendix B for illustration purposes, but 






Chapter 7 QUALITATIVE CASE STUDIES OF TEAMS IN ACTION 
The purpose of the qualitative case study is to understand the process of teacher 
collaboration on inquiry teams and in particular how teachers interact on teams. While the unit of 
analysis for the quantitative analyses is the individual teacher, the unit of analysis for the 
qualitative analysis is the team. The major qualitative research question focuses descriptively on 
the processes by which teams work together to improve their practice and develop innovative 
solutions to instructional problems. Although the research design for the qualitative analysis does 
not have the goal of making causal inferences, descriptive analysis  provides some evidence for 
proximal outcomes of successful teamwork, such as deeper questioning and abductive reasoning 
by teachers, as well as the conditions and processes associated with those outcomes, as noted in 
the conceptual framework. Overall, these findings can help contextualize the fairly modest 
results from the quantitative analyses by uncovering processes and conditions that lead teams to 
be more successful, identifying challenges and obstacles to the success of the inquiry team 
initiative, and suggesting appropriate proximal outcome measures that may show positive results 
of teamwork before value-added measures, which may require a longer time period to change. 
Answers to these research questions will help address some gaps in the literature 
identified above and inform practice by honing in on specific practices when teachers are 
collaborating and learning on teams that could improve professional development and teamwork 
and collaboration in schools. To that end, teachers were asked reflective questions about how the 
team organized itself, why the team followed the processes it did, and any initial impacts in 
terms of teacher learning and changes in practice. Teams can further be a vehicle for identifying 




within a school, as well as other schools, thereby helping to address the information gap created 
by the difficulty in predicting teacher effectiveness based on observable characteristics.  
CODING SCHEME 
 An initial coding scheme, based upon the literature and conceptual framework described 
above, the description of the intervention by the school district and Joan Talbert, the author’s 
own experience working on a team of teachers, results from a prior smaller pilot study of a 
smaller group of teams, and initial impressions from the data collection phase, was created. From 
a list of approximately 100 characteristics that constitute effective teams, including aspects from 
the conceptual framework of conditions, processes, and outcomes, conceptually similar 
categories were grouped together to create 53 codes. For each code, Appendix Table C.1 
documents the title, a detailed description, a quotation that serves as an example, and the source, 
whether it be from the literature, experience, or the data.  
 Major codes include examples of the formality of communication, the balance of 
contributions, organization and structure of meetings, leadership support, and openness to change 
among participants, generally reflecting “Conditions” in the conceptual framework. Other codes 
include experimentation, a focus on an individual student, investigation of student data or work, 
instructional strategies, and peer monitoring or peer pressure, as examples of “Processes.” 
Finally, some codes represent proximal outcomes of the inquiry team process, including 
evidence of organizational learning or improvement upon the inquiry process itself, statements of 
the benefits of teamwork by participants, evidence of improvements in student learning, and 







 While the four teams in the sample differ in purpose and composition, there are clear 
consistent patterns across teams that provide important findings for further exploration and 
analysis. First, each team has a clear leader, although cases differ as to whether that role is 
explicit or implicit. On one team with more informal leadership, the apparent leader was an 
English teacher, whereas on another team, the leader did have positional authority as Assistant 
Principal, but seemed to supersede the Principal, also present at the meetings, in terms of setting 
agendas, facilitating the meeting, moving toward decisions and action, and ensuring follow-up. 
Two other teams did have clearly designated leaders who represented their teams of teachers – 
one grouped based on commonly-identified areas for instructional improvement and another 
comprising third grade teachers – to school leadership at a core inquiry team meeting. 
A second similarity is that the teams have clearly gotten a signal that basing decisions on 
evidence, meaning specifically student work and student achievement data, is an expectation, as 
nearly all discussions were framed in terms of student evidence, and teams spent some time in 
nearly every meeting jointly analyzing student work or student data. Nonetheless, it is also clear 
that teachers have not yet received adequate training on meaningfully engaging with student data 
to make decisions, as in some cases teachers appear to be discussing student data in name only, 
or in a way that is not purposeful or strategic, and even tangential to the purpose of the meeting. 
While teams spend time discussing student data and examining student needs, as well as 
discussing instructional interventions to address student needs, there is often an apparent gap 
between these two discussions. In spite of clear differences between the four teams in terms of 
the degree of strategic follow-up based on data analysis, in all four cases teams struggled with 




identified needs. This may help explain why examining student work was not a useful predictor 
of team quality in the quantitative analysis. 
Finally, although some portion of every meeting is devoted to inquiry, defined as broadly 
as possible to capture any discussion of student data or student work, examination of the learning 
needs of an individual student or sub-group of students, and experimentation with or reflection 
on instructional strategies, teams also spend meeting time addressing other issues. These include 
student behavior issues, logistical issues such as planning field trips and parent-teacher 
conferences, as well as other off-topic discussions.  Nonetheless, many of these teams have 
multiple purposes by design, so this observation is not intended as a critique of their inquiry 
process. 
SCHOOL A 
 Inquiry teams, known as Collaborative Learning Communities (CLCs) at School A, had 
been an integral part of teacher professional development at the school for at least three years 
prior to the 2011-2012 school year. At that time, the school made a conscious shift from inquiry 
teams focused on specific sub-groups of students or specific academic skills and toward teams 
focused on teacher learning goals, although the ultimate aim remained to increase student 
learning and teachers were encouraged to measure their own success with inquiry through their 
students’ learning. In part as a result of a Race to the Top grant that required all school districts 
in the state to develop more rigorous teacher evaluation systems, the district was piloting a new 
evaluation and feedback system based on Charlotte Danielson’s Enhancing Professional 
Practice: A Framework for Teaching (2007). The Framework breaks down teaching into 
research-based strands and domains, such as “Designing Student Assessments” and “Using 
Questioning and Discussion Techniques.” Teachers reflected upon the strengths and weaknesses 




Danielson rubric. These teams were led by teachers experienced with inquiry who had undergone 
training to serve as team facilitators and who represented the teams in a core team led by the 
principal.  
 This case study focuses primarily on one such team – the Engagement team, which 
encompasses goals related to questioning and discussion strategies and classroom management – 
and its relationship to the core team. The Engagement team was composed primarily of first-year 
teachers, and therefore the case serves as an example of inquiry work as professional 
development specifically for beginning teachers. Working on a team as a new teacher could 
address failure of teacher pre-service training to fully equip students with some of the skills they 
need to successfully teach; some of these, particularly related to engagement, questioning, and 
classroom management, may be experiential and best learned on-the-job. This case also 
examines unique challenges faced by a team composed mainly of inexperienced teachers, 
although it seems likely that an experienced facilitator with a clearly defined leadership role is 
particularly important under these circumstances. Given the quantitative findings that teamwork 
may be especially beneficial for first-year teachers, understanding the processes by which a team 
of beginning teachers works is particularly important. 
 While the teachers on the Engagement team had all selected similar professional 
development goals for inquiry, they each developed their own mini-research projects, with a 
question, a measurable goal, an instructional strategy they would try, and a strategy for gathering 
and analyzing data to assess their success. Therefore, much of the work that would be done 
collectively in the original inquiry team model was done by individuals who provided one 




year teacher group, much of the communication observed by the research team was between 
individual members and the facilitator, as opposed to among the members themselves.  
 At team meetings, teachers shared their goals and how they planned to assess them. The 
team facilitator, as well as occasionally other teachers, gave individuals feedback and team 
members then revised their goals. The primary thrust of the feedback was for goals to be more 
narrowly focused and measurable. One teacher went through an illustrative process by thinking 
aloud: 
But here's the thing, like, my question has to do with students being invested in the 
learning. And students who are, like, often disengaged and unmotivated to even care what 
they're doing.  So I don't think my question is as much about, like, them doing great on 
a… quiz.  It's almost more about getting them more invested in what they're learning, 
why they're learning it, so maybe class work is my best gauge because these are the same 
kids who don't complete any work either. And they're not gonna get to the stage of 
success if they don't get to hear this first. 
And I was like, "Well, how do I, like, measure that with student data?  And how can I 
provide something-- concrete where I can -- that's actually measurable?" So I was 
thinking… there's this little-- group of students that seemed very unmotivated to, like, do 
anything… And we, like, have a little, you know, writing in journals at the beginning of 
class every day.  And they're never writing while the rest of the class is.  When we get to 
do group work, they're the ones in the group that's not contributing. 
In addition to helping new teachers refine their goals, the team facilitator served as a focal point 
for sharing instructional resources and suggesting tools to assist with data analysis. In addition to 
the direct support that sharing examples provided, it also served as a subtle form of peer pressure 
that led teachers to work on improving their own data collection and analysis practice. 
The team facilitator represented the team at a core inquiry team facilitated by the 
principal. The principal served in an active management role in this team, directly impacting all 
of the teams throughout the school, soliciting updates on how the teams were progressing, 




meetings. In this way, although the teams were semi-autonomous and individual teachers had a 
great deal of leeway in directing their work with regard to subject matter, goals, subgroups of 
students, instructional strategies, and data to collect and analyze, the process itself was 
prescriptive. The principal further reinforced the push toward more narrow, focused goals and 
concrete sources of evidence. The core team further worked to institutionalize learning from 
teams across the school by establishing a shared Dropbox folder and a newsletter for teachers. 
There are some possible leading indicators of success of this approach. The Engagement 
team facilitator noted that she adapted her expectations when working with first-year teachers, 
such that much of the initial learning would be about the research skills needed for the process 
itself, as opposed to more direct learning about instructional skills. Even so, school leadership 
noticed some general improvement in instruction as a spillover effect, as seen in teacher lesson 
plans and classroom observations, perhaps due to the sustained focus and structured reflection 
inherent in the inquiry process. 
What ended up happening though was we kinda realized that by improving that 
questioning and… by making better lesson plans and having better management it kinda 
then led to the better teaching anyway which was kind of what the core team was kinda 
hoping to get around to in the end anyway. 
 Further, teachers themselves made note of the value of the process in uncovering new 
findings. One teacher commented on his surprise at the results of inquiry that, in retrospect, he 
should not have found surprising, which ultimately suggests that he is open to challenging some 
preconceptions about teaching and about his students: 
I feel like the things that I found out are all things that I almost, like, could have assumed 
would have been the case… 
I'm basing this on, like, three activities-- specific activities I've done with them.  And 
even if everything's tight and ready to go, and like I feel like I've covered all my grounds, 




doing really well with me, and they're normally pretty defiant… because the three 
activities, especially the last one we did, we made these critters to talk about traits, and 
like-- it was something very doable for them. 
And I think… it would seem obvious that… having just something that they could do 
would help them to reduce behavior issues.  But like, I don't know, that was, like, kind of 
like a big revelation for me, actually. 
Relatedly, when another teacher was discussing a particularly disengaged student whom he had 
struggled to reach, other teachers on the team were willing to push back on the teacher’s 
assumption and suggested that if he gave the student challenging, independent work to do that he 
would master the concepts for the class. This suggests some capacity for teachers working on 
teams to share their unique experiences and insights about individual students, as well as the 
benefits of a willingness to challenge one another’s assumptions. Teachers are acutely aware of 
the challenges of inquiry and the additional investment required in terms of time and effort, but 
at this school have ultimately decided that the costs are worthwhile: 
I mean-- it's-- it's been a helpful process that-- where in the beginning I think it was kinda 
like, "Oh, this is something extra to do--" like, three years ago it's totally not viewed like 
that anymore here even by teachers that have been here the whole time-- because people 
do see results.  And even if they don't see a result always, you know, the gains definitely 
are outweighing any disadvantage or, you know, failed inquiry by not seeing the results 
that we're hoping for.  So it's been helpful. 
Overall, this case provides a useful framework for a team primarily composed of 
inexperienced teachers with an experienced facilitator, which may be a useful model given the 
quantitative analyses. It also provides some context for explaining the general lack of 
quantitative results – the outcomes of interest were focused on social and emotional learning 
outcomes not captured by student test scores or value-added results, and even with strong 
leadership and sustained focus, teachers struggled with analyzing data effectively and mastering 






 Inquiry teams at School B were organized around development of new math assessments 
that were aligned to the Common Core standards at each grade level. Therefore, this case is a 
particularly good example of how teacher collaboration may be particularly important when the 
curriculum, standards, or assessments change. Upon examining the school’s prior student 
achievement data, the administration and core inquiry team concluded that the school needed to 
focus on math and in particular on the “Number sense and operations” skill, which comprised 
47% of the new state test and the area in which students struggled the most. The skill focused on 
a broad range of arithmetic concepts, including counting, patterns, and skip counting at the 
younger grades, fractions and decimals at older grades, and addition, subtraction, multiplication, 
and division of different types of numbers across the elementary grades.  
In the first part of the year, each grade-level team focused on constructing new 
assessments to measure student progress in this area, consulting a wide variety of published math 
materials. The assessment-creation process itself served as a tool for professional development, 
as teachers needed to familiarize themselves with the new standards and expectations and 
consider what areas were most important to assess student mastery, as well as anticipate possible 
areas of confusion for students. Further, this process was an opportunity for collaborative 
learning along two dimensions – teachers gave one another feedback on their assessment 
instruments within grades and across grade levels in the core inquiry team, facilitating individual 
learning, and the group made discoveries about the new math curriculum and student learning 
needs through the entire process. The structured, focused process also provided an opportunity 
for stronger teachers to assist teachers who needed help with assessment and inquiry skills, along 




provided a great deal of support to the relatively new Kindergarten teacher in the process. 
Additionally, the development of these assessments and then the subsequent implementation of 
the tests with students and analyzing the data for patterns of results gave a great deal of structure 
to the inquiry work, taking advantage of the Common Core implementation as an opportunity for 
teachers to deeply revisit their approach at a time when they may be unusually open to change: 
Well, it was a good jumping off point to do a lot of collaboration.  You know, because 
certain topics, you know, when you're teaching for a while you teach things a certain way 
and you kinda don't really think about doing it another way.  You know, like, for example 
I was having a hard time with equivalent fractions, I tried a couple different things. 
And you know, when we look at the data together and we say, "My kids are having 
trouble with equivalent fractions.  Like, how do you, you know, approach that topic?  
How do you?"  And then it's good for us to kinda talk it out and share things.  And, I 
mean, not that we don't collaborate to begin with, but it gives us, you know, a more clear 
focus of, you know, something I'm doing is not working.  And, like, let's talk about how 
we can help each other to come up with new ways to teach things. 
After implementing the assessments, the core team discussed trends in student 
performance and brainstormed instructional strategies to address key gaps in student 
understanding. Interestingly, this process uncovered some gaps in teachers’ own conceptual 
understanding of mathematics. As teachers debated the wording of questions about place value, 
some teachers noted that a question that asked about how many tens are in 900 could be 
answered with “90,” when the teacher was looking for zero, the number that is in the tens place. 
Another teacher on the team noted that students would be correct in saying that there are, in fact, 
90 tens in 900, launching a discussion about deepening teachers’ and students’ conceptual 
understanding about mathematics and ability to communicate these ideas clearly and effectively. 
While the difference in understanding may have been purely semantic, it did lead to some 




math more conceptually; unfortunately, due to time and resource constraints, there was not 
evidence follow-up from this discussion in the subsequent meetings that were observed. 
Following up from the analysis of the assessment results, the core team decided that it 
would be most helpful to gather more evidence about breakdowns in student understanding. 
Grade teams therefore selected a number of “case study” students for whom to closely examine 
student work with individual, multi-step problems to diagnose issues that may be representative 
of a larger group of students and test instructional strategies. This was in some ways a scaling-
back from inquiry work in previous years, which involved more peer observation, low-inference 
note-taking, and closely observing students with serious learning or behavioral challenges in a 
number of settings. Teachers had generally reported that such processes required a great deal of 
time and work that did not seem to pay off in terms of improved instruction, suggesting that 
generalizing from highly idiosyncratic learning needs of students may be a challenge in inquiry 
teams leading to more systemic change. Therefore, inquiry work focused instead on carefully 
examining student work together using the “What Comes Up” protocol from The Power of 
Protocols: An Educator’s Guide to Better Practice (McDonald et al, 2003). According to the 
protocol, teachers first observe low-inference “noticings” about the work before engaging in 
more free-form conversation about potential causes of the things they notice. Once teachers have 
collectively developed a hypothesis as to the cause of any gap in student understanding, they 
brainstorm possible remedies.  
 This process did contribute to deeper thinking and root cause analysis among the 
teachers, as they tried to uncover the source of gaps in student understanding. When examining 
how students respond to the problems, teachers noticed that students were often fixated on 




connected to the problem or to mathematical reasoning. Even in cases when answers to the 
problems were correct, student reasoning was opaque. In one example, students were asked to 
derive the optimal number of students and balloons at each table for a party. Several students 
spent a great deal of time drawing individual tables, students, and balloons and ultimately 
showed that they arrived at the correct answer through multiplication, even though the most 
efficient process would have used division and the drawings did not add anything to the analysis. 
Teachers therefore devised a strategy to better get at student thinking by asking them to prove 
their responses, as opposed to just showing their work, and providing less guidance in terms of 
graphic organizers and sentence starters to avoid explanations that added little to their 
understanding. In another case, a student responding to a problem related to recognizing a pattern 
successfully filled in a chart to help him see the pattern, but then wrote a number sentence that 
was seemingly unrelated. 
If he could've followed the chart, he would've been correct.  That's why I said there's no-- 
I don't know how he got from the chart to this number sentence, to get-- 
  TEACHER 1: 
What's interesting thing about the number sentence is, even adding-- the numbers have no 
relation to the chart. 
But the answer for 10 and six and four should be 20. 
  TEACHER 2: 
Right. 
  TEACHER 1: 
But he wrote 14, which is close to the real answer. 
  TEACHER 2: 
It's still not that, either. 
 In a follow-up discussion, teachers tried to understand what led the student to write a 




hypothesized that it could have been related to the balloon drawings, in that students were 
following a mechanical set of problem-solving steps without really understanding what they 
were doing, and therefore suggested a teaching strategy that encouraged them to step back and 
think more deeply about how they approached word problems in math: 
See, so I think doing the number sentence… I think he goes-- he just knows he has to do 
a number sentence, so he's just put it in there.  He didn't really know why.  So I think 
maybe-- I mean, I think the next step is if, like, everyone says, "Okay.  We're gonna teach 
this like we're teaching reading a story, but that-- that will be what we do."   
 In spite of the apparent successes of deepening teachers’ own understanding of the 
content through developing and analyzing assessments, and uncovering gaps in student 
understanding through close examination of student work, major challenges remained with 
regard to what teachers could do with that information. One challenge was how to generalize 
findings from a single student to a group of students, or from a single skill to the larger 
curriculum, given the need to address the learning needs of all students and the need to cover the 
full curriculum. Ideally, root cause analysis through inquiry will uncover instructional gaps that 
can be addressed with strategies that benefit all students or through general improvements in 
teacher human capital. A next-best scenario may be that teachers become more comfortable with 
flexible grouping and pacing strategies so that, while student learning gaps cannot necessarily be 
addressed in a holistic fashion that benefits all students, strategic re-teaching and small group 
instruction and tutoring can help address specific deficiencies. There is substantially more 
evidence for the latter response than the former in this case, suggesting that applying the kaizen 
model of team learning and continuous improvement to education may be particularly 
challenging and providing some explanation as to why results were small even when focusing on 
high-quality teams. Teachers did, however, adapt their pacing and instructional calendars in 




And also, they were thoughtful when they looked at the results.  When they looked at the 
results from the first administration, they rearranged their curriculum so that they could 
meet the needs of, you know, for the test.  Not only for the test, but what they need to go 
to the next grade, meet the needs of the standards. 
So they became more cyclical in their teaching.  They knew they had to come back and 
review other, you know, topics that they introduced earlier on in the year.  They moved 
ahead and moved topics closer, you know, closer to the test.  They knew that some topics 
could wait.  I think they had a better understanding of the expectations for the grade and 
what the common core standards ask.  So I thought it was a very thoughtful process. 
 The lead third grade teacher and the assistant principal both cited success of the inquiry 
teams in pushing teachers to think in new ways and providing some structured opportunities to 
challenge teachers who conventionally were not open to change. The assessment development 
opened conversations about what truly constituted “mastery” – for instance, if a student 
understood a concept in a December administration but not in March, had they ever really 
understood it, or whether teachers should award partial credit when the standard calls for 
complete understanding. Grounding the inquiry work in concrete assessment and data analysis 
tasks provided a launching point for challenging reflections and conversations: 
And I think that going off of it we've really pushed ourselves to, like, go outside of what 
we knew, and you know, do more, look for more stuff, you know, teach things in 
different ways… And I think that as a majority of teachers, we did that.  And it was a 
really successful project. 
 Finally, participants noted some costs and constraints they faced in the inquiry work. The 
assistant principal noted that, although grade-level representatives to the core team helped to 
facilitate the grade-level inquiry meetings, more direct leadership participation on all inquiry 
teams would be helpful if it were feasible: 
No, the only thing is, like, you know, you meet with a core member and they have to go 
back to their teams.  It would just be, you know, a perfect world if we could, you know, 
have the teams meeting together and us going in and, you know, facilitating or, you 
know, it's just you meet with a team and they go back, you meet with a team and they go 




Teachers also noted that inquiry competed with other demands on their scarce time, both 
individually and as a grade team. Therefore, teachers and school leaders needed to be strategic in 
how much time they allocate to inquiry teamwork and how to use their resources most 
effectively. This constraint has implications for the cost analysis, as well, and may call for 
enhancing the inquiry team initiative by providing funding for after-school meetings or by 
relieving teachers and administrators who participate on inquiry teams of other responsibilities. 
SCHOOL C 
 Data from School C comes from the 7th grade team, which regularly comprised the 
English Language Arts (ELA), math, and social studies teachers, with occasional representation 
by the science, English as a Second Language (ESL), and special education teachers. The team 
met quite regularly, as often as three times per week, and focused on other topics as well as 
inquiry. The frequency of meetings may have actually been an impediment to meaningful 
engagement in team learning, as team members appeared to take meetings for granted, meetings 
were often canceled or rescheduled without notice, and much meeting time was devoted to non-
inquiry tasks. Although this is to be expected to some degree, given that inquiry was not the only 
stated purpose of the grade-level meetings and teachers had other important demands on their 
time, collectively and individually, it is notable that more time is not a sufficient condition for 
consistent engagement in inquiry work on its own. 
 At meetings when the team did follow the inquiry process, they followed a regular 
protocol by which one teacher brought a set of student work for the group to jointly examine, 
diagnose particular learning needs, and brainstorm instructional strategies that could be applied 
in that particular course or across the grade. At the next meeting, the team reflected upon the 
success of the strategy and discusses further refinements before moving on to another skill and 




to facilitate the meetings, implicitly setting an agenda even when there was not a written agenda. 
There was a notable difference in tone and focus of meetings based on whether this one 
individual was present or absent from meetings. While the team seemed very comfortable with 
this protocol, it is unclear whether it was particularly effective given a few limitations. First, I 
was unable to observe in the data any follow-up or long-term reflection that occurred after trying 
an instructional strategy; however, given the frequency of the meetings, it was not possible to 
observe all of them, so some of this work may have happened when researchers were not present. 
Further, a large portion of meeting time was spent on non-inquiry tasks (e.g., a discussion of 
pencil sharpening routines that took up about a third of one short meeting). Finally, as discussed 
in more detail in the analysis section below, the team appeared to be somewhat limited in its 
ability to connect learning needs to instructional strategies in sophisticated and nuanced ways, 
instead gravitating toward somewhat simplistic and overly broad solutions, such as teaching 
essay-writing in identical formats across subject areas to limit student confusion. 
 At one meeting, teachers each carefully read essays students had written in ELA class to 
diagnose strengths and weaknesses in writing skills that could have more general implications 
for instruction in other classes, particularly social studies. They followed a simple protocol that 
involved first sharing low-inference observations about strengths and weaknesses and then 
engaging in more open conversation about possible causes of the weaknesses and strategies to try 
to alleviate them. The meeting and the protocol provided a structured opportunity for teachers to 
engage outside resources, including the Write to Learn assessment tools and teaching strategies 
from Teaching Basic Writing Skills. Teachers identified a number of strengths and weaknesses, 
praising students’ ability to use supporting facts and details while noting that students struggled 




Nonetheless, the discussion became focused on whether teachers should be requiring a 
consistent format for introductory and concluding paragraphs for all writing assignments across 
the grade, based on a format some teachers had learned at a workshop on teaching writing skills. 
One teacher suggested that some genres of writing did not call for formal introductions and 
conclusions, and another teacher wanted longer, more detailed introductions than the format 
suggested by the workshop. After some conversation, all teachers agree to try the 3-sentence 
strategy in their classes.  
While there are some positive indicators in this interaction, including willingness of the 
team to engage in productive conflict and express disagreement and the examination of 
underlying beliefs about what constitutes developmentally appropriate writing, the resolution is 
ultimately formulaic, based on the assumption that clear and consistent expectations will 
improve student writing skills. The instructional strategy selected does not seem to be based on a 
clear connection between the student learning needs identified from the analysis of work and the 
learning standards. Although it was said in a joking manner, the following exchange seems 
revelatory in suggesting that the teachers themselves may have felt the proposed solution left 
issues unresolved: 
TEACHER A: 
All right, so that's our strategy. 
 TEACHER B: 
Thank you. 
 TEACHER A: 
And everyone have a lovely day. 
  
In an interview, the team indicated that the regularity of meetings, support from school 
leadership for the work, and the student work protocol were all contributing to the team’s 




by the more peripheral members, who could only sporadically participate in team meetings due 
to scheduling conflicts: 
But if we gonna start off with a team, I understand that we're the core because we have 
been here together since September.  But I wish that they would not, like, take… one 
person out. 
 
 In spite of competing demands for the team’s time, there is evidence that they devoted a 
great deal of time to analyzing student work, an important part of the inquiry and the team 
learning process. Team members also exhibited a positive and open attitude regarding conflict 
and instructional change and a willingness to experiment: 
Thanks for-- sorry.  I know it's hard to change your teaching practice. 
 TEACHER B: 
No, it's okay. 
 TEACHER A: 
I mean, you've done it for so long. 
 TEACHER B: 
No, no.  I mean, like-- listen, it's-- it's all about applying things and learning, you know?  
  
Overall, there is some initial evidence for the team’s success, but also some limitation. 
Notably, teachers placed strong value on collaboration and reflected that their collaborative 
processes had improved over time, mainly through communication channels becoming more 
frequent and informal, a condition predicted by Hoegl and Gemuenden. They also noted some 
anecdotal evidence that student work and course grades had improved since the previous year, 
when collaboration was less structured. In part due to the inquiry work, teachers became more 
comfortable observing one another, sharing strategies, and asking for help, and data collection 
became more systematic. Finally, teachers noted that some innovations developed in the 7th 




and concerned primarily with school culture, including the implementation of reading logs and 
reward field trips to incentivize student reading.  
The frequency of meetings and the level of freedom, informality and comfort that the 
teachers had with one another, along with some structural issues including shuffling of personnel 
at meetings, frequent rescheduling, and supplanting inquiry work with urgent issues, may have 
ultimately contributed to inquiry work that was successful in small cycles but ultimately ad hoc, 
disconnected from a larger strategy for teacher learning or instructional change. While the 
principal was very supportive of inquiry, structuring all of the school’s collaborative planning 
time around inquiry work based on a charter school model and sometimes attending meetings 
herself, the lack of any prescriptive directive from leadership as well as the elimination of the 
requirement to focus on a specific sub-group of students for a sustained period of time may have 
led to inquiry work that was too diffuse to achieve any long-lasting change, even if there were 
some short-term benefits. 
Finally, while a significant portion of the team’s collaborative work was not oriented 
around inquiry or, more broadly, team-based problem-solving, action research, or team learning, 
that is not to say that the work did not have value for teachers or students. In addition to time the 
team spent on planning events to celebrate and enrich student learning, they also spent a great 
deal of time discussing behavioral challenges and needs of individual students and appropriate 
strategies for follow-up, including communications with parents and referring to other school 
staff to evaluate student emotional and behavioral needs and provide additional services, if 
needed. Therefore, further quantitative examination of non-academic outcomes, including social 
and emotional learning measures, student behavior, and attendance, is important for further 




forms beyond those outlined in the conceptual framework in Chapter 1 and the policy under 
investigation here, and teachers and teams make choices about how to allocate their time based 
on the perceived relative costs and benefits of those different activities. It should not be assumed, 
therefore, that teams are necessarily making an incorrect decision when they substitute other 
types of collaboration, which may ultimately be more or less productive, for inquiry work. 
SCHOOL D 
 The team at School D comprised three administrators and a variable number of teachers 
who served as leaders of their own subject and grade-level teams. This team, known as the 
School-wide Data Team, came together to discuss school-wide trends in student learning, 
develop instructional strategies for the entire school, and focus on the professional development 
needs of teachers. Therefore, although the team followed the inquiry approach, the focus was 
less on direct instructional interventions and the needs of a particular group of students, and more 
on the general needs of teachers across the school to help them better meet the needs of students.  
 The team reviewed high-level student achievement data and identified academic 
vocabulary as a skill limitation that was impeding learning for many of the students across 
grades and subjects; many students were English Language Learners, so academic vocabulary 
acquisition in English was a particularly important skill within the school. The team quickly 
identified polysemous words with distinct yet related meanings across disciplines, such as rate, 
as a high-leverage area for skill development. Similarly to the School C team, however, the team 
transitioned from an evidence-based approach focused on identifying the learning needs of each 
individual student and each individual teacher to a one-size-fits-all solution that emphasized 
consistency above adaptation: the team spent much of the remainder of meetings discussing 




students would be exposed to a multi-meaning academic vocabulary word in every subject each 
day and then tested on using the words from the previous week in multiple contexts each Friday.  
It is unclear exactly why the team chose to value consistency over differentiation to meet 
the identified needs of individual students and teachers, although the data point to some possible 
reasons. One is that administrators on the team were acutely aware that teachers were feeling a 
great deal of pressure from a number of initiatives, including the implementation of the Common 
Core and a new teacher evaluation system; there was therefore a desire to keep inquiry work 
minimally intrusive so as to avoid further damage to teacher morale, which overall seemed to be 
lower at this school than in the others. Secondly, the team expressed a desire to gather data on a 
sub-sample of students across classes and grades so as to monitor and celebrate progress and 
identify any possible trends in performance that might help locate the most effective instructional 
strategies to share throughout the school. Therefore, although the proposed strategy is quite 
broad and somewhat disconnected from the original purpose of using inquiry to tailor instruction 
to student needs, it seems that the intent was for the Word of the Day initiative to be but a first 
step in the inquiry process. As appears to be a common obstacle, given the descriptive statistics 
on inquiry cycles from 2007-2010 and the findings of the CPRE inquiry studies, the team 
struggled to find the time to get the initiative off the ground quickly enough to be able to follow 
up with next steps. 
  As with the team in School C, an apparent leader played a role in pushing conversations 
to challenge underlying assumptions, as well as to move toward actionable decisions. This 
person had some positional authority, as one of the two Assistant Principals on the team, but was 
not the most senior member of the team, which also contained the Principal. This leader also 




availability of scarce time, resources, and tools in order to help teachers be successful in 
implementing inquiry and data-related initiatives, suggesting some underlying concerns with 
school culture, shared values around collaboration, and capacity constraints: 
I mean, if we keep looking at all these different initiatives as separate pieces, it-- it-- we 
have to start seein' how they fit together. Otherwise it's like that's why people freak out 
and get stressed 'cause, "Oh, here's another initiative." 
"And another one and another one and another."  We don't see how they lock together to 
make a whole picture. 
 
 There was much discussion about how to assess vocabulary acquisition, including 
whether such assessment would take place in just one subject or across subjects and for all 
students or a representative sample of students, and how to make sure the assessment was 
authentic and represented higher-order thinking skills. There is less tangible evidence, however, 
that any data from the vocabulary assessments was used to engage in root cause analysis to 
discover patterns in how particular instructional strategies relate to student learning outcomes. 
After collecting data on two rounds of pre-tests and post-tests for a representative sample of 
students from across the school, teachers and administrators met to analyze trends and decide 
upon next steps. A number of logistical challenges, including finding time to administer the 
assessments to enough students and finding meaningful patterns in the data given the very small 
sample, precluded significant follow-up.  
Therefore, it appears that School D was putting into place several of the important 
ingredients for successful inquiry, including sophisticated data collection and difficult 
conversations challenging teacher assumptions about student learning, but due to an overly-broad 
focus, lack of teacher buy-in, and capacity constraints in teachers’ time and ability to effectively 
use student data to inform instruction, did not see many indicators of positive results from 




results of inquiry work, including the development and sharing of engaging materials that used 
audio, video, and images to help teach vocabulary, as well as increased capacity to engage in 
instructional research, including assessment, data collection, and analysis, among some teachers 
who led the initiative. 
CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS 
 One clear conclusion that emerges from these four cases is that inquiry teamwork, as 
envisioned by the school district and stylized in Figure 1, is difficult to do well. Even with a 
sampling strategy designed to locate examples of the best inquiry work in the district, at none of 
the four schools were inquiry teams implemented with perfect fidelity to the original model or 
without substantial challenges and constraints. Notably, at the two schools that arguably 
achieved greater success with inquiry (Schools A and B), the model departed most radically from 
the original vision focused on targeted sub-skills and sub-groups of students, with an explicit 
focus on teacher development, as found by Chu et al. (2012). Three hypotheses can explain these 
findings, in conjunction with the quantitative findings: (1) inquiry team work is too challenging 
to work well under any circumstances, on average, given resource constraints and competing 
demands for teacher and administrator time; (2) in order to work well, inquiry teams require 
more sustained investment of time, resources, effort, and leadership support than is currently 
provided, on average; or (3) the products of inquiry team work are not well-measured by the 
existing outcome measures in the quantitative and qualitative data. The patterns of findings 
across these cases, as well as in the quantitative work, provide some suggestive evidence for the 
second and third hypotheses. 
 Table 7-1 shows counts for each code at each school, as well as the codes that most 




for brevity, co-occurrences are only listed once; for instance “Balance of contributions” and 
“Leadership support” tend to be coded together, so “Leadership support” is listed as a commonly 
co-occurring code under “Balance of contributions,” but the reverse is not true to avoid 
repetition. Additionally, if no codes co-occurred with a particular code in at least 3 text excerpts, 





TABLE 7-1 CODE APPLICATION BY SCHOOL AND CO-OCCURRENCE 
Code Commonly co-occurring codes A B C D 
Conditions 









     Specialization 
     
Courage/Openness to change 
Willingness to engage in conflict, 
Experimentation 2 5 5 2 
Formal vs. informal communication 
 










useful data 29 14 1 25 









Research skills Leadership support 5 2 1 7 
Asking good questions Gathering useful data, Focus 16 13 
 
24 
Analyzing and interpreting results 
 
3 4 2 2 
Gathering useful data Focus 14 18 5 43 
Shared values and norms Leadership support 
 
2 1 4 
Willingness to engage in conflict Asking good questions 2 11 2 6 
Processes 
     Analyzing data Goal-setting, Instructional strategies 1 17 14 6 
Reviewing student work Root cause analysis 
 
10 10 5 
Experimentation 
 
7 3 2 5 
Giving feedback 
 
1 1 2 1 
Receiving Feedback 
   
1 1 




   Depth 
 
2 1 
  Framing Goal-setting 17 13 3 4 
Goal-setting Leadership support 9 7 1 21 
Individual student Analyzing data 2 5 9 
 
Instructional strategies 
Taking advantage of outside 
resources 4 10 21 13 
Content 
 
1 2 4 5 
Skills Goal-setting 1 6 8 11 
Logistics/other non-inquiry 
   
7 3 
Peer monitoring Leadership support, Peer pressure 5 5 4 2 
Peer pressure Peer monitoring 7 




Reflecting and Adjusting Analyzing data 9 9 14 6 
Root cause analysis 
 
2 16 2 2 
Taking advantage of outside resources Skills 5 16 11 2 
Outcomes 
     Abductive Reasoning 
 
2 2 









  Deeper questioning and thinking 
 
1 4 





Student learning, reflection and 
adjusting 6 5 
  Team Reflecting and adjusting 
 
9 1 




   
1 
 Organizational learning Institutionalization 6 2 1 1 
Student learning 
 
1 9 8 1 
 
One emerging theme suggested by patterns of code application across schools and code 
co-occurrence is that any one condition for the success of inquiry is insufficient without other 
conditions being in place, as well. For instance, school leadership was most directly involved in 
inquiry work at Schools A and D. Nonetheless, the role of leadership varied across those schools, 
as it seems leadership at School A was much more involved in framing problems and 
encouraging focus. Some processes also appear to be associated with one another across teams, 
and may lead to better outcomes – for instance, closely examining student work appears to be a 
catalyst for engaging in difficult conversations that challenge teacher preconceptions and 
contribute to deeper root cause analysis and strategic leveraging of outside resources. 
Relatedly, these patterns of findings help explain why the quantitative results only 
improved slightly when taking into account quality and heterogeneity – the quality differences 
between teams are often quite nuanced. Setting a goal is not a sufficient indicator of team 




which the team effectively follows up on assessing progress toward the goal and making 
necessary adjustments matters more. Similarly, all teams analyzed student work, but it proved 
quite challenging to effectively make use of the findings of their analyses.  
Notably, discussion at school C revolved substantially around processes, whereas 
discussion at school D revolved more around conditions, suggesting that they may, in fact, be at 
different stages of development in terms of building capacity for effective teamwork. Given the 
more active, direct role of school leadership in the school-wide data team at school D, it is 
unsurprising that there was much more evidence of leadership involvement and discussion of 
organization and structure of teamwork, whereas the protocols and structures seem to be more 
solidly in place at school C and therefore less explicitly addressed. At Schools A and B, on the 
other hand, there seems to be more balance in code application between conditions and 
processes, suggesting some complementarity between the two. Notable as well is some possible 
reverse causality in the conceptual framework. For instance, according to the pattern of code 
application and the rich description, School D may be best described as in the “Compliance” 
mode, rigidly following aspects of the inquiry process but facing some substantial resistance to 
change by teachers. It may indeed be that the outcomes drive the conditions and processes, rather 
than the other way around. 
One unanticipated finding across schools is the balance between consistency and 
adaptation. The stated purpose of inquiry teams is to explore evidence-based instructional 
strategies to adapt to individual student learning needs. Teams at Schools C and D seemed to 
gravitate in the opposite direction, with school D representing almost the opposite extreme, 
whereby the strategy being tested was to teach every single student in the school the exact same 




and strategic follow-up is tenuous. It appears that a careful balance between flexibility and 
rigidity, with enough structure to give teams focus but not so much so as to limit their capacity to 
experiment, is needed and contributes to better outcomes at Schools A and B. 
Other themes include discussion of capacity constraints, including limitations on teacher 
time, competing initiatives, limited resources, tools, and technology to successfully complete this 
work, and potentially even skill gaps that teachers have in analyzing data and collaborating 
effectively. Relatedly, there seems to be some concern, particularly in school D, with teacher 
buy-in, and some fear of overwhelming teachers with new initiatives. There is even, at one point, 
explicit discussion of how additional burdens on teachers created by assessments and data 
analysis could run afoul of union contracts. Despite concerns about time, capacity, and resource 
constraints, there interestingly is no evidence of free-riding or specialization, two possible and 
divergent outcomes of teamwork predicted by economic theory. This could be because teachers 
are still ultimately responsible for their own classrooms and students, so there are limits to how 
much of these phenomena can occur. 
Overall, the findings of these case studies are mostly consistent with the prior literature 
on teacher collaboration, as well as the previous investigations of inquiry. As with Chu et al. 
(2012) and the CPRE reports, these cases emphasize the importance of school leadership, the 
shift in focus from student to teacher learning, and in spite of some very promising practices and 
clear differences between schools, great challenges in implementing inquiry work even at the 
strongest schools. They help explain the limited quantitative findings, given challenges in 
implementation, and suggest student and teacher outcomes for further analysis. Further, they 




problem-solving is difficult and requires sustained effort, training, and culture change that may 





Chapter 8 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 A full analysis of inquiry teams requires examination of not just the effects of teacher 
collaboration, but also the costs. Although regardless of the cost it makes little sense to 
implement a program that has no effects or measurable benefits, since inquiry teams seem to 
have some small effect when implemented well, and since many of the traditional alternatives to 
inquiry teams have little measured effects in the literature, a cost analysis can still provide useful 
information to policymakers. 
 A full accounting of all resources or ingredients required to achieve a particular measured 
result, and their associated properties such as experience, education, and special training or 
qualifications for personnel, taking into account all resources with alternative uses or opportunity 
costs including in-kind contributions, volunteer time, and reallocation of already-purchased 
resources from another use, gives the fullest and most accurate picture of the economic costs of 
an intervention (Levin and McEwan, 2001).  
 To obtain a conservatively high estimate of costs, this analysis will proceed by taking 
account of the costs of implementing for all teachers (as in 2009-2010). This is because, ex ante, 
decision-makers cannot likely anticipate the quality of implementation; therefore, it may be 
necessary to implement teams for all teachers but only to expect positive results from a small 
sub-sample of teachers who cannot be identified beforehand.  
COST ANALYSIS 
 Ideally, ingredients data would be gathered from informants who directly implemented 
the policy in interviews. Such informants were not available at the time of this analysis, although 
they may be for further research; however, given the unusually rich implementation data 




initiative written by Talbert (2010) and the two implementation studies by CPRE (2008 and 
2010), the ingredients necessary for replication can be inferred. Among all teams, a small sample 
within three levels of intensity of implementation were randomly selected and their responses in 
the inquiry database read to estimate the ingredients required and their associated quantities and 
qualities. Information from Talbert and the CPRE reports was used to verify and supplement this 
information with additional details, for instance on the coaching, training, and support provided 
by central district personnel. The three levels of intensity were low, defined as a team not setting 
a goal and therefore likely existing in name only; medium, defined as setting a goal and engaging 
in one inquiry cycle but no more; and high, defined as engaging in multiple inquiry cycles. The 
percentage of teams meeting each criterion among all teams in 2009-2010 was then applied to 
these estimates to obtain a weighted, pooled average of the cost of implementing inquiry teams 
to all teachers. These weights were 28% for low-intensity, 67% for medium-intensity, and 4% 
for high-intensity. These weights are varied in sensitivity analyses. 
 Relevant economic metrics can be calculated from these estimates. The weighted average 
cost per team and total cost for all teams are only meaningful when expressed relative to a unit of 
outcome. Therefore, the metrics will be cost per student per standard deviation gain in test 
scores, and cost per teacher per additional year teaching. There was a 3.8% increase in 
probability of returning for 7543 first-year teachers in 2007-2008, and about a 1.3 point (0.04 
standard deviation) increase in student test scores in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010.  
In addition to the cost per unit of output, in order to incorporate multiple outcomes and 
provide a metric that can be evaluated without a comparison, these outcomes can be converted 
into monetary values to directly ascertain whether the program is worthwhile. In other words, 




discounted costs, can be calculated to determine if the program meets the basic criterion of its 
benefits exceeding its costs. There is unlikely to be a market price for teacher retention or student 
achievement, but the values of these outcomes can be estimated using shadow pricing methods 
which assess willingness to pay. Calculating these shadow prices directly can be done via several 
methods, including stated preferences via contingent valuation, or revealed preference methods 
such as defensive expenditures and hedonic modeling, but doing so is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. Shadow prices for these outcomes have been estimated in the literature and will be 
used here. 
Note also that the perspective taken here is social and incremental. Social costs 
encompass all resources used in the intervention, regardless of who pays; in almost all cases with 
inquiry teams, the entity responsible for the costs will be the public school district. Social 
benefits similarly encompass all benefits, regardless of who receives them; the implicit 
assumption is that taxpayers have chosen to invest in public education because they value 
improved educational outcomes, even if they do not directly receive them, in part because of the 
positive externalities associated with education.  
Incremental costs refer to costs over and above business-as-usual. Since in many cases 
inquiry work is happening during the school day, when teachers and principals are already being 
paid to work, it is difficult to disentangle exactly what is incremental. In many cases, particularly 
early in the phase-in of the initiative, teachers were paid overtime for inquiry team meetings after 
school, in which case included those additional hours as a cost of the program is clearly 
appropriate. When inquiry meetings are happening during the school day, whether or not the 
costs are incremental depends on what they are substituting; for instance, if teachers are taken 




both teacher and substitute time would be double-counting). In other cases, such as when other 
types of teacher professional development or meetings are replaced by inquiry, whether or not 
the cost is incremental is less clear. To be conservative, I assume here that all costs of inquiry are 
incremental. 
 Cost estimates are presented in Table 8-1. Low intensity teams, which comprise 28% of 
the sample in 2009-2010, essentially meet once to organize but since they do not set a goal or 
report any follow-up, I assume that they then disband. The costs are therefore very low, 
essentially comprising about one hour of time for team members and for use of facilities and a 
computer to input the data on the team for that time. Total costs reported here are the product of 
unit costs and national average prices as reported by the National Center for Education Statistics 
and the Census Bureau; costs are in 2013 dollars and personnel costs reflect 29.5% average 
fringe benefit rates for K-12 educators.6  
National prices were selected for teachers with Master’s degrees and 10-14 years of 
experience, which is close to the average teacher in the school district, and for Assistant 
Principals and Principals with any level of experience and education. The average salary for 
Assistant Superintendents was used as the price for SAFs, as these personnel were generally 
senior school administrators. Average annual salaries were divided by 1440 hours in an academic 
year (8 hours per day for 180 school days) for teachers and counselors and the BLS definition of 
a working year, 2080 hours (8 hours per day for 260 weekdays per year) for administrators to 
obtain estimates of hourly wages. In the absence of a market for rental of educational facilities, 
average new construction prices as reported by School Planning and Management Magazine7 
were amortized at 3.5% interest over 30 years to annualize costs per square foot. These annual 






costs were divided into the number of usable hours (1440 per year, to be conservative) to 
estimate an hourly cost per square foot of facilities. It is assumed that teams meet in a small 
classroom or conference room, about half the size of the average 900 square foot classroom.8  
The CPRE implementation reports note that average team size was approximately 6, that 
most teams met about once or twice a month, and that the Senior Achievement Facilitator who 
trained and supported Inquiry Teams met with most teams about 2-3 times during the school 
year. These reports provide the basis for the Medium-Intensity team estimate. Based on data 
reported in the CPRE reports and inquiry databases, it is assumed that the Assistant Principal and 
Guidance Counselor are each members of the team, and the principal attends about half of the 
team meetings. High intensity teams are similar, but they are assumed to meet once per week and 
the SAF attends four times per year, which is the higher end reported by CPRE. Based on these 
estimates, the average cost for inquiry is approximately $4,360 per team, or $40,027,440 for all 
9,176 teams in 2009-2010. These costs are broken down by ingredient and by team intensity in 
Table 8-1. In each case, teacher time constitutes the majority of the costs of inquiry teams, 
although for higher intensity teams, in which leadership participation is an important ingredient, 
administrator and counselor time is also a significant cost. 
 One additional consideration is the possibility of induced costs through the inquiry 
process itself. These costs can include purchasing new curriculum materials to test instructional 
strategies, engaging in small-group or individual tutoring with targeted students, and other costs 
of the interventions devised through the inquiry process and the external resources teachers 
sought for support. The CPRE implementation reports asked principals and teachers about these 
external costs and reported that they were very low. 







TABLE 8-1 COSTS OF TEAMS BY INTENSITY 
 
 Low Intensity Medium Intensity High Intensity Pooled 
Ingredient Total Cost % Total Cost % Total Cost % Total Cost % 
Personnel 
        Teachers  $  260.00  88%  $ 3,120.00  56%  $   8,310.00  58%  $ 2,500.00  57% 
AP  $          -    0%  $    790.00  14%  $   2,110.00  15%  $    610.00  14% 
Principal  $    30.00  10%  $    430.00  8%  $   1,150.00  8%  $    340.00  8% 
SAF  $          -    0%  $    250.00  4%  $      330.00  2%  $    180.00  4% 
Other school staff - Guidance counselors  $          -    0%  $    870.00  16%  $   2,310.00  16%  $    670.00  15% 
Facilities 
        Classroom/conference room for meetings  $    10.00  2%  $      70.00  1%  $      190.00  1%  $      60.00  1% 
Materials 
        Computers  $      1.00  0%  $        1.00  0%  $          1.00  0%  $        1.00  0% 
         Total cost per team  $  300.00  
 
 $ 5,530.00  
 
 $ 14,410.00  
 
 $ 4,360.00  





   






Given the multiple outcomes of inquiry teams and the need for a single economic metric 
that can evaluate whether it pays off as a social investment, a benefit-cost analysis that applies 
shadow prices to estimate the monetary value of the outcomes discussed above is appropriate. 
Several studies have attempted to estimate the costs of teacher turnover; a report commissioned 
by the National Commission on Teaching & America’s Future attempts to do so using the “cost 
of illness” method, gathering data from five school districts on direct and indirect expenditures 
caused by teacher turnover. These could be low estimates of the costs due to negative spillover 
effects on achievement due to general disruption to school culture caused by turnover (Ronfeldt, 
Loeb, and Wyckoff, 2013). These spillover effects are omitted to avoid double-counting of 
benefits due to increased student achievement, which are themselves reduced form results that 
could be the net result of direct and indirect policy impacts. The costs of turnover collected 
include recruitment and advertising, special incentives, administrative processing, training for 
new hires, a reduction in achievement due to relatively less experienced teachers, and 
administrative costs such as substitute teachers and paperwork associated with teacher transfers. 
The average cost of turnover across four districts studied is $13,360, adjusted to 2013 dollars 
(Barnes, Crowe, and Schaefer, 2007). However, inducing a teacher to stay an additional year 
does not guarantee the teacher won’t leave the following year; to be conservative, therefore, 
these benefits are divided by the average teacher tenure in the dataset, which is about 9 years, 
yielding $1,480 in benefits per teacher-year. 
The economic benefits from increased achievement are estimated based on the total fiscal 
and social benefits of math achievement, estimated by Levin and Belfield (2009, Table 5), 




Belfield calculate these benefits using the cost of illness method, estimating the association 
between changes in math achievement and increases in the probability of high school graduation, 
and the concomitant economic benefits related to labor market, health, crime, and welfare 
outcomes. Because these estimates are based solely on math achievement, the number of 
students receiving the benefits are scaled by the percentage of inquiry teams focusing on math, 
which is 24%. Assuming each inquiry team targeted approximately 15 students, 33,034 students 
are expected to receive total social benefits of approximately $955 each, or $31,966,500 in 
benefits due to achievement. This is likely a lower-bound estimate, as it omits any benefits from 
ELA achievement, any spillover effects on math scores from teams that do not directly focus on 
math, and any benefits not captured by the outcomes measured in this study.  
These benefits are combined and the total costs of implementing inquiry teams across the 
district in 2009-2010 are subtracted to calculate net benefits; benefits are also divided by costs to 
calculate a benefit-cost ratio. These results are reported in Table 8-2. Under these fairly stringent 
assumptions, inquiry teams do not pass a cost-benefit test, as the net benefits are negative, at 
approximately a $9.5 million loss, and the benefit-cost ratio is 0.76. Since it is less than one, the 





TABLE 8-2 BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF INQUIRY TEAMS 
Benefits per teacher-year  $                                      1,480  
Total retention benefits  $                                  418,640  
Benefits per 0.04 SD  $                                    960.00  
Students 33033.6 
Total achievement benefits  $                             31,547,860  
Total benefits  $                             31,966,500  
Total cost  $                             40,007,360  
Net benefits  $                             (8,040,860) 
B-C ratio 0.80 
Sources: Barnes, Crowe, and Schaefer, 2007; Levin and Belfield, 2009 
 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Nonetheless, a number of assumptions are required in order to calculate these economic 
metrics. Some of these assumptions may be invalid, so a standard approach in cost analyses is to 
test whether the results are robust to assumptions. This can be done in a number of ways. The 
two most common are one-way sensitivity analysis, which consists of direct variation of the 
parameters in the model likely to have the greatest uncertainty to calculate, for example, best-
case and worst-case scenarios, and break-even analysis, which estimates what the parameter 
values would need to be to change the recommendation from the analysis, in order to 
subjectively ascertain whether such values would be likely to be seen in practice (Levin and 
McEwan, 2001, p. 141-144).  
The critical assumptions in this model are the weights applied to the various levels of 
intensity of team participation, the exact benefits to include, and the weights applied to derive the 
value of a teacher-year from the general costs of turnover and math scores from general 
achievement. Since assumptions were generally selected to be conservative, meaning to err on 
the side of estimating high costs and low benefits, sensitivity analyses will generally select 




three sensitivity analyses: first, a best-case scenario assumes that ELA achievement results are 
worth half as much as math achievement results. The second analysis is a break-even analysis to 
determine what combination of weights between low and medium intensity teams will lead to net 
benefits being zero. Finally, an additional break-even analysis determines what share of students 
would need to receive the benefits from additional math scores in order for the intervention to 
break even; this assumption relates to both the value of ELA scores and the spillover effect on 
math scores from being the target of a team that does not explicitly target math. 
The first sensitivity analysis estimates a benefit-cost ratio of 2.06 and net benefits of 
$42,254,260 from investing in the intervention. For the second sensitivity analysis, weights 
would have to be set such that the total costs of the intervention were $31,966,500, or equal to 
the benefits from the main estimate. This is achieved if we assume that roughly 46% of teams are 
low-intensity, 50% are medium-intensity, and 4% are high-intensity. Given that merely setting a 
goal and reporting one instructional strategy is a low bar to be considered “medium-intensity,” 
for which it is assumed that teachers met about 15 times throughout the school year, this 
assumption seems plausible. Finally, if the math benefits are applied to 30% of students, as 
opposed to the 24% who were actually the target of a team focused on math, the net benefits 
equal zero. Once again, this assumption seems plausible; it implies that there are spillover effects 
on math from at least 6% of teams that are not focused on math, or that ELA achievement is 
worth at least 10% as much as math achievement in economic value. Given that the two break-
even analyses result in plausible parameter values, the conclusion from the sensitivity analyses is 
there is a great deal of uncertainty around the benefit-cost estimates that merits further study. 




share of the teams and therefore may include a wide range of implementation variability within 
that category, and about the benefits of ELA test scores merit further examination. 
DISCUSSION 
Overall, although the main benefit-cost results and the cost-effectiveness ratios are not 
especially promising for inquiry teams, there is reason to believe that inquiry teams may still be a 
worthwhile investment under certain conditions and depending upon the outcome of interest. 
Notably, the sensitivity analyses point to significant uncertainty around the benefit-cost 
estimates, even if the main estimates are negative. It is important to emphasize that the negative 
results are under extremely stringent assumptions, including the omission of several possible 
benefits of inquiry and only focusing on math achievement results. 
 One point worth emphasizing from the cost analyses, analysis of heterogeneity, and 
qualitative analysis is that, although low-intensity teams bring down the average cost of inquiry, 
they do add to the costs while likely contributing nothing to the results. A possible 
recommendation that emerges from this study is that future policies around inquiry team focus 
on deepening, rather than broadening teams. It may be the case that even though they require 
greater up-front investment, teams which have the resources, time, and support to do inquiry well 
achieve the greatest results, whereas the large share of low-intensity teams cost significantly less, 





Chapter 9 CONCLUSION 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the literature on teacher effectiveness, quality, 
training, and collaboration by providing quasi-experimental estimates of the effects of inquiry 
teams on various measures of teacher and student learning, and exploring in-depth heterogeneity 
of results and mechanisms through descriptive, qualitative, and cost analyses. One striking 
finding is that the overall effects of the inquiry team policy mandate are small and in many cases 
not statistically significant. This may be surprising given recent enthusiasm for teacher 
collaboration, and the widespread view that collaboration itself is unquestionably good. The 
small effects of the policy indicate some challenges in measuring and studying collaboration, and 
the risks associated with using a mandate as a policy lever. While it is likely that there is 
considerable noise in the team participation data, masking some much more positive effects of 
true collaboration, as a policy recommendation it is clear that mandating that teachers collaborate 
more is insufficient to achieve desired results. Nonetheless, there are indicators that under the 
right conditions the policy could be an effective tool for teacher development. Further, while the 
net benefits of the policy are negative under a stringent set of assumptions, there is evidence that 
the policy would pass a benefit-cost test under plausible assumptions regarding parameter values. 
Given several measurement and data challenges, including the inability to identify the exact 
students targeted by inquiry and relatively weak proxies for quality in the team data, even very 
small effects are promising for inquiry as a practice, if not as a policy. 
The findings of this dissertation are largely consistent with the literature on team 
learning, the economics of teamwork and collaboration, and teacher collaboration. The effects of 




and attention from school and district leadership, including training and coaching that teams 
received in earlier years, is critical for its success. Nonetheless, the case studies reveal that these 
ingredients alone are not sufficient for successful inquiry; even among four teams sampled 
because of their promising practice, all of which implement inquiry with much higher-than-
average intensity and with significant leadership support, there is substantial variation in 
conditions, processes, and outcomes.  
Relative to economic theory on human capital and on the economics of teamwork, both 
the case studies and the quantitative results suggest that firm-specific training, experiential or 
idiosyncratic learning that is difficult to obtain in general education and pre-service training, and 
knowledge-sharing are the primary mechanisms by which inquiry teams work, as opposed to the 
kinds of innovative instructional solutions developed through team-based problem-solving and 
abductive reasoning that were originally envisioned by the policy. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Given the small, often not statistically significant, albeit usually positive results, some 
tempering of unbridled enthusiasm for teacher collaboration is in order. Collaboration by itself is 
clearly not a panacea. Structures and context matter a great deal, and collaborating effectively is 
a challenge that requires substantial resources and support. Reorganizing all school activities and 
professional learning around teamwork is unlikely to be effective on average, and the challenges 
teams face, such as generalizing from the learning needs of individual students or adopting new 
instructional strategies based on previously taught skills when teachers need to move on in the 
curriculum, suggest that adopting the kaizen model of team-based problem-solving in 




Nonetheless, given some promising results, especially in the first year and for first-year 
teachers, combined with the weak evidence on alternatives, suggests that inquiry teams do have a 
place in enhancing teacher productivity. Rather than rapidly scaling up in a way that may 
undermine the authenticity of the process, it seems that concentrating efforts and resources in 
doing inquiry particularly well in targeted areas where it is most likely to have an effect, 
especially for beginning teachers paired with volunteers who may find inquiry work most 
beneficial, would be more promising. Findings from this and further study on what makes 
inquiry effective could also inform pre-service training programs, alternative certification and 
teacher residency programs, and other avenues for increasing teacher quality by emphasizing 
experiential and idiosyncratic learning. 
Finally, although there was the least evidence for this effect in the dissertation, there is 
still promise for inquiry as an avenue for broader organizational learning and discovery, 
including sharing of knowledge, innovation around intractable instructional problems, such as 
persistently struggling or disruptive students, and adapting instruction to meet the learning needs 
of students. Testing these effects of inquiry is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but at the 
strongest case study schools, there was some evidence of using inquiry to share effective 
practices, if not direct evidence of organizational learning. 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Teacher collaboration is a particularly difficult subject to study using the emerging 
econometric tools of causal inference. Myriad selection issues, related to teachers volunteering 
on teams, principals assigning teachers to teams, the reflection problem created by team 
composition itself, and the endogeneity of team processes and implementation fidelity, make 




intensity and quality of team work are not adequately captured in existing datasets. The literature 
on collaboration suggests, and the case study analysis finds empirical support, that small, 
nuanced details – not just whether the principal participates on a team, but how, or the team’s 
willingness to engage in conflict – make the critical difference. This dissertation has made a 
contribution to frameworks for investigating workplace collaboration and team-based learning, 
particularly among teachers, but more work is to be done in terms of developing stronger 
identification strategies and improving data collection.  
Notably, by using administrative data on what teams actually did, as opposed to survey 
data on how teachers collaborate more generally, this dissertation examines data more grounded 
in empirical reality. The data still, however, were limited by potential social desirability bias and 
other inaccuracies due to self-reporting by teachers and teams. Team members may have felt 
pressure to exaggerate the extent of their actual teamwork in administrative databases, 
particularly since the data were collected by the school district sponsoring the initiative. 
Therefore, further work examining inquiry teams as a practice, as opposed to a policy, can 
uncover more nuanced and more realistic aspects of teamwork through data gathered by external 
observers, reporting on how often teams met, leadership participation, team roles, and follow-up 
in terms of changes in classroom practice. Further, while administrative data offer some 
advantages over surveys, the voluntary nature of data entry on inquiry may reflect solely the 
views of those who found inquiry most helpful or were most concerned about how they appeared 
to district leaders. Therefore, an anonymous survey that did not identify individual teachers but 
could be linked to administrative data on teams could gather more nuanced information about 




As an additional candidate for further study, the instrumental variable selected in the third 
natural experiment, based on the literature on optimal team size, turned out to have a number of 
problems. Additional sources of exogenous variation in collaboration, including policy phase-ins 
across schools in addition to within schools and natural facilitators or impediments to 
collaboration, such as the physical layout of schools or demographic similarities among teachers, 
should be explored for further causal study. Social network theory and analysis could explore 
other sources of variation in whether and how teachers work together. One limitation of several 
of the identification strategies employed in this dissertation is that they emphasized grade-level 
teams as a source of exogenous variation in teamwork; however, some descriptive evidence 
suggests that, on some outcomes in some years, grade-level teams were somewhat less effective 
than the teams that focused on a subject area or a subgroup of students across grades. Alternative 
instruments can help address this issue. 
Additionally, although this dissertation explored mechanisms and heterogeneity through 
analysis of detailed records of team activities, these activities proved insufficient to successfully 
differentiate between teams without significant, laborious, and highly subjective judgment. 
Proxies for quality, such as goal-setting and investigation of student work, were not strong 
predictors of outcomes. This could be because they simply are not related to outcomes, but it 
seems more likely that they fail to capture important nuance. Future analysis therefore might 
consider data mining techniques to uncover further patterns in the data, although such analysis 
risks spurious and ex post facto findings and must be done with caution. Follow-up work to this 
dissertation may extend the hand-coding of teams for markers of quality, in part to gain statistical 
power for further analysis with this sub-sample and in part to uncover patterns in the data that 




Further research will also more precisely estimate costs by adding data from principals 
who implemented the initiative. Further cost analyses can consider variation in costs and benefits 
as the implementation scales up. On a per team basis, the initiative was most costly but also most 
effective during first year – further research is needed to determine the implications of this for 
policy.  
 Finally, this dissertation examined a fairly narrow range of academic outcomes, defining 
teacher productivity primarily around test score gains, whether as measured by student growth or 
teacher value-added. This was largely a limitation due to the availability of data, as data on non-
academic outcomes was not disaggregated to an extent that would make it possible to link to 
specific teams, but given that the emphasis of inquiry work is on tailoring teacher development 
to student needs, it may be reasonable to expect that the bulk of the effects would be on critical 
non-academic outcomes, such as social and emotional learning, attendance, and suspensions. 
Future work should examine that link and broaden the definition of teacher productivity. 
CONTRIBUTION 
This dissertation represents a significant contribution to our knowledge about teacher 
collaboration, and collaborative inquiry teams in particular. It is the first comprehensive 
examination of a single collaboration initiative that incorporates quasi-experimental, quantitative 
analyses utilizing administrative rather than survey data, analysis of heterogeneity and 
mechanisms, qualitative case studies of the practices and proximal outcomes of effective teams, 
and a cost-benefit analysis using the ingredients method. It includes one of the few quantitative 
analyses of teacher collaboration, and only the second quasi-experimental analysis. 
 While other quantitative analyses of teacher collaboration have tended to find 




learning in almost all cases. The only small effects which may exist are on teacher retention 
among first-year teachers and possibly on student learning, both only in the first year or two of 
the intervention. These findings, in conjunction with results from the heterogeneity and 
qualitative analyses, suggest reevaluation of teacher collaboration policies are in order. While 
there is little doubt that some teams are implementing inquiry teams especially well, based  on 
examination of the inquiry database and the case study analysis, and some evidence from the 
case studies for more proximal indicators of teacher learning which suggest that longer-term 
analyses would be beneficial, it is clear that on average teams are not implementing inquiry 
intensively and are not seeing many positive results. In fact, the qualitative analysis suggests that 
even four especially strong teams could benefit from additional time, support, and resources, and 
struggle with particular parts of the process, especially appropriate follow-up. The baseline 
recommendation from the cost-benefit analysis would be to not implement inquiry teams, at least 
at the present scale, when a large investment in fairly weak implementation across the entire 
district only appears to be paying off in small results for a subset of teams and teachers. Based on 
this analysis, a more targeted initiative, focused on beginning teachers and those particularly 
interested in collaboration, with more time and support, would likely be far more effective and a 
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APPENDIX A. ADDITIONAL INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE DIAGNOSTICS 
AND RESULTS 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table A-1 report regressions of preexisting variables, including prior test 
scores and the percentage of students in the school receiving free or reduced price lunch, on the 
number of class sections. There should not be a relationship between these variables if the 
instrument is valid. There is no relationship between the number of class sections and prior test 
scores, and while the relationship with free and reduced price lunch is statistically significant, it 
is substantively very small, indicating that unlike with elementary and middle schools, the 
exclusion restriction assumption may be valid for high schools. On the other hand, column 3 
reports a test of the monotonicity assumption by restricting the sample for the two-stage least 
squares estimate of the effect of teamwork on test scores to those subjects with fewer than 8 class 
sections. The results are not statistically significant, but they do change sign from the results for 
the full sample, indicating that the monotonicity assumption may be violated in this case. 
TABLE A- 1 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES DIAGNOSTICS, HIGH SCHOOLS, 2008-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Previous score % Free/Reduced 
Lunch 
Gain scores 
Number of class sections 0.000222 -0.00619***  
 (0.000958) (0.000243)  
    
Team   -0.0396 
   (0.175) 
    
    
Constant 2.230*** 0.790*** 0.00708 
 (0.0123) (0.00293) (0.0367) 
Demographic Covariates   X 
Observations 5321 6672 3470 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A-2 presents the results of a variety of diagnostic tests and robustness checks for the 




instrument and preexisting variables, which are statistically significant in both cases, although 
once again, the association with free and reduced price lunch is substantively small. This calls 
the exclusion restriction into question for this instrument. Columns 3 and 4 provide instrumental 
variables estimates for sub-samples with fewer class sections as a test of the monotonicity 
assumption. Restricting the sample to grades with fewer than 8 class sections, in column 3, does 
not appreciably alter the results, but restricting the sample to elementary schools, as shown in 
column 4, produces results that are large, positive, and not statistically significant. On the other 
hand, columns 5 and 6 show the OLS results restricting the sample to elementary school and 
middle school, respectively; the elementary school results are very similar to the pooled OLS 
results, although the middle school results become very close to 0. Overall, it seems that the OLS 
results are more robust across specifications and sub-samples, indicating potential issues with the 
instrument. 
TABLE A- 2 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES DIAGNOSTICS, K-8 SCHOOLS, 2008-2009 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Prior score % 
Free/Reduced 
Lunch 
Gain scores Gain scores Gain scores Gain scores 
Number of class 
sections 
-0.350*** -0.00119***     
 (0.0438) (0.000273)     
       
Team   -3.633 11.19 1.780*** 0.0310 
   (8.574) (24.81) (0.181) (0.157) 
       
       
Constant 664.0*** 0.865*** -0.909 -2.606 -1.431** -2.280*** 
 (0.241) (0.00147) (1.066) (3.406) (0.503) (0.510) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
  X X X X 
Observations 24845 67801 20681 14885 15450 8221 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 






Table A-3 presents instrumental variables diagnostics for the 2009-2010 high school 
outcomes. This year, the association with both prior variables is statistically significant, although 
it is once again substantively small. When restricting the sample to subjects and schools with 
fewer than 8 class sections to test the monotonicity assumption, the point estimate remains 
statistically insignificant, although the sign changes, indicating possible violations of the 
monotonicity assumption. 
TABLE A- 3 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES DIAGNOSTICS, HIGH SCHOOL, 2009-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Prior score % Free/Reduced 
Lunch 
Gain scores 
Number of class sections 0.00207* -0.00385***  
 (0.000925) (0.000197)  
    
Team   -0.0546 
   (0.101) 
    
    
Constant 2.232*** 0.833*** 0.0791* 
 (0.0105) (0.00213) (0.0375) 
Demographic Covariates   X 
Observations 6880 8504 4764 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A-4 reports K-8 OLS results for the 2009-2010 school year. Columns 1 and 2 report the 
association between teams and gain scores and find very similar results to 2008-2009. Columns 
3-5 report various specifications of the association between teamwork and value-added as a 
check on the value-added estimates in Model 1. The coefficient of interest is on whether there is 





TABLE A- 4 OLS ESTIMATES OF THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAMWORK AND TEST SCORE OUTCOMES, K-8 
SCHOOLS, 2009-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Growth Growth Multi-year VA VA VA 
Team at grade level 1.697*** 1.708*** 1.732 0.00927 0.00878 
 (0.234) (0.232) (0.971) (0.00629) (0.00626) 
      
    0.706*** 0.682*** 
2006-2007 VA Score    (0.136) (0.126) 
      
    0.0951 0.0935 
Team SD - Prior VA    (0.111) (0.112) 
      
     0.0839 
Team*Prior VA     (0.140) 
      
Constant 0.0178 -1.758** 50.42*** 0.0251 0.0257 
 (0.131) (0.622) (4.406) (0.0349) (0.0348) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
 X X X X 
Observations 23671 23671 24570 18152 18152 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 The instrumental variables results for K-8 schools in 2009-2010 are presented in Table 
A-5. Although the OLS results are quite consistent from 2008-2009 to 2009-2010, the IV results 
shift from large and positive but statistically insignificant to negative and statistically significant. 
Columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 present the first stage, reduced form, and 2SLS results with and without 
controls, respectively, with the linear specification and columns 3, 4, and 7 present the results for 
the quadratic specification. Once again, there is likely a weak instrument problem, as the F-
statistics for the first stages are 4.28 and 5.02, respectively. The Hansen J-statistic, however, is 
0.80, below the critical value for rejecting the null hypothesis that one of the instruments is valid 





TABLE A- 5 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES RESULTS, EFFECTS OF TEAMWORK ON GAIN SCORES, K-8 SCHOOLS, 2009-
2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 

















grade or subject 
0.00871*** -0.0843** -0.00269 -0.0343    
 (0.00242) (0.0318) (0.00630) (0.105)    
        
Number of 
classes squared 
  0.000691 -0.00297    
   (0.000434) (0.00505)    
        
Team     -10.86* -8.662* -6.653* 
     (4.655) (4.085) (3.092) 
        
Constant -0.00529 -0.920 0.0261 -1.071 2.017** -0.751 -0.927 
 (0.0242) (0.702) (0.0262) (0.773) (0.753) (0.802) (0.754) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X  X X 
Observations 67801 22712 67801 22712 22712 22712 22712 
Standard errors, clustered at school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 Finally, high school outcomes for 2009-2010 are presented in Tables A-6 and A-7. There 
are small positive associations between teams and gain scores in this year, as well as teams and 
graduation rates, although all are substantively small and none is significant at the 0.05 level. 
The instrument is once again weak, with first-stage F-statistics of 4.76 and 3.94 when using the 
linear and quadratic specifications, respectively. Effects on test scores appear to be quite small 
and not statistically significant in the instrumental variables model. The Hansen J-statistic for 
this model is larger, at 1.773, but still smaller than the critical value to reject the null hypothesis, 





TABLE A- 6 OLS ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAMWORK AND HIGH SCHOOL OUTCOMES, 2009-2010 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Growth Growth Graduation rate Graduation rate 
Team at grade level 0.0205 0.0198 0.0341 0.0276 
 (0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0205) (0.0199) 
Constant 0.0255*** 0.0712** 0.572*** 0.873*** 
 (0.00537) (0.0246) (0.0121) (0.0708) 
Demographic Covariates  X  X 
Observations 11516 11476 3519 3513 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
TABLE A- 7 INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ESTIMATES OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN TEAMWORK AND HIGH SCHOOL 
OUTCOMES, 2009-2010 
Panel A. Gain scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 













Classes at grade 
or subject 
0.00774*** 0.000107 0.0131*** 0.00130   
 (0.00121) (0.000457) (0.00279) (0.00111)   
       
Number of 
classes squared 
  -0.000126* -0.0000275   
   (0.0000556) (0.0000190)   
       
Team     0.0350 0.0135 
     (0.0608) (0.0577) 
       
Constant 0.0284 0.0868** 0.000682 0.0802* 0.0819* 0.0862** 
 (0.0605) (0.0308) (0.0631) (0.0319) (0.0322) (0.0317) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X 
Observations 8504 6415 8504 6415 6415 6415 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Panel B. Graduation rates. 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 


















0.00774*** -0.00254 0.0131*** -0.00729*   
 (0.00121) (0.00241) (0.00279) (0.00339)   




  -0.000126* 0.000152**   




       
Team     -0.583 -0.649 
     (0.365) (0.701) 
       
Constant 0.0284 0.906*** 0.000682 0.918*** 0.915*** 0.920*** 
 (0.0605) (0.0804) (0.0631) (0.0806) (0.0816) (0.106) 
Demographic 
Covariates 
X X X X X X 
 8504 1582 8504 1582 1582 1582 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 





APPENDIX B. ADDITIONAL HETEROGENEITY RESULTS 
2007-2008 
TABLE B- 1 RETENTION – 100 TEAMS CODED FOR QUALITY, ALL TEACHERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Still teaching 
next year 
Years teaching Years teaching Still teaching 
next year 
Years teaching 
Overall 0.00248 0.0184 0.0179 0.00280 0.0179 
 (0.00457) (0.0276) (0.0256) (0.00441) (0.0256) 
      
Constant 0.954*** 4.558*** 4.808*** 0.980*** 4.808*** 
 (0.00288) (0.0167) (0.0679) (0.0114) (0.0679) 
Observations 7374 7355 7153 7172 7153 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
TABLE B- 2 RETENTION 100 TEAMS, FIRST YEAR TEACHERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Still teaching 
next year 
Years teaching Years teaching Still teaching 
next year 
Years teaching 
Overall 0.0251** 0.150* 0.179** 0.0317*** 0.179** 
 (0.00870) (0.0740) (0.0674) (0.00809) (0.0674) 
      
Constant 0.936*** 3.434*** 3.804*** 0.958*** 3.804*** 
 (0.00942) (0.0508) (0.220) (0.0439) (0.220) 
Observations 768 768 728 728 728 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
TABLE B- 3, VALUE-ADDED, 100 HAND-CODED TEAMS, ALL TEACHERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




VA Percentile ELL 
Overall -0.000536 0.787 0.600 -0.0454 
 (0.00456) (0.797) (1.012) (2.123) 
     
Constant 0.00973 48.66*** 38.96*** 45.31*** 
 (0.0119) (1.999) (2.671) (5.737) 
Observations 8064 7633 4723 1065 
Standard errors in parentheses 






TABLE B- 4, VALUE-ADDED, 100 HAND-CODED TEAMS, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




VA Percentile ELL 
Overall 0.00879 1.953 -3.005 10.18 
 (0.0105) (2.011) (4.446) (13.16) 
     
Constant -0.0212 52.23*** 41.66*** 57.52* 
 (0.0256) (4.981) (9.699) (26.43) 
Observations 728 686 312 70 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
TABLE B- 5, RETENTION, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, HAND-CODED QUALITY AS COVARIATE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Still teaching 
next year 
Years teaching Years teaching Still teaching 
next year 
Years teaching 
Team indicator -0.109 -1.374 -1.304 -0.0951 -1.304 
 (0.166) (1.391) (1.283) (0.152) (1.283) 
      
Overall 0.0817 0.865 0.857 0.0811 0.857 
 (0.0799) (0.680) (0.634) (0.0743) (0.634) 
      
Constant 0.936*** 3.436*** 3.797*** 0.958*** 3.797*** 
 (0.00940) (0.0507) (0.217) (0.0437) (0.217) 
Observations 768 768 728 728 728 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
TABLE B- 6, VALUE-ADDED, HAND-CODED QUALITY AS COVARIATE, ALL TEACHERS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




VA Percentile ELL 
Team indicator -0.0189 0.976 6.211 2.553 
 (0.0507) (8.788) (10.46) (25.11) 
     
Overall 0.00915 0.287 -2.644 -1.363 
 (0.0265) (4.583) (5.579) (12.76) 
     
Constant 0.00959 48.67*** 39.04*** 45.35*** 
 (0.0120) (1.999) (2.666) (5.729) 
Observations 8064 7633 4723 1065 
Standard errors in parentheses 







TABLE B- 7, VALUE-ADDED, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS, HAND-CODED QUALITY AS COVARIATE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 




VA Percentile ELL 
Team indicator 0.0755 12.99 15.51 36.70 
 (0.155) (30.26) (47.70) (127.3) 
     
Overall -0.0304 -4.821 -11.85 -11.20 
 (0.0785) (15.10) (26.52) (78.42) 
     
Constant -0.0208 52.32*** 42.03*** 57.71* 
 (0.0256) (4.990) (9.867) (26.69) 
Observations 728 686 312 70 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
2008-2009 
TABLE B- 8, IV ESTIMATES, TEAM INDICATOR ON GROWTH, K-8 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 growth growth growth 
Team indicator 18.81   
 (10.12)   
    
Has a goal  18.34  
  (9.956)  
    
Overall   -35.44 
   (40.70) 
    
Constant 2.226* 2.448* 4.648** 
 (1.103) (1.008) (1.534) 
Observations 22903 22903 8751 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
TABLE B- 9, IV ESTIMATES, TEAM INDICATOR ON GROWTH, HIGH SCHOOL 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 growth growth growth 
Team indicator 0.302   
 (0.163)   
    
Has a goal  0.395  
  (0.231)  
    
Overall   1.637 
   (2.620) 
    
Constant 0.00987 0.00343 0.0361 
 (0.0286) (0.0322) (0.0350) 
Observations 4953 4953 2676 
Standard errors in parentheses 





TABLE B- 10 IV ESTIMATES, TEAM INDICATOR ON GROWTH, K-8 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Growth Growth Growth 
Team indicator -6.653*   
 (3.092)   
    
    
Has a goal  91.47  
  (139.2)  
    
Overall   -46.02 
   (31.75) 
    
Constant -0.927 -5.626 1.789 
 (0.754) (6.663) (2.644) 
Observations 22712 22712 9752 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
TABLE B- 11, IV ESTIMATES, TEAM INDICATOR ON GROWTH, HS 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Growth Growth Growth 
Team indicator 0.0350   
 (0.0608)   
    
Has a goal  0.0636  
  (0.129)  
    
Overall   0.932 
   (1.436) 
    
Constant 0.0819* 0.0872** -0.00757 
 (0.0322) (0.0298) (0.114) 
Observations 6415 6415 2175 
Standard errors in parentheses 





INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES QUALITY ESTIMATES 
 One possibly exogenous source of variation in treatment intensity is partially random 
variation in accountability pressure schools faced due to the staggered nature of the school 
accountability system. In 2007-2008, to complement quantitative score report cards that were 
primarily based on student test score growth at the elementary and middle school levels and test 
scores, credit accumulation, and graduation rates at the high school level with a more holistic, 
qualitative assessment of the school learning environment to give schools earlier and more 
actionable feedback on leading indicators of student learning, the school district implemented a 
qualitative review system. Under this system, district officials and external reviewers would 
engage in a 2-day site visit to observe classroom practice, meet with administrators, teachers, 
students, and parents, and observe the inputs and processes that were contributing to or impeding 
student learning. All schools received a review in 2007-2008, but due to the resource-intensive 
nature of this system, reviews were staggered in subsequent years. Schools that were deemed to 
be low-performing for various reasons, including poor performance on quantitative 
accountability measures and low scores on prior qualitative accountability measures, were 
scheduled to receive reviews more often. For schools that were average-performing or better, a 
random sub-set of approximately one-third of schools were selected to be reviewed each year 
starting in the 2008-2009 school year.  
Therefore, there is between-school variation with a random component in the degree of 
accountability pressure schools faced. Even though this pressure was only directly felt during a 
2-day review, it could potentially have reverberating effects throughout the school year. Schools 
may have implemented inquiry teams with greater fidelity in anticipation of the review, of which 




earlier in the school year, there may be cascading effects by which efforts to organize teams 
early in the year in preparation for the review could pay dividends in terms of stronger teamwork 
throughout the year. 
This association between accountability pressure induced by being selected to receive a 
qualitative evaluation and teamwork sets up an instrumental variables approach, using a 2SLS 
framework: 
(8) !"#$%&'()* = ,- + ,/!0)* + 1)*,2 + ,345#6* + 7()*(first-stage) 
(9) 4()* = 8- + 8/!"#$9&':)* + 1)*82 + 8345#6* + ;()*(second-stage) 
where j indexes teams at a grade-subject-subgroup level, s indexes schools, and t indexes time. 
!0)*is a dichotomous variable indicating whether school s received a qualitative evaluation at 
time t, 1)*is a vector of school-level controls, and 45#6* represents year fixed effects. The effects 
of team quality on a vector of outcomes, 4()* , will therefore be assessed based on predicted 
quality based on accountability pressure. For 8/, the coefficient of interest, to be a valid causal 
estimate of the effects on team quality on outcomes, several assumptions must be met. Most 
notably in this case, <=>(!0)*, !"#$%&'()*) ≠ 0, meaning that the instrument is not weak, and 
the instrument must only affect the outcome through the channel of enhancing the quality of 
teamwork, or the exclusion restriction. Given the broad-based nature of the qualitative 
evaluations, it is quite possible that the exclusion restriction is violated in this case, depending 
upon the outcome in question, but given the centrality of inquiry teams to the school district’s 
strategy at this time, this assumption may be valid for at least some outcomes. 
 Results of this model are presented in Table B-12. Somewhat surprisingly, greater 
accountability pressure is negatively associated with the two selected quality measures – whether 




statistically significant and in both cases the F-statistic is quite small, indicating a weak 
instrument. In the reduced form, being subject to qualitative accountability pressure is associated 
with lower growth overall, making the 2SLS results positive but statistically insignificant.  
TABLE B- 12. ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INDICATORS OF TEAM QUALITY AND RETENTION, FIRST-YEAR TEACHERS. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 First stage 













-0.0082 -0.0022 -0.0161   
 (0.0049) (0.0075) (0.1723)   
      
Has goal    1.9544  
    (20.856)  
      








    (.3209) (1.653) 
      
Overall     70.581 
(270.982) 
      
      
Constant 24.0478*** -11.446 11607.48*** 11560.48*** 11667.98*** 
 (8.8766) (12.7309) (341.8101) (645.58) (3314.13) 
Observations 66,706 24,373 66,706 66,706 24,373 
Standard errors, clustered at the school level, in parentheses 






APPENDIX C. QUALITATIVE CODING SCHEME 
TABLE C- 1 CODING SCHEME 
Code Description/Meaning Example (if applicable) Source  
Formal communication Planned, structured 
communication through 
specified channels, e.g., 
memos 
“So typically when we 
have the data in pre-
meeting, it's the grade 
representative's job to 
kind of bring it back to 
our team meeting.  And 
then we discuss how we 
want to, you know, we 
analyze our grades data, 
you know, amongst 
ourselves and then 
decide what we need to 
do to improve the 
scores.” 
Hoegl and Gemuenden 
(2001) 
Informal communication Spontaneous (e.g., chats in 
the hallway) as opposed to  
planned (e.g., status 
memos) communication.   
“The other thing I was 
thinking about, from a 
standpoint of 
collaboration, it could 
force teachers.  For 
instance, I have this-- 
my big pet peeve, as I 
said it last time when 
(name redacted) was 
here, that what we need 
to do is get past-- 
knowing where to find 
the data and using the 
data, inform where we 
are with each kid and 
inform instruction, but 
we need to get together 
in groups, common prep 
groups, the ELA guy, 
the math guy, the social 
studies guy and the 
science guy, getting 
together about those kids 
in 701.  And making 
sure that we don't just 
talk the talk, but we're 
really looking at an 
integrated curriculum” 
Hoegl and Gemuenden 
(2001) 




perspectives, areas of 
expertise; shared effort; 
specialization as opposed 
to diffusion of 
responsibility 
you know, which is the 
best and We give them 
an incentive.  
Something.  But then 
we're the ones that are 
making the-- those 
decisions instead of 
burdening the teachers.  
They will have them 
write in their class.  And 
then they will have to 
select the best five.  But 
then we will select-- 
every month, we have a 
winner in social studies, 
ELA…” 
(2001) 
Connecting student actions to 
teacher actions 
Examples of “root cause” 
analysis – observing 
behaviors and trends and 
tracing backward, causally 
“I think that a strength is 
these statements were 
lovely.  Because I did a 
good job modeling 
them.” 
From literature on kaizen, 
Toyota production model, 
and continuous 
improvement 
organizations; Sabel et al. 
on Finland 
Consistency Focus on interdisciplinary 
connections and 
consistency in instructional 
strategies, terminology, 
etc., across classes, 
“I think that between all 
of us, we can do this, 
you know?  'Cause 
they're not only gonna 
see it your class.  They'll 
see it in mine—“ 
Inductively derived from 
data and experience 
Adaptation Focus on adapting to needs 
of particular subject areas 
and students 
“How 'bout if we turn 
those into subjects?  So 
it would be the word and 
then subject.  Social 
studies.  (Name) got an 
80.  But in ELA, got a 
70.  Or blah, blah, blah, 
got a 90. So those-- 
instead of those being 
just sort of like so ELA 
driven because all of that 
is ELA, change it into a 
subject.  So the student 
understands the 
particular word, the 
meaning of the word in 
this subject.” 
Inductively derived from 
data and experience 
Experimenting, feedback Group is oriented toward 
trying out new ideas, open 
to learning, receiving 
“See?  Yeah, we have to 
have something that we 
can collect so that we 




feedback can then look at it and 
say, ‘Okay, why are 
these students getting it 
and these students over 
here aren't?’  And then 
we can go to the teacher 
and see what practices 
are being done, and 
learn from each other.” 
Focus on individual student Sustained discussion of 
one particular student, or a 
group of students, 
especially if focused on 
learning needs 
“He's been-- yeah.  And 
his paragraph is up on 
the bulletin board.  And 
he's like, "Did you 
notice my home 
chemistry lab?"  I saw-- 
you know, he's very-- he 
really want-- and you 
know what?  What I 
think we need to work 
with Oscar is motivating 
him.  That, like, he 
second-- he second 
guesses himself.  Maybe 
that might be the alpha 
in him.  But he does, 
like, he thinks-- like, 
"Can you double check 
this?  'Cause-- are you 
sure it's okay?"  I mean, 
it's like—“ 
Inductively derived from 
data and experience 
Instruction/Instructional 
strategies 
Topical codes focused on 
what team is discussing – 
content area, skills, 
particular strategy 
“702, if you're working 
with 702, the L's, they're 
doin' the quick outline, 
just to let you know.  
On-- the Middle Ages, 
which we started 
yesterday.  And Adage 
and I are gonna continue 
working with them.  So 
that way if you're 
meeting with Manny or 
any of them, you can 
work with the quick 
outlines with them.  And 
they're doin' it on the 
Black Death: The 
Bubonic Plague.” 
From basic model of 
intervention; description 
of the content of team 
discussions 




frequency, duration, sustained long enough period of time  time.  It's… 
we need to get ready for 
next week, and how we 
make use of next 
week…” 
(2009) 
Shared values, norms, 
collaborative culture 
A common, basic set of 
beliefs, in particular about 
student learning, the 
mission of the school, and 
the purpose of the team 
“So this was his baby 
and I thought it made 
sense overall.  I don't 
think everybody really 
bought into it.  All the 
teachers didn't buy into 
it.” 
Little (1982) 
Courage – willingness to 
change/adapt, willingness to 
make teaching public 
General openness, 
willingness to try new 
things, adjust practice.  
There is much literature on 
teaching being private, and 
an essential element of 
teacher collaboration being 
making it “public” 
‘Thanks for-- sorry.  I 
know it's hard to change 
your teaching practice. 
 FEMALE 
VOICE: 
No, it's okay. 
 FEMALE 
VOICE: 
I mean, you've done it 
for so long. 
 FEMALE 
VOICE: 
No, no.  I mean, like-- 
listen, it's-- it's all about 
applying things and 
learning, you know?” 
Kelchtermanns (2006); 
Little (1982) 
Framing, exploration Problem definition and 
redefinition; willingness 
and ability to see problems 
in new light 
“I also wanna go back to 
what Russo was saying 
earlier.  We also have 
the-- it's-- I don't think 
this team-- maybe I'm 
wrong, but part of this 
team's job is to analyze 
data, but we also have to 
support teachers” 
Savelsbergh, et al. (2009) 
Peer monitoring, peer 
pressure 
Encouragement by peers to 
successfully complete 
work tasks with high 
quality; implicit or explicit 
social pressure to perform 
“FEMALE VOICE: 
Just say I'll do it.  I 
meant to (but) caught up 
with something else. 
 FEMALE 
VOICE: 
By the-- complete by-- 
by the weekend? 
FEMALE VOICE: 
Yes.” 
Mas and Moretti (2006); 
Kandel and Lazear 
(2012) 




needs learning; making 
inferences about student 
learning based upon data 
and analysis of work 
when they were drafting 
off of the outlines.  Like, 
a lot of them were, like, 
"Okay, what do I do?"  
Like, they didn't know 
where to put the thesis.” 
Analyzing data Rooting judgments in 
empirical analysis; seeking 
evidence to support 
theories and assertions; 
grounding work in 
evidence on student 
achievement 
“We continued the Right 
to Learn (sic) 
assessment today in 701.  
So the scores are all 
different now.  Like, 
they went up, pretty 
much all of them.” 
Collaborative Inquiry 
Process; Sabel et al.  
Reflection and revision Making changes to team 
process, or instructional 
strategies adopted by team, 
based upon ongoing 
feedback loops 
“But ne-- now it seems 
that we're at a point 
where the processes and 
systems are in place and 
we really have to-- we-- 
we really do have to 
work as a coordinated 
team.  I'll just use an 
example.  We have a kid 
like—(name redacted), 
who's a very bright kid.  
But he has strengths and 
weaknesses in everyone 
would call content areas 
before. 
And I don't think, from 
my view, that I am doing 
a very good job of 
articulating to the rest of 
my group and-- nor are 
they with me, what that 
kid's plan, his education 
plan, should be in each 
one of those classes.  I 
don't-- I think we just 
kind of understand in a 
nebulous way what the 
school wants, but we're 
not really, you know, 
getting down and 
making it really happen 
day-to-day.  It takes a lot 
of planning.  Probably 
gets back to my original 
point that we need to get 
From basic model of 
intervention; description 





together and really hash 
it out.” 
Focus  Tradeoff between focus on 
“big” things in a 
superficial way or smaller 
things in a deep way 
“What about 




We just focused on the 
introduction and 
conclusion.  





Inductively derived from 
data; partially based on 
description of 
intervention by Talbert 
(2010) 
Taking advantage of 
resources 
Utilizing outside resources, 
such as curricula, 
professional development, 
technology, etc., to help 
address learning needs 
identified by team, of 
students and/or of teachers 
“It just made so much 
sense when they 
presented it in the 
workshop.  It was kinda 
like, "Duh, that's an 
easy, like, formulaic 
way."  I don't know if 
that's a word.” 
CPRE (2008, 2010) 
Leadership/support Support by school 
leadership, either in direct 
participation, providing 
resources, providing time 
for team to meet, not 
interfering with inquiry 
process 
“--staff to work together, 
you-- you know?  That 
as a team, you bring it to 
the and we listen to-- 
because if we want buy-
in, they have to be a part 
of it.  It's-- again, we're 
gonna throw this at them 
and say, "Look, this is 
what you do."  …  But if 
we say, "This is what 
we're brainstorming, and 
we need some input, you 
know?  How can we do 
it together?"  I think that 
would be more 
beneficial.” 
Severa – Lee, Zhang, Yin 
(2011) 
Individual learning Through team process an 
individual learns – e.g., 
knowledge-sharing, 
inquiry teams as PD 
“And you know, when 
we look at the data 
together and we say, 
"My kids are having 
trouble with equivalent 
fractions.  Like, how do 
you, you know, 
approach that topic?  
Inductively derived from 




How do you?"  And then 
it's good for us to kinda 
talk it out and share 
things.  And, I mean, not 
that we don't collaborate 
to begin with, but it 
gives us, you know, a 
more clear focus of, you 
know, something I'm 
doing is not working.  
And, like, let's talk about 
how we can help each 
other to come up with 
new ways to teach 
things.” 
Team learning Team itself learns – e.g., 
abduction 
“It's kind of-- it's kind of 
a good way to reflect 
and see, like-- like, a 
good-- you know, what 
are our do's and don'ts.” 
Buysse, Sparkman, 
Wesley (2003) 
Reproduction cycle – passing 
on teamwork; 
institutionalizing teamwork 
Sharing learning about 
team process itself with 
the school, with other 
teachers/teams, with new 
staff, etc. 
“Right.  It has to be 
something that those 
teachers also bring.  I 
don't want it to just be-- 
the data team looking at 
this.  I would like to see 
other teachers use it as 
well.” 
Literature on Professional 
Learning Communities 
Organizational learning – 
systematizing learning from 
teamwork 
Sharing learning about 
student and/or teacher 
learning from the team 
process with other 
teachers/teams, other 
schools 
“Just everything that we 
talk about in here, and 
then it translates to the 
whole grade.  And a lot 
of our things have been 
taken to the whole 
school.” 
Crossan, Lane, and White 
(1999) 
Attitudes about conflict – 
openness 
Willingness of team 
members to productively 
engage difficult topics, 
broach areas of 
disagreement, vs. focus on 
maintaining cordiality 
“You guys are drivin' 
me nuts here.” 
Kelchtermans (2006); 
Achinstein (2002) 
Non-pecuniary benefits – 
compensating differentials of 
teamwork 
Evidence that team 
members value teamwork, 
see it as a workplace 
amenity that may enhance 
their jobs, skills, entice 
them to remain teaching 
“We're doing something 
good—“ 
Hamilton et al. (2003) 




questions, gathering useful 
data, analyzing/interpreting 
results 
have the necessary skills to 
successfully engage in the 
inquiry process 
I see that they need 
organization.  Their 
thoughts are all over the 
place.  They're there, but 
now how do we organize 
them to say, "This is 
what goes with--" I 
mean, you know, they're 
there.  Again, they just 
need organization now.” 
 
